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Abstract
This dissertation examines the conditions under which firms foster the development of their
workers' skills in the process of globalization, using a case study of the automobile
industry in India based on extensive fieldwork in India in 1996, 1997 and 1998. As India
underwent economic reforms over the past decade, the Indian automobile industry has
experienced remarkable growth and dynamic transformations, with an increased inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and intensifying competition within the domestic market,
leading to considerable restructuring. In this process, two leading vehicle manufacturers,
one with FDI, and the other without it, have played key roles in promoting growth in
production and export, while increasing their competitiveness, through their massive
investment in skill development for their workers. Indeed, both firms have well-structured
internal incentive mechanisms to encourage and reward workers' learning. They have also
strengthened their backward linkages by institutionalizing various learning mechanisms
through their supply chains, altering the model of supplier relations that had prevailed in
India. My questionnaire survey of 50 component suppliers revealed that the nature of skills
has recently changed with increased emphasis on behavioral traits, resulting in considerable
upskilling, particularly among workers at component suppliers. These findings markedly
contrasts with the experiences elsewhere documented in the literature, where few FDI-
affiliated firms develop backward linkages, and where local firms weaken comparatively in
the face of growing dominance by FDI.
Challenging the growing literature that suggests FDI plays a role in brining new knowledge
and skills to developing countries, this study finds that even in the process of globalization,
the interplay of various institutional forces both inside and outside the firms still crucially
shape the patterns of in-firm skill development. Such institutional forces include: 1) the
peculiar historical imperatives under which firms needed to operate and develop their
technological capabilities; 2) national institutional frameworks; 3) the government's
involvement; 4) institutional alliances between firms and training institutions; and 5) vertical
inter-firm linkages. In particular, inter-firm linkages are critical in promoting skill
development among smaller local suppliers, thus spreading workers' learning widely
across the economy. The Indian government has played an important role in 1) developing
a key firm that would lead the growth of the industry, set operational and performance
standards, and serve as a catalyst for the industry-wide learning; 2) forcing that firm to
develop backward linkages through various policy measures; and 3) creating mechanisms
for firms to promote in-firm training through policies such as statutory apprenticeship
schemes. Thus, contrary to the claim by human capital theorists, various institutional
conditions created rather than reduced incentives for firms to promote in-firm training not
only for their own workers but also for workers at their suppliers.
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Title: Ellen Swallow Richards Professor of Political Economy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview: Globalization, Skills and Training
This study empirically examines the conditions under which firms foster the
development of their workers' skills in the process of globalization. The forces of
globalization' and technological change together pose a paradox to firms and workers of
developing countries concerning skill development: on the one hand, firms, foreign and
local alike, are becoming ever more eager to reduce production costs, including labor costs,
to compete in the global markets, which may reduce their incentives to invest in training,
especially in an economy with abundant surplus labor. On the other hand, as the global
economy increasingly becomes "knowledge-based" (OECD 1997), with ever-accelerating
technological change and innovations, the acquisition, accumulation, and diffusion of
knowledge and skills have become more important in helping firms, and nations, become
competitive (World Bank 1998). Globalized production processes may change the nature
of the skills required of the country's workforce, which may in turn generate new demands
for training.2 Then, how do firms and workers in developing countries respond to these
paradoxical challenges? What motivates firms to promote workers' training? What
' The concept of "globalization" has been contested. Hirst and Thompson (1996), for example,
conceptually distinguish a "globalized economy" from "the international economy": in a globalized
economy "distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated in the system by international
processes and transactions," whereas in the international economy, "processes that are at the level of
national economies still dominate and international phenomena are outcomes that emerge from the distinct
and differential performance of the national economies" (p.10). Other scholars, such as Rodrik (1997), use
the term "globalization" to mean a set of global phenomena associated with liberalization of trade and
investment. While this study does not go into the debate over the definition of globalization or over
whether globalization has indeed occurred (see Hirst and Thompson 1996), it uses the latter's interpretation
as a working definition.
2 On the issue of the changing nature of skills, similar concerns have been expressed for the workforce in
developed countries such as the U.S. (Murnane and Levy 1996), the U.K. (Penn et al. 1994, Prais 1995,
Booth and Snower 1996), and OECD countries as a whole (Colecchia and Papaconstantinou 1996, OECD
1996, 1997), and for the workforce in developing countries (World Bank 1995).
incentive structures help foster the development of workers' skills? What role can public
policy play in promoting firm-level skill development?
This study examines changes in the patterns of firm-level skill development and
factors that have affected such changes, using a case study of the Indian automobile
industry. It is a micro-level study with a particular focus on firms as a locus of skill
development. The unit of analysis is thus the firm and the inter-firm linkage (the supply
chain). In this study, skills are broadly defined as a wide range of human capabilities to
apply and transfer knowledge into action in production processes in manufacturing,
including managerial, organizational, and technical skills that individuals acquire through
either schooling or on-the-job training. It particularly focuses on cognitive and analytical
dimensions of skills, which may have become more important in today's production
activities due to technological change and the adoption of more flexible production systems,
and considers what this change means to skill development, with particular reference to
small-scale subcontractors in which craft skills have traditionally prevailed.
Industrial workers in India find themselves in an increasingly integrated world
today, as India is in the midst of a rapid transformation into a member of the global
economy. India's economic reforms over the past decade have resulted in dynamic
restructuring, a growing exposure to global competition, and an increased inflow of foreign
capital. The automobile industry is one of the Indian industries that have gone through the
most rapid transformations in recent years. I particularly focus on two leading auto
manufacturers, one with foreign direct investment (FDI) and the other without it, and their
small-scale subcontractors. Both firms have achieved remarkable growth in outputs and
sales since the mid-1980s (see Chapter 2). These two auto makers have not only
successfully transformed themselves to become more competitive in the increasingly
globalized Indian markets through various measures, including their massive investment in
skill development for their workers, but have also successfully transformed their suppliers
by institutionalizing various learning mechanisms through their supply chains.
Their impressive performance and equally impressive emphasis on firm-level skill
development are somewhat surprising and go against the general trends observed
elsewhere, on two grounds. First, as liberalization of trade and investment leads
developing economies to depend more on FDI, FDI-affiliated firms often fail to transfer
skills and technologies to their counterparts in developing countries and to create backward
linkages (Kagami et al. 1998). In this study, however, the FDI-affiliated firm has
experienced active skill and technology transfers and the creation of backward linkages.
Second, intensified competition in the increasingly globalized domestic markets due to the
entry of FDI has generally weakened the relative position of local firms in developing
countries with their increased dependence on foreign capital and technologies (Kagami et
al. 1998). But the local firm I studied has actually strengthened its position: it entered the
passenger car segment by producing the first indigenously-made Indian cars, while
investing much in skill development both within the firm and in suppliers, even amidst the
entry of many foreign car makers into the Indian passenger car market. Why did these
firms invest so much in human capital, even before competition became intensified, despite
their secure dominant market positions, and despite the prevailing labor surplus? What
motivated the firms to so eagerly promote learning among their local workers as well as
their local suppliers? How do the characteristics of local labor market institutions, as well
as education and training institutions, come into play in shaping the patterns of skill
development for workers?
The dominant human capital theory (Becker 1993[1964]), using neo-classical
assumptions, has explained firms' investment in training as determined by pricing
mechanisms through market forces. With the shift in the production paradigm from the
Fordist mass production to a more flexible (Piore and Sabel 1984) or lean (Womack et al.
1990) production system in the 1980s, recent literature has focused on the role of FDI (Lall
1995, de Mello 1997), and in particular of transplants in transferring advanced
manufacturing systems and techniques (OECD 1994).3 A large body of literature has
debated the transferability of some elements of such production systems (Florida and
Kenney 1991, Kaplinsky 1995, Doeringer et al. 1996, Sargent and Matthews 1997) and
the possible convergence (or divergence) of manufacturing processes across countries
(Womack et al. 1990, MacDuffie 1996, Kochan et al. 1997). Many of these studies,
however, simply consider the relationships between certain attributes of firms and changes
in in-firm human resource practices, and downplay institutional conditions inherent in local
economies outside the firm that might have interacted in shaping the pattern of skill
formation in the firm. They also offer few insights into the implications of such changes
for broader economic development in developing countries. This study shows how the
interplay of various institutions shapes the patterns of skill development in these firms,
while at the same time, even in the process of globalization, local institutional arrangements
that had historically evolved over time have had greatly influenced the patterns of in-firm
skill development.
The aim of this study is to develop an alternative framework that is more
comprehensive than the existing theories, for guiding public policy to promote skills
development in developing countries. More specifically, it aims 1) to understand the
changing nature of skills required in different segments of the labor market in the
automobile industry due to recent rapid transformations; 2) to examine how different
institutions interact with one another in shaping the ways in which skill development occurs
at the firm level; and 3) to analyze the patterns of firm-level skills development as a
dynamic process beyond static models employed in the conventional theory.
3 In recent years, many scholars in different fields such as economic institutions, industrial development,
organization sociology, and management, have paid much attention to the Japanese (more specifically the
Toyota) production system, or the "lean production system" (Womack et al. 1990), as a successful model
for firms in other countries to follow. The automobile industry has perhaps been the most well-researched
industry on this subject (e.g., Womack et al. 1990, Florida and Kenny 1991, Sabel 1994, Kochan et al.
1997).
Several considerations motivated me to conduct this study. First, for developing
countries like India, as the processes of industrialization largely involve learning in terms of
borrowing technology from industrially advanced countries (Amsden 1989), the skill
implications of global integration not only mean distributional consequences4 but also
concern the very way they industrialize. As industry moves into more complex products
with technological development, specific types of higher technical and other skills become
essential to efficient operation (Najmabadi and Lall 1995: 48). Some scholars even argue
that the rate at which individual and organizational learning (i.e., acquisition of knowledge
and skills) occurs is the major competitive advantage, especially in knowledge-intensive
and skill-intensive industries (Stata 1989).
Second, as knowledge and skills required for today's production activities are
becoming more and more tacit, hard to obtain, and costly to transfer between firms, and
thus more specific, and often even firm-specific (Najmabadi and Lall 1995), the role of
firms as a defacto institution for skill development is becoming of greater importance to
improve productivity and gain competitiveness. Indeed, firms' investment in training to
generate and diffuse knowledge and skills can constitute an important part of creating
"competitive assets" (Amsden 1995). Yet, the existing literature has paid little attention to
the factors determining firms' decisions regarding the mode, content, and extent of in-firm
training. Nor has it successfully explained how existing training institutions, both formal
and informal, involving the state, firms, and workers, influence the way in which training
takes place at the firm level.
Third, this research is particularly relevant and timely in light of currently renewed
interests in and ongoing debates on the role of education and training in economic
development. Education and training have long been recognized as crucial not only in
I Many scholars have debated over the relationship between globalization and skill-based inequality. Some
scholars argue that globalization is a main cause of the declining demand for low-skilled workers in
developed countries, increased unemployment for low-skilled workers in Europe, and a widening income
inequality between the skilled and the low-skilled in the U.S. (Wood 1994). Others refute this argument,
fostering economic growth but also in reducing inequalities and alleviating poverty.' The
economic successes of East Asian countries since the 1960s have prompted economists to
theorize the main determinants of their rapid economic growth. Various schools of
economists have attributed education and training to the East Asian "miracles" (World Bank
1993, Birdsall et al. 1997, Ashton and Green 1996). Indeed, a group of economists came
up with a new (endogenous) growth theory, which emphasizes increasing returns on
education, training, and R&D investment. They argue that economic growth is determined
by the aggregate accumulation of human capital and the stock of knowledge of society as a
whole (Stokey 1991). From the institutionalist perspective, other scholars emphasize the
"most decisive role" of the East Asian governments in promoting education and in
successfully linking education and training policy to trade and industrial policy, as in
Singapore (Ashton and Green 1996). However, these discussions on the role of education
and training have so far been limited to the macro level and not well grounded at the micro
level.
Fourth, new growth theorists argue that as production becomes more decentralized
and integrated beyond national boundaries, the increasing international flows of knowledge
and ideas required for production accelerate economic growth (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
1991, Young 1991). Spillover effects of such firm-level learning would also contribute to
the aggregate accumulation of human capital and the social stock of knowledge. However,
it is less clear how ideas and knowledge are generated and transferred at the micro level
(Rodrik 1995). My study, therefore, focuses on the role of firms as a locus of learning, in
terms of receiving knowledge and ideas from abroad and transferring and diffusing them
within the firm and between firms.
suggesting technological change as a main cause for these trends (Katz and Murphy 1992, Krugman 1994,
Bhagwati 1998). (Also see Rodrik for review). On India, see Parikh 1997.
1 Notably, the human capital theories in the 1950s and 1960s (Becker 1993 (1964)) emphasized the
importance of investing in education and training. Proponents of "redistribution with growth," "basic
human needs," and the more recent "equity-oriented" development strategies (Chenery et al. 1974, Burke and
ul-Haq 1981, Birdsall et al. 1997, Sen 1994) have all stressed the role of public investment in education
(particularly basic education and secondary education) for upgrading skills of the labor force and thus
Finally, while the literature on education and skills development acknowledges
higher returns on investment in training by employers than in pre-employment vocational
training, empirical studies on skills development for workers at the firm level in developing
countries are extremely rare (Middleton et al. 1993). As for India, despite some
speculation that the poor productivity growth of Indian manufacturing in the past may have
been due to the economy-wide under-investment in human resources (Kaplinsky 1997),
virtually no micro-level study has been conducted on the educational and training profile of
the labor force and on the nature and extent of in-firm training in the manufacturing sector.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the
Indian case to provide some background. Section 1.3 reviews the literature concerning the
issue of skill development, while identifying limitations of the existing theories in analyzing
skill development in a changing Indian economy. Section 1.4 discusses the methodology
of this study. Section 1.5 outlines the structure of this dissertation.
1.2 The Case
This study focuses on the automobile industry in India. India is a fascinating
country in its own right, as one of the largest emerging economies with a huge growth
potential in its domestic market with a total population of 940 million. Thus, the trends in
India's economic performance, as well as the extent of its integration into the global
economy, will have a significant impact on the economic trends of the developing world as
a whole.
Until the mid-1980s, India's economic policy was characterized by an inward-
looking trade regime, autarky, highly protected and regulated domestic markets, and
restrictions on FDI. However, India has undergone economic reforms since the mid-1980s
and more drastically since its introduction of the liberalization policy, along with a new
industrial policy, in 1991. The actual inflow of FDI in India has increased almost fourteen
increasing both productivity and earnings as a viable strategy for achieving growth and alleviating poverty.
times in just four years since 1991. This growth in FDI is particularly striking when
compared with India's export performance, which only nearly doubled during the same
period (see Chapter 2). While the amount of FDI is still very small by global standards,6
FDI shows a clear upward trend in India, attracted by the growth potential of its huge
domestic market. These policy changes have brought about an economy-wide dynamic
industrial restructuring.7 These changes have also made manufacturing firms more
conscious of producing high quality goods and at the same time attaining cost
competitiveness. The automobile industry is one of the industries that have gone through
the most dynamic restructuring.
1.2.1 The Indian Automobile Industry in Transformation
Automobile industry has been strategically important for every country that now
produces cars (Kochan et al. 1997: 5). In particular, for newly industrializing developing
countries, it has been a key industry to determine the course of post-war industrialization.
The history of the Indian automobile industry predates the nation's independence in
1947; by the early 1940s, both local and foreign auto makers started producing cars in
India.' However, by the mid-1950s, the government required the gradual localization of
component production, which forced foreign firms such as GM and Ford to close down
their operation in India, and prevented any new firms from entering the industry (Kojima
1995). Since then, the growth of the automobile industry has lagged behind other auto
producer countries, because of the closed and regulatory nature of the Indian economy,
6 For example, China received $38 billion in FDI in 1995-95, nineteen times that received by India (Parikh
1997).
7 On the debates on the impact of Indian's economic reforms on its long-term economic development, see,
for example, Kapila 1992 and Gelam 1996.
8 In the 1930s, India imported about 20,000 cars annually. General Motors (GM) set up an assembly plant
in Bombay in 1928, while Ford Motor Company (Ford) established assembly plants in Madras in 1930 and
in Bombay and Calcutta in 1931 (Venkataramani 1989). Two major domestic car producers, Hindustan
Motors and Premier Auto Ltd., were established in 1942 and 1944 respectively. A total of 2,000 cars were
produced annually (Kojima 1995).
with little exposure to foreign technology or international competition.' The number of
passenger cars in production remained almost unchanged throughout the 1970s, at 33,000
per annum on average.' 0 In fact, the share of the automobile industry in the total value
added of the manufacturing sector declined from 10.2% in 1965 to 6.3% in 1985
(Takahashi 1995).
Since the 1980s, however, the Indian automobile industry has witnessed
remarkable growth, along with a rapid spurt in the inflow of FDI, and has experienced
dramatic transformations in the industrial structures, production processes, and market
environments. The passenger car segment grew most remarkably, at 19% annually in the
1980s and at 13% in the first half of the 1990s. In addition, the component industry grew
at 13% annually during the same period. Moreover, by the mid-1990s, the entry of the
world's leading auto assemblers and leading suppliers intensified competition within the
domestic market. Meanwhile the domestic market expanded, due to the growth of middle-
class consumers who can afford to purchase cars (estimated as 100 to 200 million) and
increased variety in consumer tastes.
These changes have in turn brought about considerable intra-firm organizational
restructuring not only in foreign-affiliated car manufacturers but also in local firms--car
manufacturers as well as many small-scale suppliers. Intensified competition has led firms,
both FDI-affiliated and local, to adopt more advanced manufacturing and management
techniques, such as TQM, "kaizen" (or continuous improvement), QC circles, to improve
both efficiency and the quality of products. They also changed the nature of inter-firm
relations between car manufacturers and their suppliers. This has in turn changed the
nature of skills required of their workers.
9 In fact, "Ambassador," a single passenger car model made by Hindustan Motors, a major domestic car
manufacturer, did not go through any major model change since the 1950s, because it was controlled by the
government through licensing.
" I calculated from ACMA 1995.
So far, few studies have shown how Indian firms have responded to industrial
restructuring at the micro level (Kaplinsky 1997)" and how the patterns of workers'
learning have been affected by such changes. In particular, despite these drastic economic
reforms and their important and urgent implications for human resources development, the
issue of education and training in India has not been a major focus among scholars and
policy makers (Dreze and Sen 1996). Subsequent chapters show how such changes in
skill requirements have also led to a considerable change in the characteristics of local labor
markets and the way in which firms develop their workers' skills. Indeed, a growing
number of local firms have made enormous strides in developing their workers' skills, by
introducing or upgrading various in-firm training programs, whereas others have not, even
though they operate in the same industry under the same domestic market conditions
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
1.2.2 The Segmentation of Local Labor Markets
Before introducing the case, two considerations are to be made in understanding the
patterns of skill development in the automobile industry in India. One is the nature of
urban labor markets, and the other is the performance of formal education and training.
Urban labor markets in India have been highly segmented. While a large number of
well-educated and skilled workers exist at the upper echelons of society, predominantly in
the public sector and large-scale firms, the skill base for industry has remained small
(Najmabadi and Lall 1995). India has not achieved universal basic education; its adult
literacy rate is still 52% (Sen 1994, World Bank 1995). The incidence of poverty is still
high: 40% of the total population live below the poverty line. In addition, India has a
surprisingly low enrollment in secondary education, tertiary-level science and engineering
education, and in vocational training, lower than that of more recently industrializing
" A recent study by Humphrey et al. (1998) attempted to illustrate the process of industrial restructuring at
the micro-level through a case study of Crompton Greaves, Ltd., a leading Indian firm in the electrical
industry.
countries such as Indonesia (Najmabadi and Lall 1995). As of 1990, junior secondary
enrollment (11-14 years) was still 57.4%, while senior secondary enrollment (14-17 years)
was only 24% of the respective age group population (Institute of Applied Manpower
Research 1996: Table 2.1.21).12
Moreover, despite its emphasis on expanding general education at both elementary
and higher levels, as well as vocational and technical education, India's past experience in
promoting vocational and technical schools has been considered largely unsatisfactory for
several reasons. Vocational and technical schools cannot anticipate the needs of the labor
market; they lack flexibility to respond to the changing demands for skills; and they are
relatively ineffective and expensive to run in terms of a higher cost per student than general
education (Middleton et al. 1993).13
By contrast, in East Asia (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan), where the
skills required to develop technology, particularly local R&D to increase productivity and
attain world competitiveness, resulted from massive investment in higher-level technical
education and from measures that induced firm-level training at large firms, as in the case
of POSCO in Korea (Amsden 1988, 1989). Moreover, enterprise-based training in Taiwan
has been associated with a significant rise in output per worker, with the largest gains
realized in firms that invested simultaneously in training and technology (Middleton et al.
1993). East Asian countries have almost universally achieved high levels of general
education (with secondary enrollment rates of over 90%); thus, high levels of human
resources were readily available across different sectors and firms of different sizes,
12 India's progress on the education front has been particularly slow, compared to countries like Korea. In
1965, both Korea and India had secondary students as 29% of the secondary-age population; but by 1978,
Korea's figure more than doubled to 68%, whereas India's figure remained almost unchanged (Amsden 1989:
Table 9.2).
13 For instance, the National Policy of Education 1986 suggested the introduction of systematic, well-
planned and rigorously implemented programs of vocational education to enhance individuals' employability
and to reduce "skill mismatch" between demand and supply of skilled manpower, and aimed at enrolling
25% of secondary students in vocational schools by 1990. However, this objective had not been achieved
with only less than 10% of secondary students enrolled in vocational training (Dougherty 1989: 71 as cited
in Middleton et al. 1993).
allowing the diffusion of learning among different segments of society to occur relatively
smoothly and rapidly. Without such an equitable distribution of education and skills, how
can India manage to accelerate the processes of skill acquisition, accumulation and
diffusion in various segments of its economy, when faced with a need to produce goods of
higher quality?
As noted earlier, however, the average educational level of industrial workers in
Indian large-scale enterprises is comparable to, or even better than, that in its East Asian
counterparts, with a minimum attainment of two-year post-secondary industrial training in
technical schools after general high-school education. Differences from East Asia,
therefore, lie in the educational level of workers in the small-scale sectors of the economy.
India is nearly unique among developing countries in having maintained its
democratic political institutions since its early stages of industrialization. Indian
development policy has always placed emphasis on its distributional concerns, as the
government needed to make populist policies to satisfy the social demands arising from the
political constituency. The government has promoted and protected small-scale industries
(including cottage industries), partly because of such distributional concerns, in terms of
creating employment and generating income for the poorer section of society, and partly
because of the Gandhian ideological tradition which respected cottage industries
(particularly in the textile sector) as a way to achieve self-reliance, particularly among the
poor."
In India, as of 1993-94, 2.4 million small-scale firms accounted for 89% of the
total enterprises, employed 14 million workers, or 29% of the total industrial workforce,
" Interestingly, in this respect there are some similarities between the earlier Japanese experience of
industrialization and the more recent Indian experience. In both Japan and India, the government heavily
promoted and protected small-scale firms, and as a result, in both countries, small-scale firms have played a
large role in economic and social development. In Japan, small- and medium-size businesses create 57% of
value added to products but employ about 74% of the total industrial workforce (UNDP 1993). The earlier
Japanese experience also shows that large-scale manufacturers provided their smaller-scale suppliers with a
great deal of assistance and support, including skill development and transfer.
and created 17% of value added. 5 In addition, with regard to informal sector employment,
according to the Government of India (1996b), as of 1995-96, as many as 85% of the total
workforce of 319 million are self-employed or employed on casual wages (of whom the
majority are in rural areas), whereas only 15% are regular wage-employed workers. About
35 million workers are categorized as marginal workers (p.73). In India, twice as many
jobs have been created in the unorganized manufacturing sector as in the organized sector
(UNDP 1993: 41).
If indeed, globalized production processes influence the nature of skills and skill
formation practices, how do such practices become diffused and penetrate among workers
in different segments of a highly stratified society like India? Despite the limited availability
of skilled workforce for small-scale firms, the role of small-scale firms seems crucial in the
acquisition and diffusion of skills, as they employ the majority of India's urban workers.
Indeed, small-scale finns, particularly subcontractors to large-scale manufacturers, are
exposed to the growing needs to produce goods of higher quality while improving
productivity, as their customers' products must face global competition and/or need to meet
global standards. How do they cope with these needs? Do they invest more in machines,
or upgrade the skills of workers, or replace the existing workers with more skilled ones? If
these small-scale firms choose to upgrade workers' skills, do they have the means and
capabilities to train their workers, in the face of the possible change in the nature of skills
required? What conditions facilitate firms' promotion of skill development? What roles do
inter-firn linkages, both vertical (between manufacturers and suppliers) and horizontal
(among these local finns), play in these processes of skills development? To answer these
questions, I examined the cases of two leading auto manufacturers and their small-scale
suppliers in India.
" In India, small-scale firms refer to those with fewer than 100 employees. It should be noted that the
definition differs from that of small-scale industry (SSI), which refers to firms with an initial capital of Rs.
6 million (regardless of the size of employment). The figures for India were calculated from (Government
of India 1996a: Statements 6&7).
1.2.3 Two Successful Learners: Maruti and Telco
In this study, I analyzed the experiences of two leading Indian automobile
manufacturers and their respective local suppliers in skill development for workers. One is
Maruti Udyog Limited (hereafter Maruti), a joint venture firm between the Indian
government and a Japanese auto manufacturer (Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd.), and the other is
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (hereafter Telco), a local private firm entirely
owned by the Tata Industries, the largest industrial business house in India. Telco is one
of the two flagship firms of the Tata Industries, and the third largest firm in India. Telco is
at present the only domestic producer that has no FDI involvement).16 Maruti started its
operation in 1983, while Telco was established in 1945.
Maruti's main plant is located in Gurgaon, a newly developing industrial town in
the state of Haryana near Delhi. Maruti started its second plant in Gurgaon in 1992, and is
expected to start its third plant in Noida near Delhi in 1999. On the other hand, Telco has
three plants in various locations. The oldest plant, which was built in 1945, once the main
plant, is in Jamshedpur in the state of Bihar, the poorest state in India, but the town has
also been the home of Tata Iron & Steel Co (TISCO), the biggest firm of the Tata. The
second plant, currently the main plant, is in Pune in the state of Maharashtra, which is one
of India's wealthiest and most industrially advanced states. The third and newest plant is
located in Lucknow, the state capital of Uttar Pradesh, the most populous and second
poorest state in India.
These two firms are interesting to study for a variety of reasons. First, both Maruti
and Telco have been leading manufacturers of passenger cars and commercial vehicles
respectively and played an especially influential role in shaping the development of the
16 This statement requires some clarification. Telco started with a license, but terminated in 1967, from
Daimler-Benz, which still has 14% non-voting equity (Lall 1985b:27 1). Telco reinstated its technical
cooperation with Mercedes-Benz to assemble Mercedes luxury cars on its premises (but in a separate plant)
in Pune with 100% CKD components from Mercedes in Germany. However, Telco does not receive any
financial cooperation from Mercedes for its own products.
Indian automobile industry (see Chapter 2). As of 1994-95, Maruti produced 197,842
vehicles per year, accounting for 75% of the Indian passenger market, while Telco
produced 121,252 light and heavy commercial vehicles per year, accounting for 62% of the
commercial vehicle market." Second, both firms have made enormous investments in
developing the skills of workers to enhance the firms' capabilities so as to produce vehicles
of higher quality even before competition became intensified in the Indian car market.
Despite their differences in ownership, product mix, and locations, somewhat surprisingly,
they share some common elements in their skill formation systems. Yet, different
dynamics, generated through the interplay of several institutional factors, have shaped
different patterns of skill development within these firms (see Chapter 3). Finally, they
both have made considerable efforts to upgrade the capabilities of their first-tier suppliers
(see Chapter 4). Given their large share in the domestic markets, and given a high rate of
local contents (96% for Maruti and 97% for Telco), their supplier relations are likely to
have a great impact on the patterns of development of the component industry as a whole.
The experiences of these two firms in developing the skills of their workers and
suppliers challenge popular assertions made in the recent literature in several ways. First,
while many scholars have linked firms' more positive attitudes towards training to their
export orientation and exposure to international competition, the export performance of the
Indian automobile industry has remained modest in volume and sales (see Chapter 2). In
fact, both Maruti and Telco have primarily focused on the domestic markets so far. Thus,
the suggestion of positive associations between the change in trade regimes and the increase
in in-firm training does not seem to hold here.
Second, as noted, a large body of recent literature suggests the role of FDI in
changing skill requirements and hence in bringing about organizational changes in favor of
skill development (Florida and Kenny 1991, OECD 1994, Lall 1995), but Telco, without
" In addition, Maruti produced 7,347 jeeps in the same year, which is not included in the percentage share
in the market. Telco's percentage market share is the figure for both heavy and light commercial vehicles
combined. For heavy commercial vehicles only, the share for Telco is 73% (ACMA 1995: 11).
any significant FDI involvement, has made massive investment in developing its workers'
skills since the 1950s. Of course, Telco's emphasis on the type of skills to be developed
has changed over time, but its overall institutional mechanism for skill formation, built in
through various internal incentive measures, has evolved incrementally within the firm over
time. This is striking in the Indian context where few firms, including Telco's competitors
in the industry, had an explicit human resources policy until recently and where there was
virtually no competition under India's heavily regulated and protected market conditions.
Telco's experience challenges the popular claims that in developing countries the presence
of FDI brings about organizational changes in firms that are more conducive to skill
development among their workers and that local firms have become increasingly dependent
on FDI.
Third, on a similar line, many scholars have seen positive links between the
adoption of the so-called Japanese production systems, characterized by such
manufacturing techniques as just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems and total quality
management (TQM), and the changes in firms' orientation in favor of training (Florida and
Kenney 1991, Kaplinsky 1995, Sargent and Matthews 1997). In both Maruti and Telco,
however, the emphasis on skill development preceded the adoption of some elements of
JIT and TQM, making it difficult to establish a link between the adoption of such
techniques and skill development.
Finally, many empirical studies suggest that FDI-affiliated firms often do not invest
in building up local backward linkages in developing countries (e.g., Amsden 1989, Piore
and Luis- Duri.n 1998), as they tend to develop "ready-made" linkages with suppliers
overseas, because of the high costs of searching out and transferring skills and know-how
to small-scale firms (Najmabadi and Lall 1995). However, the case of Maruti suggests the
contrary. Maruti has made massive investment in the development of local suppliers, many
of which are small-scale, instead of using Suzuki's suppliers abroad.
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Thus, the experiences of Maruti and Telco suggest a need for a more detailed
investigation, at the micro level, of factors that encourage firms to foster skill development,
both inside and outside the firm, beyond the simple explanations by firms' attributes (such
as ownership and the adoption of certain management techniques).
In what follows, I briefly review the existing literature on skill development, to see
how different schools of thought have considered the factors motivating firms to invest in
workers' skill development.
1.3 The Theoretical and Empirical Literature on Skill Development
The concept of skill is difficult to define, because the skills a worker acquires to
perform tasks for production activities are often tacit, intangible, and diverse across
industries and firms and among different levels of workers. Even skilled workers differ
greatly in the range and level of their skills. Thus, the content of skills has long been left as
a black box, or alternatively, measured solely by the proxy of years of schooling or
experience (Koike and Inoki 1990).
Even within the discussion of skills in manufacturing, different researchers appear
to use the term "skill" in different dimensions and on different levels, and attribute skills to
individuals, groups, or the firm as a whole. As for individual production skills, according
to some researchers, skill refers to the ability to apply and translate knowledge into action
in the production process. Individual learning in turn refers to a process by which
individuals gain new knowledge, insights, and skills, and thereby modify their behavior
and actions (Stata 1989). Whether in industrialized countries or in developing countries,
most skill development takes place in the workplace, through informal on-the-job training,
or through formal training programs financed by employers or workers, provided either in
the workplace or at external training institutions (Middleton et al. 1993).
1.3.1 Human Capital Theory and the Market Failure Approach
The literature concerned with the relationship between training and work has
predominantly relied on the human capital theory and has mainly focused on establishing
three relationships: 1) between years of schooling and productivity; 2) between years of
schooling and occupational status; and 3) between years of schooling and earnings (Becker
1993[1964], Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985; see Middleton et al. 1993 for review).
Some scholars have debated whether learning itself through schooling or the diploma
obtained from education (or education as a screening device) contributes to economic gains.
Otherwise, the literature on education, training, and skills development has mainly been
concerned with the question of which mode of education and training (e.g., formal versus
informal; general versus vocational education; or pre-employment vocational training
versus in-firm training by employers) has higher rates of return. Hence, these scholars
have been busy calculating the costs and benefits of each mode of education.
The human capital theorists, using the neo-classical assumption, typically argue that
government interventions in labor markets in pursuit of social and economic goals restrict
wage flexibility and labor mobility, and thus distort the operation of labor markets and
affect incentives for individuals and enterprises to invest in skills development (Becker
1993[1964], Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985, Middleton et al. 1993: 85).8
With respect to skill training, human capital theory postulates that there is perfect
competition for general skills,19 and that in the case of "general" training, which is useful
for all employers in the economy, employers have no incentive to bear the costs of such
training, because it is not employers but workers who receive all the benefits from training,
' Human capital theory justifies minimal government interventions on only the grounds of 1) externalities
(as social benefits exceed private benefits, government should redistribute income and wealth through taxes
and transfers to reduce inequalities, but not by intervening in the market for training); 2) imperfections in
capital markets (which constrain access by individuals to loans and loan guarantees to finance education,
creating uncertainty in investing in education); and 3) economies of scale (thus it is more efficient to
finance and provide education publicly) (Becker 1993 [1964], Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985).
19 Becker's distinction between "general" and "specific" training differs from Doeringer and Piore's constructs
of general and specific skills (See Doeringer and Piore 1971).
in the form of increased wages reflecting increased productivity; thus, workers should bear
the costs of training through a subtraction from wages. In the case of specific training to
acquire specific skills, which are useful only to a specific firm, the costs of training should
be shared by firms and workers, so that workers internalize the cost of turnover, and the
firms internalize the cost of firing. Hence, in both cases, the argument goes, there are no
market failures. Proponents of this theory argue that removing institutional barriers such as
minimum wages and progressive income taxes would allow employers to shift the cost of
general skills training to the workers in the form of lower wages, increasing a private rate
of return for the enterprise, which would encourage employers to invest in training for
workers (Middleton et al. 1993). According to them, otherwise, such price distortions
would lead to stagnation of employment growth in the modern sector, reducing individuals'
incentives to acquire modern sector skills.
However, this dominant human capital theory suffers from two major limitations
with regard to in-firm skills training. First, its underlying neo-classical assumption that
market forces provide adequate incentives to invest in education and training does not allow
us to consider what policy measures would promote in-firm training and what incentive
structures created within the firm might motivate workers to learn. Second, the theory's
preoccupation with the cost-benefit calculation of productivity gains arising from training
pays little attention to the very question of how workers learn.
Challenging the human capital theory, another school of economists applies the
market failure approach to argue for government interventions in skills development
(Najbamadi and Lall 1995, Booth and Snower 1996). A recent study by Booth and
Snower (1996), for example, identifies various types of market failures (while cautioning
of the danger of "government failure") to explain "skills gaps" in the labor market in the
U.K.20 Their approach suggests that because of imperfect competition and the imperfectly
20 These market failures include: 1) imperfect competition, making wages set below the market-determined
level and workers unable to appropriate all the benefits from their training; 2) externalities caused by labor
turnover and mobility between firms, with the result that benefits from training go not only to the firm
transferable nature of skills, the free market does not provide sufficient incentives for
training.
While the market failure approach helps explain why markets do not function under
certain conditions, it does not help us consider what factors would create conditions that
promote skills acquisition and development, beyond removing market failures. Moreover,
it still suffers from the same limitations as the human capital theory, as I pointed out earlier:
it lacks any insight into the process of workers' learning within the firm and the actual
internal mechanisms within the firm which create incentives for training. Therefore, like
the human capital theory, this approach still has only limited utility for the analysis of skills
development.
Insights gained from the market failure approach into the processes of externalities
and learning complementarities between firms do, however, provide some hints to consider
some factors outside the firm affecting in-firm training for workers. But few empirical
studies have so far examined how the processes of externalities and learning
complementarities between vertically-related firms actually occur in developing countries,2 1
an aspect that may be important in understanding the nature of skill transfer through the
inter-firm linkages that Maruti and Telco have forged with their suppliers (see Chapter 4).
1.3.2 The Internal Labor Markets Theory
Considering that knowledge dissemination and diffusion are part of what
constitutes organization-level learning, one may need to pay more attention to the process
providing training and the workers who undergo training but also to other firms that could make use of the
skills acquired through training; 3) imperfect information and imperfect competition in the job-matching
process, which allow workers to get jobs not at the wage level determined by the market but at the rate that
other potential negotiating firms agree to pay; and 4) the market failure arising from the interaction between
skills and skilled workers (firms create few skilled vacancies because there are few skilled workers available,
and few workers acquire skills because there are few skilled vacancies, resulting in what they call a "low-
skill, bad-job trap" (Booth and Snower 1996).
1 A large body of literature on industrial districts and industrial clustering focuses on the learning
complementarities among horizontally-related autonomous small firms in a geographically proximate
locality (Pyke et al. 1990, Schmitz 1992, Nadvi and Schmitz 1994). A recent study by Tewari (1996)
makes an important contribution by providing empirical evidence of such horizonal learning
of learning, including the system of knowledge dissemination and diffusion as an
institutionalized form inside and outside of the firm, including the nature of on-the-job
training. In addition, skills are developed and enhanced over time within firms, not only as
a result of firms' decisions to do so, motivated by certain incentives (the external
environment, policy, or incentives created through inter-firm relationship) and other
institutional factors, but also as a result of individual workers' motivation to seek new
knowledge and skills.
Realizing the shortcomings of mainstream economics in approaching the issue of
skills development, some scholars, mainly in the fields of labor economics, economic
institutions, and sociology, advocate a more micro-level orientation and focus on
institutional factors inside and outside of the firm. These scholars commonly view the
process of skills development (what Koike and Inoki call "skill formation systems") as a
social institution.
Among them are those who developed the concept of internal labor markets
(Doeringer and Piore 1971, Osterman 1984), which provides insightful analytical
frameworks to understand the process of skills development, particularly on-the-job
training and its interactions with other institutional factors existing within the firm. These
authors argue that the internal labor markets, i.e., a set of administrative rules and
procedures within the firm, rather than the external labor markets, govern the allocation and
pricing of labor inside the firm, such as recruitment, promotion, transfer, wages, and
training. Such internal labor markets also include customary laws, which evolve over time
through repeated practices and imitation (Doeringer and Piore 197 1).22 According to this
concept, the rigidity of the internal labor market is closely connected with firms' investment
in firm-specific human capital and the content and extent of on-the-job training (Doeringer
and Piore 1971: 7).
complementarities in an industrial district of Ludhiana in the state of Punjab, India.
2 Similar constructs of institutions are also theorized in more recent work by scholars of the new
institutionalism in organizational sociology (Powell and DiMaggio 1991).
Traditionally, on-the-job training, which occurs informally as part of the production
process, has been considered central in skills acquisition and development, particularly for
production workers (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Odaka 1989, Koike and Inoki 1990). On-
the-job training (and its narrow focus) makes the skills acquired highly specific to the
context in which they are acquired; on the other hand, skills change with time as they are
transferred from one person to another (Doeringer and Piore 1971: 22). In addition, the
process of on-the-job training is automatic and dependent upon each individual's curiosity
and desire to master a job. Thus, a firm's ability to infuse values within the firm by
appreciating the types of skills to be required by the firm and rewarding those skills also
seems important in promoting skills development.
Workers typically learn their skills as they move up a hierarchical ladder of
different, but closely-related, job assignments, progressing from easier to more difficult
jobs in the course of their worklife in the firm (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Odaka 1989,
Koike and Inoki 1990). This suggests that skills development is greatly influenced by the
division of labor and by the firm's organization of rules and procedures with respect to the
assignments of workers to different jobs, i.e., internal labor markets. Some scholars
emphasize the decentralization of skills and knowledge within the firm structure as a
determinant of productivity and efficiency (Koike and Inoki 1990).
With respect to factors influencing the process of on-the-job training, Koike and
Inoki (1990) highlight two requirements on the supply side: 1) a long-term firm history,
because skill formation takes a long time; and 2) a stable firm environment, because skill
formation takes the form of shopfloor practices. In terms of demand-side factors, scholars
commonly point to wages, promotion opportunities, and long-term employment security as
the most important incentives for workers to learn (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Koike and
Inoki 1990). Some scholars also mention the existence of company unions as a factor
(Osterman 1984). Other scholars argue that important as it is, in-firm training still requires
a base of educated manpower to work with, which can be provided only by general
schooling (Najmabadi and Lall 1995, Koike and Inoki 1990).
These institutional perspectives are very helpful for examining the nature of skill
development for workers and understanding the incentive structures for training within the
firm. However, this approach alone may not be sufficient to analyze the cases of skill
development in the Indian automobile industry which has undergone a rapid
transformation, for a few reasons. First, well-defined internal labor markets exist largely
among large-scale enterprises, and therefore the concept may be less useful for analyzing
the nature of skill development among small-scale suppliers of Maruti and Telco. Second,
this approach pays little attention to the institutional environment outside the firm (e.g.,
inter-firm linkages, public and private training institutions, and policy measures) and its
interaction with the internal labor markets. Finally, this perspective's emphasis on
institutional stability may overlook the processes through which firms transform
themselves while adjusting the internal labor markets in response to changes in external
institutional environments.
1.3.3 Technological Change, Division of Labor, and Organization of Work
For decades, scholars have debated the relationship between technological change
and skills. The popular assertion in the literature in the 1970s that the need for skills
decreases or that "de-skilling" occurs as mechanization and technological change proceed
(Braverman 1974) was replaced by the opposite "upskilling" argument by the mid-1980s
that current technological change is skill-biased and requires more skills (OECD 1996)."
Scholars argue that the conceptual, organizational, and interpersonal skills required on the
contemporary shopfloor actually increase as technology advances (Koike and Inoki 1990,
Bailey 1990, Penn et al. 1994, Murnane and Levy 1996). For example, the tasks for the
operator of high-level automated equipment, which are not one specialized repetitive task
but a wide range of tasks,2 4 require more complex cognitive or conceptual skills.2" Other
scholars argue that in the current era of global competition, only the production of high
value-added goods leads to "upskilling," while the production of low-value-added goods
does not require more education and training (Ashton and Green 1996). Thus, this body of
literature suggests that technological change in a high-value-added industry promotes skill
development.
Another factor that scholars have considered as influencing in-firm skill
development is the firm size. Many scholars agree that as the complexity and
responsibilities of jobs increase in moving up the ladder from an entry-level job to a highly
skilled one, cognitive and conceptual skills, including reading, writing, basic mathematics,
skills in diagnosing problems, problem-solving and working in teams become more
important than specific manual skills (Odaka 1989, Koike and Inoki 1990, Middeleton et
al. 1993, Murnane and Levy 1996). Thus, in both developed and developing countries,
employers of large-scale firms with more hierarchy and more division of labor generally
prefer to hire individuals with comparatively high levels of general education for entry-level
jobs over those with proficiency in specific manual skills, and provide training after
employment (Middleton et al. 1993). A study on Korea shows large-scale firms that
assigned high-quality managers to the shopfloor and inspired initiatives on the part of such
managers to develop the skills of the workforce and to improve process performance
(Amsden 1989: 160).
" Some scholars distinguish "mechanization" and "automation" and attribute "de-skilling" to the former and
"upskilling" to the latter (Bailey 1990).
4 These tasks include: installing a wheel, monitoring the quality of the installation, moving over to help
other workers when they have trouble, diagnosing problems, working in groups to solve problems, and
constantly suggesting ways to improve assembly-line performance (Murnane and Levy 1996: 12; similar
observations are also made in Koike and Inoki 1990).
25 Based on extensive observation of the Japanese shopfloor, Koike and Inoki (1990) claim that production
skills on today's shopfloor require much more intelligence than they used to do. They stress the importance
of two kinds of production skills: 1) the cognitive skills to respond to unexpected changes; and 2) the
analytical skills to be able to detect, diagnose, and rectify any problems efficiently. Similarly, scholars of
organizational learning also suggest the importance of such individual skills as the capability to understand
causal associations, to make a prescriptive decision, and to predict the course of production processes, as
critical elements contributing to organizational learning (Bohn 1994: 62).
A growing body of literature suggests that the organization of work is an important
factor influencing the extent and contents of in-firm skill development. This includes
management patterns, such as flatter hierarchies between managers and workers, a high
proportion of engineers at the plant level, and emphasis on manager training and education,
which promote the development of individuals' skills (Amsden 1989, Najmabadi and Lall
1995). Other scholars emphasize the importance of decentralized production processes,
characterized by team-work, task rotation, and worker participation in continuous
improvement as the best way to induce intra-firm knowledge transfer and attitudinal
changes in the workplace (Stata 1989, Sabel 1994).26 In addition, they point to the
demand for product variety and thus the emergence of flexible specialization production
systems, which allow workers to assume multi-tasks operating different machines from
line to line, as an important factor for promoting workers' training (Piore and Sabel 1984,
Sabel 1994).
Many recent studies have examined the transferability of such organizational forms
to Japanese transplants in industrialized countries (Florida and Kenney 1991, Doeringer et
al. 1996) and in developing countries (Kaplinsky 1995, Sargent and Matthews 1997); they
found marked differences between the Japanese transplants and domestic local firms in
work organization and employment practices, including training. The Japanese transplants
emphasize more social and organizational learning and employee commitment as the means
of motivating labor efficiency, whereas local firms define workforce quality in different
ways, and tend to assemble a patchwork of best practices without paying adequate attention
to the consistency of the practices within the overall production systems (Doeringer et al.
1996, Kochan et al. 1997).
A recent cross-national study finds considerable variations in employment practices
including those concerning skill acquisition and development among countries, due to
26 Some scholars suggest a convergence towards the Japanese production model among the automobile
industries around the world (Womack et al. 1990). But others suggest that transferring the Japanese work
organization to other countries has had mixed results (see Florida and Kenney 1991 for review).
differences in the strategies and power of the parties involved in the transfer and learning
process (such as firms, unions, and government), as well as the effects of local institutional
and cultural forces (Kochan et al. 1997). Thus, my study also considers these aspects in
analyzing factors that have motivated Maruti, Telco, and their respective suppliers in the
Indian automobile industry, as discussed in subsequent chapters.
1.3.4 The Role of FDI in Skill Transfer
The important role of foreign capital in bringing skills and know-how to developing
countries was recognized as early as the 1950s (Hirschman 1958). However, the role of
multi-national corporations (MNCs) in economic development has been debated, especially
in terms of their effects on technology, finance, and income distribution. From the neo-
Marxist perspective, the dependency theory in the 1970s and the more recent concept of
"the new international division of labor" in the 1980s viewed the expansion of MNCs'
activities as detrimental to the economic development of developing countries. One classic
argument is that MNCs contribute to an increase in income of only the richest social group
of recipient countries but do not benefit the majority of the population, particularly the
poor, because 1) MNCs tend to use more capital intensive technology, which is labor
displacing rather than labor saving; and 2) where capital is not in the hands of local people
but in the hands of foreign firms, incomes generated out of such capital are not distributed
to the masses who do not own capital, resulting in a worsening income distribution. In
particular, the entry of MNCs often has a negative impact on small-scale local producers
(Caves 1996). However, this line of argument does not take into account the externalities
and spillovers of foreign firm activities in the host countries, including skill development.
Many studies in technological and skills development have regarded FDI as an
effective means of transferring technology and skills (e.g., Lall 1985a, Koike and Inoki
1990): when MNCs come, they bring highly developed product differentiation techniques,
sophisticated management systems and financial practices, and advanced methods of
quality control, product development and process engineering, apart from the initial
provision of complex technology (Lall 1985a: 83). The common assumption is that MNCs
transfer advanced management techniques from developed countries to developing
countries, send high-level managers from the home country, and attract the best workers by
offering relatively high salaries. MNCs' technological and engineering capabilities,
together with highly developed training schemes, would tremendously benefit industries
requiring such skills (Lall 1985a: 86). FDI promotes the direct movement of people
between the home country and the host country, and thus influences the way in which
technology and skills are disseminated (Koike and Inoki 1990). Lall (1985a) suggests
various stages of skills and knowledge transfer by MNCs, from the acquisition of
knowledge on how to carry out manufacturing activity to the acquisition of operating
knowledge (know-how); the development of "know-why" capabilities; and the ability to
undertake scientific research.
Partly influenced by new growth and trade theories, a large body of literature has
recently resuscitated its interest in the role of FDI in transferring knowledge, skills, and
technology to developing countries, viewing FDI as an engine of growth (OECD 1994,
World Bank 1998; see de Mello 1997 for review)." The rapid growth of FDI, particularly
by MNCs, is believed to bring about two associated phenomena in developing countries: a
change in the level of technology and a change in the organization of work for local
production activities. FDI is also believed to have a positive effect on human capital
accumulation by providing training and skills acquisition and diffusion for workers in
recipient countries (de Mello 1997: 9, OECD 1998).
However, advocates of FDI as a prime driving force for transferring knowledge
and skills fail to explain the variance of experiences among firms with the same FDI
partners across different countries. Moreover, many studies on FDI lack insights into the
2" However, other scholars argue that what promotes growth is not FDI per se but particular characteristics
of recipient countries which attract FDI, including existing factor endowments, such as the existence of
well-educated labor (Kokko 1992).
detailed processes of skills development at the firm level. In addition, empirical studies
find that FDI firms in developing countries often do not contribute to the development of
skills in a local economy, as in the Korean automobile industry (Amsden 1989, Amsden
and Lessard 1995) and in the Mexican automobile industry (Dussel et al. 1997, Piore and
Ruiz-Durin 1998).
A study by Lall (1985a) on technological development in India, however, found no
marked difference in the adaptation of imported technologies between MNCs and local
firms; MNCs were as active as local firms in transferring skills, know-how, and product
design to vertically linked suppliers (Lall 1995:123). The presence of MNCs also had a
positive impact on local competing firms, as competition from technologically efficient
MNCs induces local firms to improve their own technology (particularly know-how) and
promote skill development. This suggests a need to look into peculiar institutional
conditions in India, which might have encouraged MNCs such as Maruti to foster local
skill development, rather than simply attributing firms' efforts towards skill development to
FDI.
Inspired by the existing theoretical and empirical literature concerning skill
development as reviewed above, and, also informed by their limitations, I focused on three
institutional factors that may influence and determine the patterns of skill development at the
firm level: 1) institutional factors28 and incentive structures (such as recruitment,
promotion opportunities, and labor relations) within the firm (see Chapter 3); 2) the nature
of inter-firm linkages, i.e., the way firms organize their interactions and cooperation
(Chapter 4); and 3) institutional arrangements and incentive mechanisms outside of the firm
2" For some scholars such as Najmabadi and Lall (1995), institutions refer to the organizations set up to
support the functioning of the skill, capital and information markets that are relevant to industrial
technological development, including education and training institutions, development finance and venture-
capital institutions, science and technology institutions, and others that support subcontracting, small-scale
enterprises, and information flow. However, I define institutions in a broader sense to refer not only to
organizations but also to a set of "rules of the game" (North 1990) which bind individuals and
organizations, although I do not necessarily agree with North's behavioristic assumption underlying his
theory.
(including external labor market conditions, government intervention, and links with
education and training institutions) (Chapters 3 and 4).
1.4. Methods
This research involves a micro-level case study. I chose to study the nature of skill
development in two leading vehicle manufacturers in India, Maruti and Telco, and skill
transfer to their respective local first-tier suppliers.2 9
I collected data through three rounds of fieldwork: first in June and July 1996, then
between November 1996 and May 1997, and finally in August 1998.
My primary data come from an original questionnaire survey and extensive
interviews that I conducted with a sample of 50 first-tier supplier firms (25 of Maruti's and
25 of Telco's). In addition, I conducted extensive interviews with the two vehicle
manufacturers, Maruti and Telco; interviews with each firm lasted about two weeks. With
regard to the second- and third-tier suppliers, there are virtually no data available even to
indicate who and where they are. Thus, I obtained lists of subcontractors from the first-tier
suppliers I visited. However, due to both time and data constraints, the sample size of
these lower-tier suppliers is small. I interviewed only about two dozen second-tier
suppliers. My future research will focus more extensively on such lower-tier suppliers.
In visiting suppliers, I used a questionnaire survey format, partly to create a
legitimate atmosphere for asking questions, and partly to maintain some consistency in the
data I would gather from each firm. To develop my questionnaire, I referred to, and
modified, four questionnaire survey formats used on related themes in the U.S. and India
to allow a cross-country comparison in future research.3 0 I added some questions that are
29 This is incidentally similar in terms of research design to Lall's 1979 study on the role of inter-firm
linkages in technological development. He compared two leading truck manufacturers and their suppliers in
India: Ashok Layland, a joint venture with a British firm, and Telco, a local manufacturer (Lall 1985b).
However, Lall did not do a detailed study of the actual processes of skills transfer and how such vertical
linkages actually influence the way in which skills development and transfer occur within and between
firms.
30 The questionnaires that I referred to are: 1) "Worker Training and Workforce Adjustment Questionnaire"
(prepared and administered by Harry Katz and Jeffrey Keefe, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education,
more country-specific and of particular interest to me, such as questions related to castes,
migration, educational attainment, and social security benefits, to accommodate factors
relevant to my research framework.
To select sample firms, I employed a different strategy for Maruti and Telco. In the
case of Maruti, I was able to obtain the list of all 404 first-tier suppliers, with their
addresses, firm size, and share of sales to Maruti. Accordingly, I classified the suppliers
on the basis of location, firm size, and the share of sales by Maruti (as a proxy for the
strengths of the inter-firm linkage), and selected 30 firms (of which 25 agreed to respond),
balancing these three criteria. Telco was reluctant to release a list of its 1,200 suppliers,
partly because it has no consolidated lists due to a wider product range and multiple
locations of plants in three states. Therefore, I visited Telco's suppliers through
arrangements made by Telco's supplier development department. As a result, the sample
of Telco suppliers is more subject to selection bias. The geographic coverage of these 50
first-tier suppliers spreads over four states, namely, Union Territory of Delhi, Haryana
(cities of Gurgaon and Faridabad), Maharashtra (Mumbai, Pune, and Aurangabad), and
Uttar Pradesh (Ghaziabad and Lucknow).
During my field visit to a firm, I asked questions with my questionnaire in hand to
elicit answers from the respondents, then filled in the answers myself while listening to
their responses. Respondents were mainly managers and production-level supervisors,
and, in smaller firms, often the owner or partner; they often invited appropriate
subordinates to sit in. I tried to interview production workers but rarely gained useful
results because such interviews were allowed only with the presence of managers. I gained
supplementary data through additional questions after the questionnaire survey. Interviews
the Center for Advanced Human Resources of Cornell University, and the Institute of Management and
Labor Relations of Rutgers University); 2) "International Automotive Assembly Plant Study" (administered
by International Motor Vehicle Program, MIT with Jones Center on Management Policy, Strategy, and
Organization, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); 3) "Performance of Ancillary Units:
Questionnaire for 'Mother Units"' (administered by the Small-scale Industry Development Bank of India
(SIDBI)); and 4) "Survey of Small Industries" (Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad).
were usually followed by a guided tour of the plants, following the production lines on the
shopfloor. I conducted additional interviews during and after such plant tours. A typical
visit lasted half a day. In some cases, I returned to the same firms for follow-up
interviews.
In addition, I have interviewed officials from various ministries of the Government
of India; personnel from industrial organizations; officials from government agencies in
charge of small-scale industries, such as the District Industrial Centers (in Gurgaon and
Pune, in particular), and training institutions, such as Industrial Training Institutes (in New
Delhi and Pune, in particular); representatives from national umbrella organizations of trade
unions and researchers from local research institutions relevant to my study. Also, I
collected secondary data (including statistical data) from various government agencies, the
international organizations such as the International Labor Office (ILO) and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in New Delhi, industrial associations, and local
research institutions.
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 illustrates the
nature of rapid transformations of the Indian automobile industry since the-mid 1980s
while identifying the setting where Maruti and Telco have been placed. Chapter 3 analyzes
the pattern of skills development in the two auto manufacturing firms, with particular focus
on five types of in-firm training: 1) internal labor markets and on-the-job training; 2)
apprenticeship programs; 3) in-firm formal training; 4) overseas training, and 5) work
organization. I then examine factors that determine the patterns of skill development in
each firm. Chapter 4 analyzes the pattern of skill development among the 50 sample
suppliers of these two vehicle manufacturers, and examines how the inter-firm linkages that
Maruti and Telco have forged with their suppliers have influenced the way skills have been
transferred and developed in these suppliers. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation while
summarizing the findings and discussing their implications for public policy for promoting
skill training in developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Globalization and Transformations of
the Indian Automobile Industry
2.1 Introduction
This chapter illustrates the dynamic process of transformation that the Indian
automobile industry has gone through since the mid-1980s. In so doing, it shows the
performance of Maruti and Telco and their critical roles in leading the growth of the
industry during this process.
Until the mid-1980s, the Indian economy, with its import substitution
industrialization strategy since the late 1950s, was characterized by an inward-looking trade
regime, highly regulated and protected domestic markets, and control on foreign
investment, partly because of the country's ideological orientation towards self-reliance.
This policy regime had long discouraged innovation, cost reduction, and the acquisition of
technological capabilities, causing considerable inefficiencies, sluggish export
performance, and slow growth (Lall 1987, Rodrik 1995, Agrawal et al. 1995). The 1963
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act restricted the activities of large
private business houses (conglomerates) in order to control monopolies and growth of
private-sector firms and to promote public-sector enterprises.' The government had also
restricted the inflow of FDI since the 1960s, both in terms of the sectors to enter and the
percentage of equity share, to promote localization of the domestic industries and limit FDI
only to the sectors that needed foreign technology (Lall 1985a, 1987).
In the mid-1980s, however, the government adopted macroeconomic adjustment
policies; along with some liberalization of the industrial and trade regimes, these led to
1 In India, the state has played an important role in promoting industrialization. It owns more than 60%
of all productive capital in the industrial sector, and runs 8 out of the top ten enterprises in the country. It
directly employs two-thirds of all workers in the organized sector, through nationalized financial institutions
holds over 25% of paid-up capital of joint stock companies in the private sector (Bardhan 1984: 37-38).
considerable industrial growth and improved export performance. 2 In 1991, faced with an
acute balance-of-payment crisis, the government introduced the New Economic Policy and
the New Industrial Policy, bringing about a drastic shift towards trade liberalization and
economic reforms. As part of the policy, the government: 1) abolished the licensing Page 42
of system in 1992; 2) lifted the reservations to the state of many areas of economic activity;
3) relaxed restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital and technology transfer; 4) relaxed
restrictions on the large business houses; 5) abolished import controls on raw materials,
and intermediate and capital goods; 6) reduced the tariff levels; and 7) devaluated the
currency (Kaplinsky 1997).
Table 2.1. Recent Trends of Economic Performance in India
1950-80 81-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 [95-96
GDP growth rate 3.52 5.46 5.36 0.82 5.10 4.97 6.33 6.60
as a % of GDP:
Exports (%) n/a n/a 6.2 7.2 8.2 8.9 8.9 10
Imports (%) n/a n/a 9.4 8.4 10.1 9.8 10.6 12.8
Foreign n/a n/a 0.6 0.8 2.9 18.7 18.2 13
investment (%)
FDI (in US$ n/a n/a 165 150 341 586 1,314 2,133
millions)
Source: Constructed from data in various tables in Parikh 1997.
Table 2.1 shows recent trends in economic performance. One of the most dramatic
changes resulting from economic reforms was the increased inflow of foreign capital. The
actual inflow of FDI in India has increased fourteen times, from US $150 million in 1991-
92 to US $2,133 million in 1995-96 (Reserve Bank of India 1996 as cited in Sen et al.
1997). This growth in FDI is particularly striking, when compared with India's export
performance, which only nearly doubled during the same period, from US $17,866 million
2 These policies include: 1) Long-Term Fiscal Policy in 1985/86, 2) Long-Term Import Export Policy, 3)
Technology Policy, 4) Textile Policy, 5) Electronics Policy, 6) Computer Policy, and 7) Policy on Sick
Industries. These policies aimed to deregulate import restrictions in favor of the import of foreign
technology, particularly in the high-tech industries. But the effects of these policy reforms were modest
(Kaplinsky 1997).
to US $31,831 million (Government of India as cited in Parikh 1997). While India
remains a relatively unpopular destination for FDI as compared with countries like China,
Mexico and Singapore, 3 the trends in economic performance indicate a clear transformation
of the Indian economy towards being more open and globalized.
Not only did India see a considerable increase in demand for consumer goods, but
middle-income purchasing power also expanded in the domestic markets. These led to a
change in India's industrial structure in favor of consumer goods. Meanwhile, income
inequality widened and household savings fell. During the 1990s, then, the increase in
middle-class demand, coupled with the openness to imports and to international taste-
patterns, forced Indian manufacturers for the first time "to 'win over' consumers rather
than to produce poor-quality standardized products into a supply-constrained market"
(Kaplinsky 1997: 685).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews key policy
changes as part of the introduction of the liberalization policy and in particular those
pertaining to the automobile industry. Section 2.3 illustrates how the increased integration
of the Indian economy into the global economy has led to a rapid transformation of its
automobile industry, while Section 2.4 examines how it has brought about a dramatic
restructuring of the industry. Together, this chapter provides some background contexts in
which skill development occurs in firms in the automobile industry, which I discuss in
subsequent chapters (Chapters 3 and 4).
3 FDI is heavily concentrated in the largest recipient developing countries, which receive nearly 80% of the
total FDI inflows to the developing countries (Lall 1995). These countries are: China (US $158,462
million); Mexico (US $40,222 million); Singapore (US $39,176 million); Malaysia (US $31,967
million); Brazil (US $22,876 million); Argentina (US $22,409 million); Indonesia (US $20,773 million);
Thailand (US $14,238 million); Hong Kong (US $11,639 million); and Chile (US $10,152 million)
(OECD 1998: Table 2).
2.2 Liberalization Policy
This section reviews major changes in four policy areas as part of economic
reforms beginning in the mid-1980s, and illustrates how these changes have affected the
automobile industry. The four areas are licensing, foreign investment, localization, and
reservation.
2.2.1 Licensing Policy
The Indian government formulated its first industrial policy in 1948, when India
adopted the model of central planning to promote its overall economic development. This
early policy was characterized by heavy regulation, excessive state control over private
capital, and the promotion of state-owned enterprises in key industries.. The 1963 MRTP
introduced an extensive licensing regime (termed the "License Raj" in India) to control
virtually every aspect of the industrial activities of large private firms, such as entry, plant
size, product type and range, technology choice, and production capacity (Lall 1987,
Agrawal et al. 1995). Moreover, the government protected and promoted state-owned
enterprises by reserving key sectors of the industries for them. Thus it used licensing to
protect them and prevent them from facing competition with private firms.
In addition, the import substitution trade regime required trade licensing for all
imports, capital goods and intermediate inputs, including foreign technologies. This aimed
to protect the domestic markets from foreign competition and helped the nation attain the
goal of "self-reliance" (Lall 1987). This import licensing was relaxed in 1978, allowing
some items to be imported without a specific license under the category of an "Open
General License" (OGL). Later, under the 1985-1990 plan, the licensing policy was
further relaxed, with an expanded list of industries open to large firms (Bowonder 1998b).
Under this "License Raj" regime, the government promoted, protected, and
controlled two domestic car manufacturers--Hindustan Motors Ltd. (hereafter HML) and
Premier Auto Ltd. (hereafter PAL)--and several domestic commercial vehicle
manufacturers, such as Telco, Ashok Layland (a joint venture with British Layland), Bajaj
Tempo, and Eicher Motors. During this regime, virtually no new firms were permitted to
enter the industry. At the same time, government licensing kept these domestic producers
from expanding plant capacity, increasing product variety, and purchasing foreign
technologies. For example, Telco, which was considered a "monopoly" firm, took seven
years to obtain a license to start operating in its new plant in Pune in the 1970s. Likewise,
domestic producers were forced to produce old-fashioned cars with obsolete technologies:
From the 1950s on, HML was not permitted to undergo a major model change for the
"Ambassador," its only car model. Moreover, licensing kept the level of output for each
producer well below the demand level (Humphrey et al. 1998). In the 1980s, however,
considerable de-licensing occurred in the automobile industry, permitting four new comers
to enter the commercial vehicle sector, all in joint ventures: DCM-Toyota, Eicher-
Mitsubishi, Swaraj-Matsuda, and Allwyn-Nissan. In addition, existing vehicle
manufacturers were permitted to diversify their products, which allowed, for example,
Telco to enter the passenger car market.
After the 1991 liberalization policy, industrial licensing was totally abolished in
1992. Accordingly, the component industry was de-licensed in 1992, and the vehicle
manufacturers in 1993 (Humphrey et al. 1998), thus allowing firms to enter the market,
expand their operations, diversify their products, upgrade their technologies, and increase
their production, without requiring the lengthy process of obtaining licenses.
2.2.2 Foreign Investment Policy
During the earlier inward-looking trade regime, the government restricted the inflow
of foreign capital, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1974 forced
foreign investors to keep their equity share to 40% or less (Lall 1987).4 In addition, the
4 For the detailed discussions of this policy and its effects, see Lall 1987.
government imposed strict controls on the payments permitted and the life of the contract
for technology licensing (Lall 1987: 35).5 These policies constrained India's access to
foreign technologies for decades. Along with the absence of competition within the
domestic market that discouraged innovations, and the control of imports by licensing for
the purchase of foreign technologies, this policy left the automobile industry with large
technological gaps compared to the world's leading car producers.
The 1991 liberalization policy dramatically reversed India's anti-FDI position. In
1991, the government lifted FERA, which entailed that: 1) in 35 high-priority industries,
including automobiles, up to 51% of equity holding by foreign investors is automatically
approved if certain norms are satisfied; 2) FDI proposals no longer must include
technology transfer agreements; 3) trading companies primarily involved in export activities
are allowed up to 40% foreign equity; 4) existing firms can now raise foreign equity up to
51% for proposed expansion in priority industries; and 5) the 1973 FERA was amended
and restrictions placed on foreign firms by FERA were lifted (Sen et al. 1997: 132).
Gradually, the 51% limit on foreign equity was raised to 75%, except in a few industries
(Bowonder 1998b). In addition, a new policy package targeting the small scale industry
(SSI) sector, 6 including tiny units, 7 permitted equity participation in SSI firms, including
that by foreign collaborators, up to 24%, to encourage modernization and technological
upgrading in the sector (FICCI 1994).
5 The government restricted the royalty payments to be only up to 3-5% of the value of sales, and subject
to a 40% tax, and the life of a technology contract up to 5 years (with an exception of specially permitted
export-oriented industries). These conditions are unattractive compared to the norm in other countries,
where royalties of 5-10% are common (Lall 1987: 35).
6 Small-scale industry (SSI) refers to firms with an initial capital of Rs. 6 million (approximately US
$150,000), regardless of the size of employment. In the case of a firm which exports at least 30% of the
annual production by the end of the third year, the ceiling of investment goes up to Rs. 7.5 million. In
addition, an ancillary unit, with an initial capital of Rs. 7.5 million, also receives similar protection.
7 The government of India defines "tiny units' as those firms with an initial investment of up to Rs.0.5
million, as a subcategory of SSI firms.
2.2.3 Localization Policy
Under the import substitution industrialization regime, along with its commitment to
"self reliance," the government required, through its Phased Manufacturing Program
(PMP), both foreign and domestic producers to achieve a high level of localization of raw
materials and components.
The PMP was abolished in 1992. However, the government still implicitly
demanded 50% local content in approving foreign collaboration proposals; this would rise
to 70% after five years. In order to promote FDI, the government deliberately formed no
specific policy for the automobile industry with respect to local content. Rather, it signed
confidential "Memoranda of Understanding" (MOUs) with each new entrant on a case-by-
case basis (Humphrey et al. 1998). Imports of complete knockdown (CKD) kits with a
45% import duty were allowed in return for a firm's commitment to localization. Once
certain levels of local contents are achieved, CKDs can be imported at the prevailing duty
rate of 20-40% (Humphrey et al. 1998).
In 1997, with pressure from the industry to establish a clear and transparent policy
on the automobile industry, the government formed a new policy requiring that a new
foreign entrant 1) have a minimum foreign equity of US$50 million in the first three years
of operation; and 2) achieve local contents of 50% in the first three years, and 70% by the
fifth year (Humphrey et al. 1998).
2.2.4 Reservation Policy
Aside from extensive licensing, Indian industrial policy has required that more than
800 industrial products be produced exclusively by SSI firms. For some firms, this
interfered significantly with achieving economies of scale. Moreover, the government
provided various incentives for small firms, including favorable excise duties for every
activity in which they competed with large firms (Lall 1985b, 1987: 30).
This reservation policy has had a large impact on the development of the automotive
component industry in at least two ways. First, it prevented large auto manufacturers from
intensifying their vertical integration by acquiring small suppliers and expanding into their
activities. Second, it actively encouraged the growth of supporting industries by reserving
many auto components to be produced by the SSI sector (see Appendix 2.4 for a list of
such items), which forced auto manufacturers to buy rather than make these items. Thus,
unlike the experience in Southeast Asian countries, with this government support and
protection, small- and medium-scale firms that were capable of producing technologically
simple components existed long before liberalization policy was introduced.
As part of liberalization, the total of 17 industries reserved for the public sector was
reduced to 8 in 1991, and later to 6 (Bowonder 1998b). Even after liberalization, however,
the reservation policy for SSI continued, with only 7 items removed from the list by 1994,8
despite a recommendation for its lifting by a special government-appointed committee on
SSI. The government has been hesitant to abolish its reservation policy for SSI: it is
committed to employment generation, and also sees this sector's considerable growth in
export performance, with an increase in its export share from 13.2% in 1975-76 to 30% in
1990-91, and further to 34% in 1993-94 (Sen et al. 1997, FICCI 1994:3).9 Moreover, the
1991 liberalization resulted in a specific policy package introduced in 1994-95 for small,
tiny, and cottage industries aimed at stimulating growth impetus in this sector. 10
2.3 Globalization of the Indian Automobile Industry
8 Based on a study by UNIDO in 1996.
9 However, exports in the manufacturing sector has concentrated on relatively low value-added industries,
such as leather, garments, wood and wood products, and gems and jewelley.
10 In 1994-95, the government announced further policy changes concerning the SSI sector toward
deregulation and liberalization, including: 1) simplified duty structures; 2) the elimination of government
registration requirements to be qualified as SSI firms; 3) the abolishment of inspection systems for visits
by government inspectors without a written authorization (FICCI 1994).
This section describes how policy reforms since the mid-1980s reviewed above
have affected the performance of the Indian automobile industry, particularly in terms of the
growth of production, an increased inflow of FDI, and greater trade openness.
2.3.1 Growth Spurt and the Emergence of an Industrial Leader
Although the Indian automobile industry began to emerge in the early 1940s, its
growth lagged behind that of other countries from the mid-1950s on, because of the closed
and highly regulatory nature of the Indian economy as discussed above. Trade policies
such as the control of imports of raw materials, components, and equipment through
licensing, the restrictions on FDI, and the imposition of localization of components
production, protected the domestic market. At the same time, however, this inward-
looking trade regime constrained the growth of domestic car producers, with little exposure
to foreign technology or international competition."
These trade and industrial policies discouraged the industry from attaining
economies of scale and improving its performance in terms of both costs and quality.
Moreover, very high levels of excise duties on passenger cars, which the government
classified as "luxury goods," also impeded the growth of this segment even within the
domestic market. Thus, during the 1970s, the number of passenger cars in production,
mainly by HML and PAL, remained almost unchanged throughout the decade, at 33,000
per annum on average;12 in fact the average annual growth rate was negative (see Table 2.2
below).
This picture changed dramatically in the early 1980s, with the entry of Maruti
Udyog Ltd. (hereafter Maruti), a joint venture between the Indian government and a
Japanese auto manufacturer (Suzuki Motors Corp., hereafter Suzuki), into the domestic
11 In the early 1940s, both local and foreign auto makers started producing cars in India, but in the 1950s,
the government imposed the gradual localization of component production, which forced foreign firms such
as GM and Ford to withdraw their operations in India, and prevented new firms from entering the industry
(Kojima 1995).
12 I calculated this from the data in Automobile Component Manufacturing Association of India (ACMA)
1995b.
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market. While Maruti started as a private firm, the government nationalized it in 1980 and
reached joint venture and licensing agreements with Suzuki in 1982.13 Suzuki's 26%
equity participation in Marurti was the largest single FDI in India and the first major
investment by a Japanese company (Venkataramani 1989: 2).14 Maruti remained a state
enterprise until 1992, when the government's share of equity was reduced from 60% to
49.9%, in accordance with government policy change that allowed public enterprises to
form joint ventures.
Table 2.2: Production Growth by Type of Vehicle (numbers)
1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 Average Average Average
annual annual Annual
growth growth growth
rate (%) Rate (%) Rate (%)
1 1971-80 1981-90 1991-95
Cars 36,032 21,658 31,275 102,804 181,821 347,800 -2.5 19.2 13.3
Jeeps9,876 7,133 15,667 27,961 37,369 67,643 3.5 10.8 8.8
Commercial 62,165 76,998 144,480 173,908 283,129 450,441 9.7 7.3 9.3
vehicles
Two 108,576 213,219 440,310 1190917 1820746 2658106 14.7 16.2 6.3
wheelers
Three 4,743 13,378 26,930 49,947 89,162 161,679 17.6 13.7 9.9
w heelers I _ __ 7 .4
Total 221,392 332,386 658,662 1545537 2412227 3685669 11.5 14.7 7.4
Source: Constructed and calculated from data in ACMA 1996
13 The origin of Maruti was highly political. Initially, Sanjay Gandhi, the elder son of then-Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, started Maruti Ltd. as a private firm to achieve his dream of producing a "national
car." Due to some political problem, however, it never started operation, and closed down in 1977. Indira
Gandhi's government nationalized the firm in 1980, after the death of Sanjay Gandhi, to achieve her son's
dream. Advised that the project would not succeed without the involvement of foreign technology, Indira
Gandhi started searching for a potential partner. The government signed joint-venture and license
agreements with Suzuki in 1982 (Interviews with a former CEO, Maruti Udyog Ltd.). Suzuki ranks only
the sixth largest among the nine Japanese auto manufacturers. In the early 1980s, precisely because of its
weaker domestic base, Suzuki, in search for a market niche, was keen to go to India, which then the major
Japanese auto manufacturers considered to be a high-risk country for investment. In fact, larger
manufacturers like Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi all started a joint venture in the Indian market in the
early 1980s, but virtually all withdraw by the late 1980s. Only Suzuki, with generous government
support, managed to remain successful all along, with Maruti being its largest overseas operation.
14 This 26% in cash equity participation was the highest bid. Mitsubishi, which was the second highest,
offered only 10%. FDI in India was then considered still risky. In fact, the then Japanese ambassador to
India advised Suzuki not to take part in this project (A talk by Mr. Bhargava, a former CEO of Maruti, at
Harvard, February 1998).
As Table 2.2 shows, the industry's growth spurt occurred in the 1980s--even
before the 1991 introduction of liberalization policy--particularly in the production of
passenger cars, jeeps, and motorcycles. In fact, somewhat surprisingly, most vehicle
types recorded higher growth rates in the 1980s than in the 1990s. As of 1995-96, India
produced a total of 3.7 million vehicles (including two-wheelers) per year, ranking it as the
seventh largest auto producer among developing countries.
Figure 2.1: Passenger Cars Production by Manufacturers
300000
250000
200000 4P
----- Hindustan
PAL-Peugeot
15000- Premier
Maruti
.. ----- ercedes
Nil Telco100000
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year
Source: ACMA 1996.
As Figure 2.1 indicates, the growth in the passenger car segment of the Indian
automobile industry has largely been due to Maruti's growth. In 1983, Maruti started
producing a small passenger car (the "Maruti 800") modeled after Suzuki's 800cc cars, in
its new "greenfield" plant; it was the first modem assembly plant in India, as the Indian
automobile industry was still largely operating in the craft production principle. It was a
close copy of Suzuki's Kosai plant in Japan, in terms of plant layout, equipment, the
organization of production and the operating principle. But, Maruti's level of automation
was much lower than Suzuki's, because of large technological gaps between the two
countries and much lower labor costs in India. While all capital goods were purchased
from Japan, and all the technologies were brought from Suzuki, Maruti has paid Suzuki
only 3,000 yen (approx. US $25.00) per sale of a vehicle as a loyalty, thus keeping the
costs of technology transfer relatively low.
Maruti's cars were 21% cheaper than the lowest-priced existing passenger car
produced by domestic manufacturers, yet offered much higher quality, more safety
features, and greater fuel efficiency. Since then, Maruti has dominated the small car
segment, which was virtually untapped before its entry. With capital costs written off and
over 90% localization, Maruti's production costs are extremely low: At the price of Rs.
210,000 (US$ 5,927), Maruti's small car is still "probably the cheapest car available in the
world today" (Sen et al. 1997: 138). With sales of its cars soaring at 16% per year, Maruti
sold more units in its first five years of operation than all other domestic manufacturers
combined in the previous forty years. 15
Maruti achieved a remarkable productivity growth, with 53 cars produced per
employee per year, as compared with 5 for HMI, in 1996-97.16 This makes Maruti's
productivity the highest in the Indian automobile industry, and even comparable to those of
world-leading car manufacturers such as Toyota (whose number of vehicles produced per
employee was 51 in 1991).17 Figure 2.2 shows Maruti's recent growth in productivity in
terms of the number of vehicles produced per employee per year and value added per
employee, which have nearly doubled and grown four times respectively between 1992-93
and 1996-97. Table 2.3 compares Maruti's value added per worker with those for the
automobile industry in Japan, the U.S., and Germany, indicating Maruti's rapid process of
catching-up with the world leading car producers, despite its relatively recent entry in the
industry.
15 The Economic Times New Delhi, May 8, 1996.
16 Calculated from Maruti's and HML's 1996-97 annual reports.
17 Fujimoto 1997: Figure 3.2. Due to the two firms' different product mix, these figures are not
comparable in a strict sense.
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Table 2.3: Productivity Comparison: Maruti and Global Players
Maruti Maruti Japan U.S. Germany
1987-88 1995-96 1987 1987 1987
Value Added Per
Employee ($1,000) 28.5 57.6 73.3 75.8 45.0
Notes: 1) Figures for Japan, the U.S. and Germany are the industrial average for both assemblers
and component manufacturers combined. Therefore, these figures are not comparable with that for
Maruti in a strict sense. 2) Figures for Maruti take into account different exchange rates for the
two periods. The exchange rates for 1987-88 and 1995-96 were Rs.13.40 and Rs.33.18 per dollar
respectively. Therefore, Differences in the figures between the two periods appear smaller than
shown in Figure 2.2.
Source: Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994 (for Japan, the U.S. and Germany data); Maruti 1998 (for
Maruti data).
During the 1980s, the government carefully protected and supported Maruti, by
preventing other foreign firms from entering the Indian market and other domestic firms
from entering the small-car segment through licensing and policy measures as mentioned
earlier. For example, the government never granted license for Telco's proposal to start a
joint venture with Honda to produce passenger cars. Moreover, in 1983, the government
reduced customs and excise duties for cars which had a capacity of no more than 1000 cc, a
criteria that virtually only Maruti's small car could qualify (Venkataramani 1992). In
subsequent years, only Maruti was granted foreign exchange clearance for two models of
its middle-sized cars by the government.18 Even after the 1991 liberalization policy, with
Maruti's dominance in the small-car segment, other late entrants had to turn to the higher
end of the passenger market; they could hardly compete with the price of Maruti's small
car, given their lower levels of localization and the higher costs of imported components.
In the 1990s, the domestic market expanded markedly and the competition within
the domestic market intensified, with the growth of middle-class consumers who can afford
to buy cars (estimated at 100 to 200 million), and increased variety in consumer tastes.
Maruti diversified its product range, introducing new middle-sized passenger cars in the
early 1990s. In response to Maruti's growing dominance in the market, and a rapid
expansion of the domestic market, local passenger producers such as PAL and HML had to
upgrade their models, with foreign technical collaboration from Fiat and Peugeot and from
Isuzu respectively.19
Telco, a local manufacturer, has traditionally dominated the heavy and light
commercial vehicle markets, with its market share at 62% in the commercial vehicle sector
in 1994-95.20 It also diversified its product range and entered the passenger car market,
introducing three models of multi-utility vehicles, after the abolishment of licensing in
1992. Further, in 1997, Telco started producing small passenger cars, as the "first genuine
18 The Economic Times, New Delhi, November 9, 1996.
19 PAL produced an updated Fiat124 body, while HML introduced a new model, Contessa, based on a
Vauxhall body with an Isuzu engine (Eurotech International 1993).
20 See Bowonder (1998a) for a detailed account of Telco's historical development.
Asian car," entering the market segment so far almost monopolized by Maruti. Telco's
successful performance in terms of both remarkable growth in production and its entry,
without FDI involvement, into the domestic passenger car market, where competition has
become fiercely intensified, stands out among local car manufacturers in India and even in
developing countries as a whole. Many recent studies report the growing dominance of
FDI in the automobile industries in the emerging markets, such as Mexico, Brazil, and
China, where local producers, both assemblers and suppliers, have increasingly lost their
independence (the exception is perhaps Hyundai in Korea).21
By the mid-1990s, the Indian automobile industry saw the entry of many foreign
car producers in the middle-sized passenger car market. With a rapid expansion of the
domestic market and export growth, sales of passenger cars in the industry as a whole
doubled in the three years between 1993 and 1996. Interestingly, despite the intensified
competition, Maruti continued to grow remarkably, with its share in the passenger car
market rising to 80% in 1996-97, after the entry of several new players.
2.3.2 FDI and Internationalization of the Automobile Industry
Reflecting the government's dramatic turnaround in its policy toward foreign capital
in 1991, which resulted in the virtual elimination of restrictions on FDI, however, the
automobile industry experienced a big spurt in the inflow of FDI in the 1990s. One major
factor motivating foreign auto manufacturers to enter India is clearly the huge growth
potential of the Indian domestic market, with an estimated total population of 940 million
and a recent reported growth in middle-class consumers.22 As discussed earlier, the 1991
uplifting of FERA resulted in a rapid increase in foreign collaboration with local assemblers
and component manufacturers; as of 1996, there were a total of 89 financial collaborations,
21 See Amsden (1989).
22 However, the industry's analysts have recently modified downward their projections of the industry's
growth, admitting that they had overestimated the growth of the Indian middle class that could afford to
purchase passenger cars.
and a total of 211 technical collaborations (through licensing agreements) between local
component firms and foreign firms.23
With this increased alliance with global auto makers, the passenger car segment has
experienced very rapid transformations in recent years. In 1995, two local car
manufacturers, PAL and HML, both started new joint ventures (PAL with Peugeot and
Fiat, and HML with GM and Mitsubishi respectively) to produce new middle-sized
passenger cars, which are luxury cars in the Indian context. Mercedes-Benz from
Germany started producing luxury cars in 1995, with a new joint venture with Telco.
Daewoo from Korea also started local production in 1995. Another Korean manufacturer,
Hyundai, set up a 100% subsidiary to start operations in 1998.24 By 1998, U.S. auto
manufacturers such as Ford and GM, as well as other Japanese auto makers such as Toyota
and Honda, had all entered the Indian passenger car market (see Appendix 2.1 and 2.2).
The entry of these new auto manufacturers has made the Indian automobile market
extremely competitive.
Also, many of the world's major auto component manufacturers, such as Delphi
(GM's 100% subsidiary component supplier division), Lucas-TVS (a joint venture with
Lucas in the U.K.), MICO (a joint venture with Bosch in Germany), and Denso India (a
joint venture between Maruti and Denso in Japan), entered India to start local production to
supply such new joint-venture car manufacturers (see Appendix 2.3 for a profile of the 25
largest component manufacturers in India).25 Some of them have long-term plans to
source components from India in the future.26 The entry of these global suppliers has
posed enormous challenges to local component producers, particularly in terms of
23 Calculated from ACMA 1996.
24 The government announced in 1994 that it would give preference to foreign investments by MNCs
through joint ventures with Indian partners, over the establishment of wholly-owned holding companies or
subsidiaries. However, in 1995 the Foreign Investments Promotion Board (FIPB) suddenly approved a
number of MNCs to set up 100% subsidiaries on special grounds. FIPB approved Hyundai because its
proposal included 78% localization and committed to 98% localization by 2000 (Sen et al. 1997).
25 For discussions on implications of the emergence of global supplier networks for supplier relations in
the Indian and Brazilian automotive industries, see Humphrey et al. 1998.
26 The Economic Times, Bombay, July 19, 1995.
improving their quality standards, as it exposes them to the unprecedented global
competition emerging in the domestic market.
The largest number of foreign joint ventures came from Japan. This is due not only
to Maruti's dominance in the industry (in joint venture with Suzuki), but also to the large
presence of Japanese joint ventures in two-wheeler segments, such as TVS Suzuki (a joint
venture with Suzuki), Hero Honda Motors Ltd. and Kinetic Honda Motors Ltd. (both in
joint ventures with Honda). Thus, many Japanese joint-venture partners are suppliers of
Suzuki and Honda in Japan. In fact, a dozen Maruti suppliers set up joint ventures with
Suzuki's suppliers, through a matchmaking initiative by Maruti-Suzuki. Several firms that
are Maruti's key suppliers with a joint venture with Suzuki's suppliers are located within
the same complex as Maruti's main plant in Gurgaon.
The concern among first-tier suppliers, including relatively small firms, that they
must upgrade their capabilities so they can expand their business with these new joint-
venture car manufacturers, has led many of them to form partnerships with foreign firms.
Some of the suppliers I interviewed have more than four foreign partners. One large firm
producing lighting equipment, air filter systems, and rear mirrors (with 1,845 employees)
has five joint ventures (2 Japanese, 1 Spanish, 1 U.S., and 1 Korean) for different
products, while another firm producing similar products (with 183 employees) has four
foreign collaborators. The growth in the number of FDI-related car manufacturers has led
local suppliers to develop partnerships with their respective suppliers in their home
countries, to meet different product specifications and standards.
Many firms have opted for foreign partnerships not only because of strategic
decisions to expand their businesses but also because they fear that without them, they will
fail. In fact, one small-scale firm owner said, "I honestly don't know if this is the right
thing to do. But, since everyone else is doing it, I just don't want to be left out. In the
long run, there will be a tremendous restructuring of the industry and only the fortunate
few among local component producers will survive. The majority of us may be all wiped
out by foreign firms unless we improve our product quality." This fear seems common
among small-scale component manufacturers, and has led them to build alliances with
foreign firms to invest in plant capacity and develop technological capabilities.
Against this trend toward increased FDI involvement, however, in a few cases,
firms actually terminated such alliances with foreign firms. For example, a large-scale
maker of clutch components had a joint venture with a Japanese component firm, which is
a key supplier to Toyota, between 1991 and 1993. But this firm decided to terminate this
partnership because the Japanese partner was interested in transferring technology
concerned with Japanese components, i.e., components supplied to Maruti, and was not
willing to give any advice on other components. Differences between local suppliers and
their global component manufacturers in their expectations of partnerships, in their
management styles, and in their understanding as to the terms of technology transfer often
give rise to some tensions between them.
2.3.3 Trade Performance: Gradual But Modest Entry into the Global
Markets
As discussed above, until the mid-1980s, trade policies under the inward-looking
trade regime discouraged exports of vehicles and components, and controlled imports of
capital goods, raw materials, and components, as well as vehicles.
In the first half of the 1990s, however, as Table 2.4 indicates, exports of both
vehicles and components increased considerably. But, for passenger cars and jeeps, the
growth has been slower and is still very small in volume, with only 32,321 cars and jeeps,
or 9% of total cars produced, being exported in 1995-96. In fact, the growth in exports of
components has been much faster in the 1990s at an average of 13.4% per year, compared
to that for cars and jeeps at an average of 5.9% per year.
Imports of cars and jeeps have also grown slowly, reflecting the high import duties
that remain even after the 1991 liberalization. In fact, export growth for passenger cars and
jeeps has been much slower than their production growth during the same period (see Table
2.4). Clearly, the Indian auto industry has grown primarily because of the expanded
domestic market rather than the export growth.27
Table 2.4: Trends in Export and Import Performance of the Automobile Industry
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 Average
Annual
Change(
%/)
Vehicles &Engines
(Numbers of units)
Exports
Total n/a 63,964 73,886 115,807 179,346 193,944 32.0%
Cars & Jeeps n/a 25,660 16,029 18,835 22,933 32,321 5.9%
Imports
Total 478 520 502 816 1,598 n/a 35.2%
Cars & Jeeps (new 296 124 157 301 373 n/a 6.0%
assembly)
Auto Components
(US $millions)
Exports
Total 124.5 170.1 189.1 197.5 209.9 226.0 13.4%
Imports
Total 279.2 223.0 265.9 257.1 323.2 n/a 3.7%
Notes: Exchange rates are derived from IMF 1997. One dollar was Rs. 18.81 f
93; Rs. 30.71 for 1993-94; Rs. 31.64 for 1994-95; and Rs. 33.18 for 1995-96.
Source: Constructed and calculated from data in ACMA 1996.
With regard to the export of vehicles, Telco has been a main exporter in the industry
even during the inward-looking trade regime. Telco started exporting its trucks to more
than 80 developing countries in 1961-62 (Lall 1987).28 Telco exported over 15% of its
outputs abroad even in the early 1980s (Lall 1985a). While exports were much less
profitable than domestic sales,29 the firm promoted exports as a deliberate strategy to prove
its capabilities in international markets (Lall 1987: 176). Telco exported 16,581 vehicles,
or 7% of its outputs, in 1995-96, including 3,212 passenger cars, which accounts for 13%
27 New joint ventures with European, U.S., Japanese and Korean auto makers began only in 1995;
therefore, their performance is not reflected here.
28 A total of 28,214 trucks had been exported in the 20 years between 1961-62 and 1981-82 (Lall 1987).
29 But, because of export subsidies, exports were not made at a loss (Lall 1987).
or 1990-91; Rs. 27.0 6 for 1992-
of all passenger car exports from India.30 In addition, Telco was the single largest exporter
of engineerig goods from India as early as 1978 and a multinational firm in its own right
(Lall 1985a: 271).
Maruti has also been a major source of recent export growth, exporting 26,103
vehicles in 1995-96 (25% increase from the previous year), and thus accounting for nearly
81% of all passenger car exports from India.31 In 1986, Maruti started exporting 10% of
its annually produced cars, as a response to the public criticism that Maruti was not
contributing much to local technological development. Until recently, however, Maruti
(and its collaborator Suzuki) was rather reluctant to export its products, fearing that they
would not meet the quality standard required to compete in the global markets. Moreover,
vehicles exported abroad, many to European markets, were not generating much profit--
they used a higher content of imported components than those produced for the domestic
market. As the price of imported components were determined in US dollars, an
appreciation of yen against dollars affected the price significantly, thus making profit
margins of exported cars negative. 32 But since 1986, the government has been pushing
Maruti to export, to promote innovation; in its near-monopoly position, the firm had little
incentive to innovate without exports. This export push has forced Maruti to meet the
feedback from overseas dealers and customers, making the firm to produce more cost-
efficient and better-quality cars.
While the component industry's export performance in recent years is quite
impressive, many exporters tend to cater to the lower-grade "after market" for repair parts
abroad rather than produce high-technology high-quality OEM (original equipment
manufacturers) parts for foreign car makers. This is because the technological capabilities
of these component manufacturers are generally limited (with few firms having their own
R&D facilities) given their low quality, they cannot meet the product standards expected in
30 Telco's Annual Report 1996-97.
31 Maruti's Annual Report 1996-97.
the international market. For example, Denso India Ltd., a joint venture between Maruti
and Denso, one of the largest global component suppliers and a key Toyota group firm, has
not ventured into exports due to its products' low quality below the standards acceptable to
Denso in Japan, even though the latter has actively promoted a cross sourcing operation
with other overseas affiliates. However, supplies to OEMs abroad have also gradually
increased in recent years. For example, Sundaram Fastners supplies 85% of GM's need
for radiator caps in the U.S.33 Moreover, the entry of several new FDI car manufacturers
has recently created the problem of over capacity within the domestic market, due to a
smaller demand increase in the domestic market than predicted by industrial analysts in the
early 1990s; this forces the component industry to turn increasingly to export markets.
Such interests in exports have provided component manufacturers with an acute sense of
their need to improve their product quality to gain international acceptance and recognition.
As seen above, economic reforms since the mid-1980s have led the automobile
industry to grow rapidly, to increase its linkages with the global automobile industry
through increased FDI, and to be more open to trade. Clearly, Maruti and Telco, the
industry's two leading firms, have played a key role in these transformations in terms of
both promoting growth and improving export performance, while acquiring
competitiveness in the face of the increasing integration of the Indian automobile industry
with the global auto industry.
2.4 Changes in the Structure of the Automobile Industry
The rapid transformation of the Indian automobile industry, with a number of new
entrants with joint ventures with foreign car manufacturers, as discussed above, has
drastically changed the structure of the automotive component industry. The Indian
automobile industry consists of about two dozen assemblers of different vehicle types and
32 The price of CKD components was set in US dollars; even though the dollar value remained the same,
the yen value became 31% less, due to the appreciation of yen.
the automotive component industry. The latter consists of 350 large- and medium-scale
firms in the organized sector, and approximately 6,000 small-scale firms in the unorganized
sector, which accounts for 30% of total production (ACMA 1995b). This coincides with
the distribution of manufacturing enterprises in India, reflecting the government's policy of
promoting and protecting small-scale industry (SSI) firms, as discussed in Chapter 1. Of
these 6,350 component producers, about 400 firms are members of the Automotive
Component Manufacturers Association of India (ACMA), a single association representing
component makers.
Table 2.5: Growth of Automotive Components/ Parts Production
(by Type of Components) (value in US$
millions)
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96
Engine Parts 453.3 445.7 468.9 495.6 605.1 720.4
Electrical 105.1 94.0 94.3 102.7 133.0 163.6
parts
Drive 288.9 288.1 271.8 278.0 350.0 459.4
transmissions
and steering
parts
Suspension 161.2 157.0 195.8 205.9 310.7 408.2
braking parts
Equipment 52.2 47.5 49.4 74.2 89.1 132.5
Other 85.5 75.4 102.8 127.6 147.6 216.0
Total 1,146.1 1,107.7 1,183.0 1,283.9 1,635.6 2,100.0
organized
sector
SSI sector 342.8 332.3 354.9 410.9 490.7 630.0
(estimated) I I I I I I
Total auto 1,490.0 1,440.0 1,537.9 1,694.8 2,126.2 2,730.0
component
Industry
(%increase) (-3.4%) (6.8%) (10.2%) (25.5%) (28.4%)
Source: ACMA 1996
Despite this large number of enterprises in the automotive industry, however, the
Indian automotive component industry is still fairly small by international standards
33 The Economic Times New Delhi, May 8, 1996.
(ACMA 1995a, Kumar et al. 1995). Its total annual sales, of US $2.6 billion, place the
industry on the same scale as a single fairly large first-tier supplier like Sumitomo Electric
(Kumar et al. 1995). In fact, only eight component manufacturers had sales turnover
exceeding US $100 million in 1996 (see Appendix 2.3). This implies that the Indian
automotive firms face a very serious problem in attaining economies of scale.
However, the component industry also grew by 13% annually in the 1990s, much
higher than the growth rate of 7.4% for the automobile industry (see Table 2.2); production
almost doubled in the first five years of the decade (see Table 2.5).34 This is partly
because, despite the 1991 liberalization policy, imported components still bear
disproportionately high customs and excise duties, 35 forcing vehicle assemblers to develop
a domestic supplier base.36 Moreover, as seen earlier, exports of components have grown
rapidly (see Table 2.4), and the replacement market has been growing fast, as I discuss
later.
While the component manufacturers in the organized sector account for 77% of the
total automotive component production in value terms in 1995-96, the production by the
SSI sector is estimated to account for 23% of component production. As discussed earlier,
the government's reservation policy has helped protect small-scale producers while they
develop, but has also discouraged domestic firms from competing in the global market. In
particular, it has prevented the industry from attaining economies of scale in production,
resulting in considerable inefficiencies. Moreover, a series of policies provided SSI firms
with preferential treatments with regard to land acquisition, water, electricity and telephone
connection, and concessionary excise duties. These policies have encouraged
entrepreneurs to enter the business as small-scale firms; they have also led some large firms
34 This is in dollar terms. In rupee terms, the component industry's growth is even more impressive:
26.4% annually in the 1990s, with production tripling between 1990 and 1995 (calculated from ACMA
1996).
35 Eurotech International 1995.
36 Customs duty of up to 50% is levied on imported components (while import duties on components were
as high as 131% until 1991).
to split into several small-scale firms in order to qualify as SSI firms, despite a loss in
efficiency (Lall 1987). There are no official data on the profile or performance of SSI firms
in the unorganized sector of the automobile industry. However, given the rapid growth of
the SSI sector over the last few years (Government of India 1994), the distribution between
the organized and unorganized sectors may have actually shifted in favor of the latter more
than the estimates in Table 2.5 indicate.
2.4.1 Creating A Local Supplier Base
Due largely to the policy measures described above, which encouraged the import
substitution industrialization, and "self-reliance" since the 1950s, existing auto
manufacturers have traditionally achieved high levels of local contents. Local producers,
such as HML, PAL, and Telco currently rely on almost 100% local components, while
Maruti has also achieved 96% local contents for its 800cc small car and mini van (ACMA
1995a).37
Several factors explain Maruti's unusually high level of local contents. First, as
discussed earlier, the government's phased manufacturing program (PMP) mandated
foreign firms to promote localization; Suzuki's MOU (Memorandum of Understanding)
with its joint-venture partner, the Indian government, included its commitment to achieve
50% local contents within the first three years, and 70% by the fifth year. Second, the
appreciation of the yen in the early 1980s, along with the high customs duty imposed on
CKD (110% until 1991), made imported components from Japan extremely expensive,38
leading Maruti to fear that if it used CKD (complete knock-down) imports, it could not
compete with other domestic producers. 39 Thus, not only local content requirements but
37 This figure applies to HML's passenger cars (Ambassador, Contessa); PAL's passenger cars
(Padmini,NE1 18); and Telco's multi-utility vehicles (Tata Sierra, Estate, and Sumo). Maruti's local
contents are lower for other models (80% for Gypsy; 85% for Maruti 1000; and 75% for middle-sized
Esteem) (ACMA 1995a).
38 The price of CKD was determined in US dollars, and thus the exchange rate between the US dollar and
the Japanese yen significantly affected the cost of production (talk by Mr. R.C. Bhargava, former CEO of
Maruti, at Harvard University, February 1998).
39 Mr. R.C. Bhargava, talk at Harvard, 1998.
also cost considerations led Maruti to develop local suppliers. Third, initially, Maruti
focused on the domestic market and not on exports, allowing it to compromise on the
quality of the components produced by local suppliers; this would not have been acceptable
if it were exporting its products.
Fourth, Suzuki, as a small assembler in Japan (ranked only the sixth among the
nine Japanese car manufacturers), let alone on a global scene, has a relatively weak supplier
base at home, compared to other larger assemblers such as Toyota and Nissan. It has a
"kyoryokukai" (supplier associations formed by a car manufacturer for its "keiretsu"
supplier firms) only for its small-scale suppliers located near its plants.40 When Maruti
started its operation in India, few dedicated suppliers of Suzuki could afford to follow
Suzuki to India to supply parts for Maruti. Finally, as discussed earlier, many local small-
scale firms that could serve as ancillaries already existed, although their technological level
was not compatible. Maruti stands in sharp contrast to the cases of the Japanese affiliates
in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where they had to develop
suppliers from scratch, as no local supporting industries had existed prior to their entry.
Faced with the dilemma between the poor quality of locally-produced components
on the one hand and the need to increase local contents on the other, what strategies did
Maruti take? The firm arranged a joint venture between local suppliers and Suzuki's
suppliers in Japan. Maruti itself holds equity in about a dozen such joint-venture suppliers
of key components, many located in Maruti's premises, to gain greater control over the
management of their operation and performance standards. Moreover, it has made
enormous efforts to develop the capabilities of its suppliers (see Chapter 4). The
development of suppliers has been particularly important for Maruti, given its high reliance
on outsourcing which accounts for 80% of the value of a car, even higher than the level of
outsourcing in Japan (70%).41 Further, while Maruti supplies key components from a
40 See Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994.
41 Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994 for the figure on Japan.
small number of large-scale suppliers in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, its growth has
also encouraged many small-scale entrepreneurs to start business in close locations; about
one third of 404 Maruti suppliers were established after Maruti started its operation in
1983.42 These new small firms became more easily attuned to Maruti's quality standards
and style of operations than old ones.
New entrants do not necessarily start with a high degree of localization. For
instance, Mercedes-Benz India relies on about 95% CKD imports (while it aims at
increasing local contents up to 50% in the first five years), while Daewoo relies on 83% to
85% imported components.43 But, as Table 2.6 shows, until 1993, they were forced to
propose a gradual increase in their local contents under the PMP to accelerate their
procurement of local components. Even though the PMP was lifted in 1993, new entrants
were actually forced to continue increasing the level of localization, due to two factors: the
high customs duty (currently 50% for CKDs and components, in addition to a
countervailing duty of 60%) and the licensing required for CKD imports (Mukherjee and
Sastry 1996).44 Moreover, Maruti, their main competitor, has achieved more than 90%
localization and already written off its initial capital investment. Therefore, new joint
ventures with foreign manufacturers, many starting as "greenfield" projects, could never
compete with Maruti's prices if they had to rely on expensive imported components. This
means that they either have to search out desirable suppliers from the existing pools to
create tiered supply chains, or set up their own subsidiaries, or bring their own suppliers
from their home countries.
New entrants generally prefer to work with suppliers that have joint ventures with
their own suppliers in the home country. Companies like GMI, Ford, Mercedes-Benz, and
Toyota are all encouraging their group companies or their established suppliers to create
42 Data are from Maruti's Supplier Data Base.
43 My interview with a market research officer at Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).
44 A study by Humphrey et al. (1998) reports that the government increased tariffs on imported
components in 1997. But it reduces tariffs on component sets for firms which achieved 50% local contents.
manufacturing facilities in India (ACMA 1995a). In fact, some newcomers, such as
Daewoo, GMI, and most recently Toyota, are investing in auto component supplier bases
near their plants. The increasing presence of these global suppliers in India has posed
serious challenges to local vehicle assemblers to develop and consolidate their supplier
bases which have largely relied on a large number of small-scale local suppliers.
Table 2.6: Local Contents for Car Models Agreed by New Entrants under PMP (%)
Models 1st 2 nd 3 rd 4 th 5 th
DCM Daewoo (Cielo) 30 40 60 70 80
PAL-Peugeot Ltd.(Peugeot 309 15 25 65 70 80
GL)
GM (Opel Astra) 40 50 60 70 70
Mercedes-Benz (Mercedes E220) 10 30 50 60 70
PAL (UNO) 30 40 50 70 80
Source: ACMA 1995.
The increased competition with new suppliers arriving in India with new vehicle
manufacturers has forced local component manufacturers to improve the quality of their
products. However, despite its recent growth, the automotive component industry is still
limited in terms of technology, quality, and productivity. To strengthen their own supplier
bases, local large business houses such as the Tata group (of which Telco is a member
firm) and the Birla group (of which HML is a member firm), as well as local vehicle
producers such as Mahindra & Mahindra, have all set up joint ventures with global
suppliers to produce components (Kumar et al. 1995, ACMA 1995a). For example, in
1997, the Tata group set up a new firm, Tata Auto Component Systems (TACO), to
manage 20 new joint-venture suppliers in a "greenfield" supplier park in the state of Tamil
Nadu. Similarly, in 1997, Maruti also set up a new supplier park close to its main plant in
Gurgaon as a joint venture between Maruti and the Haryana State Industrial Development
Corporation (HSIDC) as part of the industrial model township developed by HSIDC, to
house Maruti's 65 first-tier suppliers which produce essential and critical components for
Maruti cars, and to ensure unhindered supply of these components. The cost of the
development of this industrial park, at nearly Rs.100 crore (or approx. US $30 million),
was shared between Maruti and HSIDC. A tripartite plant-level committee comprising
representatives of Maruti, the government, and HSIDC oversaw the process of planning
and implementation of this project. Clearly, Maruti's close collaboration with the
government has facilitated the development of Maruti's local supplier base.
2.4.2 Changing Supplier Relations
As discussed above, small-scale firns account for a large proportion of Indian
component suppliers. During the inward-looking trade and industrial regime, a small
production volume and absence of competition provided auto assemblers with few
incentives to strengthen the capabilities of their suppliers. Thus, Indian supplier relations
have been generally "arms' length" in nature, as in the U.S. until the 1980s (Florida and
Kenney 1991), where assemblers form short-term contractual relationships with a large
number of suppliers largely driven by prices. However, Maruti took a dramatically
different approach to its suppliers, with a more long-term close relationship with them
based on reciprocal interactions, with a greater emphasis on quality and on-time delivery,
adopting some elements of the Japanese model of supplier relations (see Chapter 4 for more
detailed discussions).
The recent entry of several new joint-venture car manufacturers, which has
increased the number of product varieties, has led local component manufacturers to
diversify their customers. This has also induced these suppliers to adopt more flexible
production techniques to ease the changeover of tools and lines and allow low-cost tooling
(ACMA 1995a). In fact, unlike the widely-believed Japanese model of "keiretsu,"45 where
45 Contrary to the popular belief that the Japanese auto component suppliers have exclusive contractual
relationships with a single car manufacturer in the "keiretsu" system, many Japanese suppliers do have
multiple customers. While Toyota's suppliers usually do not have contractual relations with Nissan, and
vice versa, it is common for these suppliers to cater to other Japanese car manufacturers. In addition, there
are many independent suppliers who do not belong to any "keiretsu." Fujimoto and Takeishi (1994), based
on their study on the Japanese supplier relations, show the relationship between the type of components and
the degree of autonomy (as indicated by the number of customers). According to their study, over 60
a single customer forms a group of loyal suppliers based on long-term stable supplier
relations, car manufacturers in India generally encourage their suppliers to take on multiple
customers due to a relatively small volume of production, thus allowing them to seek
economies of scale. Car assemblers also need multiple sources, because factors such as
poor infrastructure (roads, electricity, and telecommunication) make it costly to rely on a
single source of supply for each component. Despite such moves, a considerable number
of suppliers remain loyal to one customer. For instance, of Maruti's 404 suppliers, 58
firms depend on Maruti for more than 90% (in many cases 100%) of their sales.46
Given India's vast country size, as in the U.S. (Florida and Kenney 1991), the
location of assembly plants greatly influences the location of suppliers at different levels in
the supply chain. In fact, the geographical dispersion of auto manufacturers to different
parts of the country has historically led to the evolution of industrial districts in various
regions such as Pune, Faridabad, and Madras, where many small-scale component
suppliers are concentrated, actually supplying only customers in the region.47 Thus, while
every car assembler has suppliers from all over the country, each has a supplier base in its
respective region. For example, 60% of the 5,800 all manufacturing firms in industrial
districts in Pune in the state of Maharashtra, constitute a supplier base for three local auto
manufacturers (Telco, Bajaj Tempo and Bajaj Auto) located in the city, enjoying the largest
geographical concentration of auto suppliers in the country (see Chapter 4).48 Similarly,
the majority of Maruti's first-tier suppliers are concentrated in the north, of which 248 are
in Gurgaon and its neighboring cities in Haryana. More than 100 of these firms are small-
Japanese large-scale first-tier suppliers belong to more than five "kyoryokukai" (supplier associations
formed by a car manufacturer for its "keiretsu"). Among the nine Japanese auto manufacturers, 7 have such
"kyoryokukai"; Honda has no "kyoryokukai."
46 Data are from Maruti's supplier database. Thus, there might be false reporting on the part of Maruti
suppliers to indicate their loyalty to Maruti. The actual dependency rate might thus be lower.
47 For extensive discussions on industrial districts and the role of industrial districts in economic
development, see, for example, Pyke, Becattini, and Sengenberger 1990, Pyke 1994, Schmitz 1995.
48 Interviews with a director, the Maratha Chambers of Commerce, Pune, in April 1997.
scale. Most second-tier suppliers are located in the same city as their customers. And the
smaller-scale first-tier suppliers often have their second-tier suppliers in the same locality.
The recent entry of new joint-venture car manufacturers in India, with increased
competition within the Indian market, has further intensified this geographical concentration
of supplier bases, as discussed earlier. This is largely because the increased awareness
about the importance of on-time delivery through the adoption of some elements of just-in-
time (JIT) inventory systems, has motivated first-tier suppliers to establish new plants close
to each customer. For example, several of Maruti's first-tier suppliers located in Haryana
are establishing new plants in Maharashtra to cater to Telco, and vice versa. With the
introduction of the JIT concept, which aim to reduce assemblers' inventory costs, some
first-tier suppliers with more than two customers are setting up new plants in proximity to
their major customers in three or four different regions to cater to each of them. While the
presence of these suppliers in proximity helps reduce inventory costs on the part of
assemblers, it also places some constraints on the suppliers, as they have to manage and
finance simultaneous expansions in widely dispersed locations (Humphrey et al. 1998).
However, even Maruti and its suppliers, let alone local manufacturers, have not fully
adopted the JIT inventory system. In fact, Japanese managers think that the Indian
automobile industry, including Maruti, is still far from operating under the JIT principle. 49
Some even have different FDI partners in different plants catering to different car
makers. For example, Motherson Sumi, a wiring harness supplier, started in the early
1980s as a joint venture firm with one of Suzuki's main suppliers in Japan; the matchmaker
was a Japanese general trading firm, whose major client is Suzuki. In the early 1990s,
Motherson set up a new plant in Pune to cater exclusively to Telco's Pune plant. With the
entry of Mercedes-Benz as a joint venture with Telco, Motherson started a new joint
venture with Mercedes-Benz's German supplier. Interestingly, there is little technical
49 My interviews with senior managers of Maruti and Denso India. Also, the CEO of Toyota India Corp.,
which starts production in 1999, commented that "current Indian condition is still one step behind JIT."
collaboration or information exchange between Motherson's Japanese FDI-involved plant
and its German FDI-involved plant, as the specifications for products differ according to
the customer.50
Only a few large-scale suppliers have their own design capabilities; most rely on
drawings provided by their customers. Moreover, many suppliers I interviewed had no
long-term production plans. They think that their production volume, as well as the growth
of their firms, depends completely on their customers. Thus, many suppliers enjoy only
limited autonomy (see Chapter 4).
2.4.3 Formation of Tiers
The growth of the industry has also led the industrial structure to divide into tiers:
the car assembler deals with only the first tier of suppliers which in turn obtain supplies
from lower tiers of suppliers. This may have increased the number of firms involved in the
supply chains with a greater number of suppliers at the lower ends of chains.
Car assemblers like Maruti and Telco have started increasingly consolidating and
streamlining their first-tier suppliers to make the production processes leaner. For
example, in 1997 Maruti began consolidating its supplier base from 404 to 300 first-tier
suppliers over two years. 51 It started ranking these suppliers into three tiers, and sourcing
the maximum number of components from the tier 1 suppliers that are relatively large-scale
and have high capabilities. Likewise, the Telco Pune plant planned to consolidate its
supplier base from 1,200 to 500 in three years beginning in 1997.52 The large-scale first-
tier suppliers are increasingly required to semi-assemble modules such as steering systems
and rear axle systems that are put directly on the final assembly line at the car assemblers.
50 My interviews with a Japanese manager in Noida and Indian managers in Pune, both working for this
firm.
51 My interviews with a manager, Maruti's Vendor Development Department, in August 1996.
52 My interviews with a manager, Telco's Purchase Department, April 1997.
Such consolidation moves among car manufacturers have also drastically changed
the nature of supplier relations. Car manufacturers have imposed higher performance
standards on their suppliers with tighter control over the operations of suppliers; on the
other hand, suppliers are pressured to either improve their performance, or lose business.
This has resulted in a dramatic shift in the power relations in the supply chain, giving the
assemblers much more leverage. Until recently, few first-tier suppliers could produce high
quality products, so good-quality first-tier suppliers had enjoyed some leverage vis-A-vis
customers, who had to rely on them to promote localization. These changing dynamics
between car manufacturers and suppliers have significantly affected the way in which skills
development occurs in suppliers (see Chapter 4).
The picture of a clear hierarchical structure in the supply chains seems to emerge,
with the FDI-related car assemblers at the top of the hierarchy (the exception is Telco).
However, this pyramidal structure is shallower than those in Japan and the U.S., partly
because the entire Indian automobile industry produces such a small volume. My own
interviews with 50 first-tier suppliers revealed that many have only second-tier suppliers
and none in lower tiers. Even these second-tier suppliers are often tiny-scale
subcontractors doing some "job work" (i.e., processing material provided by their clients,
the first-tier suppliers). Of course, the situation is different for large-scale first-tier
suppliers like Denso India, whose suppliers are comparable in size to the smaller-scale
first-tier suppliers of vehicle assemblers. In these cases, third-tier suppliers do exist,
performing "job work," as do many second-tier suppliers. For example, some of Denso
India's suppliers (i.e., in tier 2) are also first-tier suppliers for Maruti.
Virtually no data are available on the lower end of supply chains, where small-scale
subcontractors, largely in the informal sector, take on hazardous tasks like heat treatment,
painting, and coating. The literature predicts that globalization, by bringing about more
flexible production processes, increases the practices of outsourcing and subcontracting
work to such lower-wage firms. I found, however, that at least one third of sample firms
did not increase such practices. When I asked 50 first-tier suppliers of Maruti and Telco
whether they had taken on more subcontractors over the last five years, 17 said they
hesitated to increase subcontracting, citing the lack of reliability and the low level of quality
as their main reasons (see Chapter 4).
2.4.4 Division between OEM Suppliers and Replacement Market Suppliers
Another change to note in the structure of the automotive component industry is the
increasing separation between OEM parts suppliers and the low-quality, often spurious,
parts suppliers. Indian owners often try to keep their cars going for over 25 years (Kumar
et al. 1995), as compared to 12 years in the U.S., and licensed repair shops have only been
introduced recently; cars have commonly been repaired on the roadside using any parts
available. This tradition resulted in a huge replacement market (or "after market"), for parts
used to repair or maintain vehicles after their original sale. Many such low-quality parts
producers, mostly in the informal sector, are located in Punjab and Old Delhi. More than
half of the total domestic demand for auto components originates from this replacement
market, nearly 35 to 40% from the OE demand and the rest from exports.53 These
spurious component manufacturers have a great cost advantage; many evade various kinds
of taxes,54 and Indian customers have generally preferred low price to high quality. The
replacement market is so large partly because few car owners appreciate the value of high-
quality components; until recently, only half of Indian owners actually drove their own
cars. This may change as the proportion of owner-driven cars increases; owners who drive
their own cars may prefer to pay a little more for higher quality spare parts rather than
continue having breakdowns and buying cheap low-quality parts.
53 The Economic Times, Bombay, July 19, 1995.
54 According to a study conducted by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER),
these spurious auto parts manufacturers raised an illegal turnover of about Rs. 2,700 crore in 1991-92
alone; the loss of duty in the form of sales tax, excise duty, corporate tax, and octroi during 1991, totaling
nearly Rs. 1,200 crore. (The Economic Times, Bombay, July 19, 1995).
However, as it introduced more technologically advanced vehicles, Maruti also
developed a nationwide service network and recommended that cars be serviced only at
their approved service shops. More recent foreign producers followed this policy. 55 As a
result, many component manufacturers which had been producing inferior parts for the
"after market" have gradually started concentrating on producing components directly for
their assembler customers to become "OEM (original equipment manufacturer)" parts
suppliers, though they might have earned higher profits on products sold in the "after
market." There are two main reasons for this shift. First, because the quality of OEM
parts and spurious parts differs so much, manufacturers find it difficult to produce both
types of parts in the same production processes. Second, concentrating on OEM parts will
help them maintain their reputations as OEM parts producers, letting them gain more
confidence from future customers, including foreign customers. This trend has led to a
clearer division between OEM component manufacturers and those who cater mainly to the
"after market." This split could lead to further segmentation of employment and skills.
Indeed, the structural change discussed above suggests a serious problem facing the
Indian automobile industry: the low quality output of sub-suppliers to the first-tier suppliers
(Kumar et al. 1995). With all these changes, even small-scale first-tier suppliers are also
increasingly upgrading their facilities and training their workers to improve their skills to
meet customer requirements (ACMA 1995a). However, second-tier suppliers are left out
of such moves, creating a wider gap in production processes between these tiers.
Consultants report that average incoming defect rates for Indian component suppliers are
still significantly high at 31,500 ppm, compared with 2,065 ppm for average Japanese
firms and 4,500 ppm for average European firms.56 A similar concern was shared by a
Japanese manager of Denso: "Given a large gap in the quality of products between Indian
55 For example, Mahindra Ford India Ltd., a 50:50 joint venture between Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd and
Ford Motor Co. has developed a nationwide network of dealers in several large cities in India (The
Economic Times New Delhi, August 20, 1996.
56 A study by McKinsey (Kumar et al. 1995).
sub-suppliers and Denso's sub-suppliers in Japan, with the difference in defect rate being
100:1, the fact remains that we cannot use Indian sub-suppliers' products even if the ratio
changes to 95:1."57 The low quality from sub-suppliers lowers the operating efficiency at
the first-tier suppliers, who have to waste considerable time in sorting, testing, and
reworking parts. Thus, many large-scale FDI-related suppliers, like Denso India, are now
increasingly promoting vertical integration within their own firms.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the ongoing rapid process of globalization, particularly
since the introduction in 1991 of liberalization policy, has led to dramatic transformations
of the Indian automobile industry. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the automobile
industry has experienced rapid growth in production and sales, a huge inflow of FDI
accompanied by intensified competition within the increasingly globalized domestic market,
and gradual but modest growth in exports. However, the growth spurt actually started
before the introduction of liberalization policy, and the main driving force of this rapid
growth was Maruti, a joint venture between the Indian government and Suzuki, which
entered the Indian passenger car market in the early 1980s. Maruti achieved remarkable
growth not only in sales of small passenger cars but also in productivity. Even after the
liberalization policy was introduced, which resulted in a huge inflow of FDI, Maruti
remained dominant; its market share in the passenger car market actually increased after the
entry of many other FDI affiliates into the market in the 1990s.
Telco, a leading local commercial vehicle producer, has also experienced
considerable growth in the commercial vehicle sector. After the licensing policy was
abolished in 1992, Telco entered the passenger car market, then almost monopolized by
Maruti, and strengthened its market position, without significant FDI involvement, by
starting to produce the first locally-made modern small car in India in 1997. Telco's
57 Interviews with a Denso manager.
successful performance, in spite of the huge inflow of FDI into the domestic market in the
1990s, is unique among local car producers not only in India but even in developing
countries as a whole, as many recent studies report a growing preponderance of FDI-
affliated firms in the automobile industries across many developing countries. Clearly,
Maruti and Telco have played a key role in transforming the industry, in terms of both
promoting growth and improving export performance, while acquiring competitiveness,
even before the FDI flood started in the 1990s.
This process of rapid transformations has also led to a dynamic restructuring of the
industry, as the component industry has grown even faster than the vehicle industry.
Component suppliers have increasingly formed alliances with FDI component
manufacturers and set up various plants for different customers in different locations.
Efforts by car manufacturers such as Maruti and Telco to consolidate their supplier bases
have gradually led to the emergence of a pyramidal structure within the automobile
industry. However, given that the industry's production volume as a whole is still small
by global standards, this pyramidal structure is shallower than those in countries such as
Japan and the U.S.
Not only has Maruti led the growth of the industry but also contributed to this
structural change, and in particular, to the development of backward linkages. Maruti's
rapid growth resulted in the emergence of many local small-scale suppliers in proximity
since the mid-1980s as well as the soaring growth of component industries in the 1990s. It
also drastically changed the dominant model of supplier relations in the country, from
short-term "arm's length" relationships to more long-term, close ones, involving reciprocal
interactions with suppliers, similar to the Japanese model, with a great focus on improving
the quality of components as well as of the efficiency in suppliers' operations (see Chapter
4 for more detailed discussions).
However, due to the still small production volume for the Indian automobile
industy as a whole, Indian component manufacturers have not formed exclusive
relationships with their customers, unlike the Japanese "keiretsu" model; suppliers are
instead encouraged to diversify their customers to attain economies of scale. While the
intensified competition within the domestic market due to the entry of many new players
has led the Indian automobile industry to introduce some elements of the "flexible" or
"lean" production systems, it is still far from operating in the JIT principle. While the
export of components has increased considerably, so far Indian component manufacturers
have primarily catered to the replacement market abroad. Low quality of products remains
a serious constraint for local producers that aim to enter the OEM global markets.
What factors have contributed to Maruti's successful performance? This study
finds that the government has played an important role in developing Maruti as a firm that
could lead the automobile industry, through not only its direct involvement in Maruti's
operation and management by holding its 50% equity, but also through various policy
measures carefully designed to protect and promote the firm: before introducing the drastic
liberalization policy, the government had provided Maruti with subtle preferential
treatments in duties, taxes, and foreign exchange clearance. At the same time, the
government pressured Maruti to promote exports and achieve high levels of local contents,
over 90%, an exceptionally high figure for FDI firms operating in developing countries.
Given the importance of the automobile industry in industrialization in developing
countries, Maruti has literally served as a driving force for India's industrial development.
In addition to the government's requirement of high local contents, several other
factors also contributed to Maruti's unusually high level of local contents. These include
the firm's cost considerations due to the appreciation of the yen in the early 1980s; Maruti's
focus on the domestic market at the initial stage, allowing it to compromise on the quality of
locally-produced components; few dedicated Suzuki's suppliers who could afford to come
to India in the early 1980s; and the existence of a local engineering base among many
small-scale enterprises, which had been promoted and protected by the government since
the 1970s, prior to Maruti's entry. While the government's imposition of high local
contents on Maruti at the initial stage was primarily motivated by its balance-of-payment
concerns rather than the development of backward linkages per se, the government's
promotion and support of small-scale industries has clearly facilitated Maruti's development
of its local suppliers.
Unlike the experiences of other FDI-affiliated firms in developing countries, Maruti
has turned a high level of localization, coupled with a high level of outsourcing at 70 to
80%, into a competitive advantage in terms of lowering production costs. At the same
time, however, this strategy has made the development of local suppliers even more critical
than ever. How did Maruti develop these local suppliers whose product quality was so low
when it started? Chapter 4 addresses this question.
A question still remains as to how Maruti and Telco have developed their
competitiveness and succeeded in achieving their remarkable performance. One answer lies
in their massive investment in human resources, a topic we turn to in the next chapter.
Foreign Collaborations in the Indian Automobile Industry
1) Number of Foreign Collaborations (as of March 1995)
Country of foreign Vehicles Auto Components
collaborator
Japan 15 74
U.K. 8 34
Germany 8 48
USA 6 32
Italy 7 13
Spain - 8
Australia 3 1
Austria 3 -
Korea 2 10
France 2 12
Taiwan - 6
Canada 2
Switzerland 4
Others 1 13
Total 55 257
Source: ACMA 1997.
Note: These figures do not include foreign collaborations with Indian small-scale industry
(SSI) firms.
2) Joint Ventures in Vehicle Industry
Indian Partner Foreign Partner Name of JV Vehicle Targeted
Company Type Installed
Capacity
The Govt. of India Suzuki Motor Maruti Udyog Ltd., cars 450,000
Corp., Japan Gurgaon
Telco Mercedes Benz, Mercedes-Benz cars 20,000
Germany India Ltd.
DCM Group Daewoo Corp., DCM Daewoo cars 70,000
Korea Motors, Ltd.
Premier Peugeot, France PAL-Peugeot Ltd. cars 35,000
Automobiles, Ltd.
Premier Fiat, Italy Premier cars 60,000
Automobiles, Ltd. Automobiles Ltd.
Birla Group of General Motors, General Motors cars 25,000
Comranies USA India, Ltd.
Mahindra & Ford Motors, USA Mahindra Ford cars 12,500
Mahindra Ltd. India Ltd.
Mahindra & Mitsubishi Motor Mahindra & mini vans 6,000
Mahindra Ltd. Corp., Japan Mahindra Ltd.
5riram Industrial Honda Motors, Honda SIEL Cars cars 3,000
Enterrises Ltd. Japan India Pvt. Ltd.
industan Motors Mitsubishi, Japan Hindustan Motors cars 30,000
Ltd.
Ashok Leyland IVECO, Italy Ashok Leyland trucks 35,000
Ltd. Ltd.
Greaves Ltd. SAME, Italy Greaves, Ltd. tractors 15,000
Hero Honda Ltd. BMW, Germany. Hero Motors, Ltd. motorcycles 500 to 700
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3) Other Financial Collaboration with Foreign Firms (Vehicle manufacturers)
Name of Indian firm Item of Manufacture Name of Foreign
Collaborator
Hero Honda Motors Ltd. Motorcycles upto 350cc Honda Motors Co., Japan
New Delhi
Kinetic Honda Motors Ltd. Two wheelers Honda Motors Co., Japan
Pune
LML Ltd., Kanpur Two & Three Wheelers Piaggio V.E., Italy
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., Jeeps Willys Overland Corp. Ltd.,
Mumbai USA
Eicher Motors Ltd., New LCVs Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
Delhi Japan
Swaraj Mazda Ltd., Punjab light & medium comm. Mazda Motor Corp. Japan
vehicles
TVS -Suzuki Ltd., Madras Motorcycles 100cc Suzuki Motor Corp., Japan
4) New Joint Ventures in the Auto Component Industry (1995)
Name of Indian Company Name of Foreign Item of Manufacture
Collaborators
Amtek Auto Ltd., Gurgaon Bendo Kogyo, Japan Fly Wheel Ring Gears
Jay Bharat Maruti Ltd., Allied Signal, USA Seat Belts & air bags
Gurgaon
Subros Ltd., New Delhi Allied Signal, USA Catalytic Converters
Mark Exhaust Systems Ltd., Sankei Giken, In. Co., Japan Exhaust Systems, Catalytic
Gurgaon I Converters
Atul Glass Industries Ltd., Saint Gobain Vitgrage, Laminated Safety Glass
New Delhi France
Menon Pistons Ltd, Kholapur Alcan Deutschland GmbH, Pistons & Piston Rings
Germany
Automotive Axles Ltd, Rockwell International Corp., Axle systems
Mysore USA
Autolec Industries, Madras Blue Chip Products Inc., Water Pumps
USA
Spicer India Ltd., New Delhi Dana Corp., USA Engine Bearings
Sona Steering Systems Ltd., Somic Ishikawa, Japan Ball Joints & Suspension
New Delhi -_Joints
Sona Steering Systems Ltd., Fedoro, UK Asbestos Free Brake Linings
New Delhi
Sona Steering Systems Ltd., Matsuda Industries, Japan Cold Forging
New Delhi
Haryana Sheet Glass Ltd., Pilkington Plc., UK Laminated Sheet Glass
Haryana
Tata Industries Ltd., Bombay Johnson Controls Inc., USA Seating Systems
Sommer Allibert, France
Yazaki, Japan Interiors and Plastics
ZF, Germany Wiring Harness
NIFCO, Japan Transmission of steering sys
ITT, USA Plastic Fasteners
Brake systems, electrical &
wiper systems
Appendix 2.2 Automotive Products Reserved for the SSI Sector
1. Armature tester
2. Arms & blades of windshield wipers
3. Ashtrays - car fittings
4. Auto leaf springs excluding tapered leaf
springs
5. Automobile radiators
6. Battery cables & fittings
7. Battery cell tester
8. Battery terminal lifters
9. Brake & pedal pads - auto
10.Bulbrief horns
11.Bus caps - auto
12. Camber testing equipment
13. Condensers & resistance testers
14. Electric horns - auto
15. Electrical fuse boxes - auto
16. Electrical fuses - auto
17. Exhaust mufflers other than double coil
18. Exhaust mufflers
19. Feeler gauges
20. Fenders spoons and hammers
21. Flanging tools
22. Flaring tools
23. Fuel lines - auto
24 Fuel tank caps - auto
25. Gear flashers
26. Grease nipples
27. Gun metal bushes
28. Horn bushes
29. Horsepipe & radiator hoses
30. Brake pedals
31. Clutch pedals
32. Door channels
33. Dust covers
34. Rearview mirrors - auto
35. Ring compressors
36. Ring expanders
37. Screw extractors
38. Seat cushions
39. Seats for buses & trucks
40. Shackle pins (automobile use)
41. Side lamp assembly - auto
42. Spark plug tester & cleaners
43. Spot lamp assembly - auto
44. Steering wheels - auto
45. Stud removers - extractors
46. Sun shades - auto
47. Tail lamp assembly - auto
48. Toe in gauges
49. Truck body building: wooden structure
50. Tube cutters
51. Tire inflators, both hand & foot
operated
52. Tire valve pullout tools
53. Valve lifters
54. Valve replacing & resetting tools
55. Window channels - auto wiring harness
56. Luggage carrier
57. Ornament fittings
58. Painting equipment.(e.g., spray guns)
59. Pulleys grills - auto
60. Rubber beadings
61. Rubber mat
62. Sun visors
63. Windscreen beadings
64. Wiper blade components
Appendix 2.3: The Profile of the Indian Vehicle Manufacturers
Year of # of Main Sales Export # of JV Partners
Name Commenc plants plant State US$ M. # of Employe
ing location 1996-97 Units es
Productio 1995-96
nI
Ashok Layland Ltd. 1952 7 Chennai Tamil Nadu 696. 185 1361 Fiat
Ba'a' Tem o Ltd. 1958 1 Pune Maharashtra 193. 15 7000
Daewoo Motors India 1985* 1 Ghaziaba U..P. 269. 281 49 Daewoo
Ltd. d
Eicher Motors Ltd. 1986 2 Dhar M. P. 90. 39 78 Mitsubishi/AVL
General Motors India 1996 1 Halol Gujarat 5 GA
Ltd.
Hindustan Motors Ltd. 1948 4 Calcutta W. Bengal 243. _ 1271 Mitsubishi
Honda Siel Cars India 1997 1 New Delhi 65 Honda
Ltd. Delhi
Hyundai Motor India 1997 1 Chennai Tamil Nadu Hyundai
Ltd.
Mahindra Ford India 1997 1 Chennai Tamil Nadu Ford
Ltd. I
Mahindra & Mahindra 1945 6 Mumbai Maharashtra 1002.1 80 1762 Peugeot/AVL/
Ltd. Mitsubishi
Maruti Udyog Ltd. 1983 1 Gurgaon Haryana 2128. 30761 540 Suzuki
Mercedes-Benz India 1995 1 Pune Maharashtra 89. 35 Mercedez-Benz
Ltd. I
PAL- Peugeot Ltd. 1995** 1 Thane Maharashtra 1 249 Peugeot
Swaraj Mazda Ltd. 1985 1 Chandiga Punjab 51. 551 Mazda
Telco 1954 3 Pune Maharashtra 2813. 1447 3689 7 technical
a___I_ collaborators
Premier Automobiles 1944 2 Mumbal Maharashtra 72.1 10 412 Fiat
Ltd.
Volvo India Pvt. Ltd. 1998 1 Bangalor Kamataka
plan Stt-S$M_ f mly
Toyota 1998 1 Bangalor Kam7ataka
Note: * firm wfirst established as DCM Toyota, a joint venture with Toyota to produce commercial vehicles. B in the
early 1990s, Daewoo took over the equity shares from Toyota and started producing passenger cars in 1995.
** Peugeot withdraw its partnership in 1997.
Source: ACMA 1997, 1998.
Appendix 2.4: The Top 25 Component Suppliers in India (By Sales Turnover)
Name Year of Sales Export # of Main Plant Location # of Products
Startin (US$M) (US$M) employ
g _ _ees
Produc Year Year 1996 City State Plants
tion 1996
Modi Rubber Ltd. 197 271.1 38.1 ? Meerut U.P. 2 Automobile tyres, tubes &
___________________~~~~~~~  _ ____ ____ 
laps
Motor Industries Co. 1951 233. 25. 937 Bangalore Karnataka 3 Diesel fuel injection
Ltd.(MICO) equipment
Tube Investment of ? 206. ? 140 Chennai Tamil 1 Cold rolled strips,
India Ltd. Nadu ERW&CDW tubes
Lucas TVS Ltd. 196 153. 3. 295 Chennai Tamil 2 Starters, generators,
Nadu distributors
Bharat Forge 196 139. 14. 249 Pune Maharasht 4 Steel forgings/machined
ra crankshafts
SKF Bearings India 196 125. 2. 258 Pune Maharasht 2 Ball & roller bearings
Ltd. ra
The Supreme 194 116. 6. 120 Mumbai Maharasht 5 Steering columns
Industries Ltd. ra
ubros Ltd. 198 106. 0. 58 Ghaziabad U.P. 2 Air-conditioning systems
______ _______ _______ 
_____for cars
Brakes India Ltd. 196 90. 5.1 265 Chennai Tamil 7 Drum Brakes, Disc brakes/
Nadu Rotors
Wheels India Ltd. 196 85. 4. 135 Chennai Tamil 2 Truck wheels, agricultural
I_____ ___Nadu wheels
Sundaram Fasteners 196 78. 11. 160 Chennai Tamil 2 High tensile fasteners
Ltd. Nadu
rube Products of 195 73. 3. 1871 Chennai Tamil 3 Cold rolled strip steel,
India Ltd. Nadu ERWCEW
Goetze (India) Ltd. 195 61. 0. 272 Patiala Punjab 2 Piston rings, Cylinder liners
Asahi India Safety 198 52. 0. 41 Rewari Haryana 1 Tempered atuomotive
3lass Ltd. safety glass
Sundaram-Clayton 199 51. 0. 109 Chennai Tamil 1 Air assist and full air brake
Ltd. Nadu systems
Escorts Mahle Ltd. 195 48. 0. 411 Patiala Punjab 1 Pistons
Fenner (India) Ltd. 195 46. 1. 200 Madurai A.P. 1 V Belts, Auto Belts, Oil
_____ _______ 
_____seats
Gabriel India Ltd. 1961 45.1 2. 111 Mumbai Maharasht 6 Shock absorbers, struts,
ra front forks
Amforge Industries 194 42. 2.1 140 Mumbai Maharasht 4 closed die forging in carbon
Ltd. ra steel
India Pistons Ltd. 194 37. 1. 226 Chennai Tamil 2 Pistons, Piston pins, Piston
Nadu rings
Denso India Ltd. 198 37. _ 801 Ghaziabad U.P. 1 Starter motors, alternator
Sona Steering Sys. 198 36. 0. 40 Gurgaon Haryana 1 C
Ltd.
utomobile 198 35. 2. 107 Sattari Goa 1 Pressed sheet metal
orporation of Goa, component
Ltd. Sys_ 1987 36.__ 40____Hraa 1 Cmltserig __
ri Ramdas Motor 195 35. 80 Kakinada A.P. 1 King pins, King pin repair
ransport Ltd. kits
Premier Auto 199 34. 48 Chennai Tamil 1 Automobile starter
Electric Ltd. Nadu -motors/alternators
Source: ACMA 1998
Chapter 3
Building Institutional Alliances for Skill Development:
A Tale of Two Successful Learners
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the patterns of skill development in two leading auto
manufacturers in India, Maruti and Telco (see Appendix 3.1 for a brief profile of each
firm). Both firms have invested heavily in skill development for their workers, since the
time when the Indian economy was still heavily regulated and protected, and even before
competition became intensified within the domestic markets. Both have internalized
learning within the firms by institutionalizing various measures for skill development, albeit
differently. Yet both firms have considerably changed the patterns of their skill
development in recent years, in response to transformations in the Indian automobile
industry. How has this dynamic transformation process, as illustrated in the previous
chapter, affected and reshaped the patterns of in-firm skill development? This chapter first
examines the mode, contents, and extent of in-firm skill development in these two firms,
and then considers what has shaped these successful practices in each firm. A larger
picture this chapter paints is the process of institutional change as it relates to skill
development.
Training, whether on-the-job or off-the-job, is an institutionalized form of
knowledge and skill transfer. Particularly in the work context, training is a means of
acquiring and enhancing firm-level learning, through which what the organization has
learned gets translated into the learning by members of the organization, and knowledge
acquired by the firm gets shared among them in different part of the organization, i.e., the
intra-firm diffusion of knowledge and skills. This also involves the process of
socialization,I through which certain values are infused within the organization. Thus
training can also be considered as an integral part of process innovations that occur within
the firm to acquire "competitive assets" (Amsden 1995). In short, in-firm training has three
distinctive but interrelated components: 1) the transfer and diffusion of knowledge and
skills within the organization; 2) the embodiment of knowledge by individuals; and 3) the
institutionalization of learning mechanisms. This chapter shows that Maruti has focused on
the first component, while Telco has focused on the second: Maruti has focused more on
enhancing collective performance to improve production capabilities, 2 and in particular line
management. Telco, on the other hand, has focused more on accumulating individual trade
skills, reflecting its traditional emphasis on strengthening innovation capabilities. And,
both firms have been successful in the third area: both have developed elaborate
institutional mechanisms for promoting skill development inside the firm while linking it
with outside institutions.
Many recent studies have focused on the effects of globalization and the increased
adoption of more "flexible" or "lean" Japanese (Toyota to be more precise) production
systems3 on changes in work organization and employment practices (Florida and Kenny
1991, Doeringer et al. 1996, Sargent and Matthews 1997, Kochan et al. 1997).' Some
variants of these studies have examined whether production processes, including work
organization, in the automobile industry is converging into more "flexible" or "lean"
production systems across countries, or national distinctive systems of employment
See Adler 1993.
2 Technological capability development entails the enhancement of three types of capabilities: a project
execution capability, a production capability, and an innovation capability. Project execution capability
refers to the skills required to establish or expand operating and other corporate facilities. Production
capability refers to the skills required to operate the facilities once they are established. Innovation
capability refers to the skills associated with basic and applied research and related engineering or creating
major new products and processes (Amsden and Hikino 1994: 129).
3 A large body of literature exists on analyses of the Japanese (or Toyota) production systems. See, for
example, Monden 1983, Womack et al. 1990, Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994, and Fujimoto 1997.
4 "Flexible" or "lean" production systems have four distinctive dimensions that are different from those of
mass production: 1) the use of more general resources (multi-skilled workers, general-purpose machines,
fewer functional specialists); 2) small buffers and lot sizes to facilitate the handling of a greater variety of
practices still remain strong and influence the pattern of firm-level labor practices despite
globalization of the markets, resulting in wide variations in experiences across countries
(Womack et al. 1990, MacDuffie 1996, Kochan et al. 1997).
Paradoxically, however, this study supports both the "convergence" and
"divergence" arguments. This study finds that, clearly, the Indian automobile industry has
recently adopted some elements of "flexible" or "lean" production systems, including the
Japanese model of work organization characterized by multi-skilling, small-group
activities, and decentralized decision making on the shop floor (Womack et al. 1990, Sabel
1994), which has led to a considerable change in the content of in-firm training. Yet, at the
same time, it also finds a robust national-level institutional framework that has greatly
influenced the patterns of in-firm skill development, particularly in employment practices,
including hiring and promotion, stable employment, and an extensive use of apprentices.
But, beyond this debate on convergence versus divergence, the cases of Maruti and
Telco show how and why they have developed their particular institutional mechanisms
inside the firm over time while forging institutional alliances with outside organizations, in
particular training organizations. Such institutional alliances have helped them
institutionalize the process of learning, while externalizing the costs of training and
internalizing the benefits from such training. Historical conditions have led the two firms
to take different paths to skill development.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 analyzes the patterns of skill
development in terms of five elements in the two firms. Section 3.3 examines the
conditions under which these two firms have facilitated skill development. Section 3.4
summarizes the findings.
product designs; 3) a more decentralized decision-making process; and 4) a higher degree of integration of
conceptual activity with the execution of production tasks (MacDuffie and Pil 1997: 10).
3.2 The Patterns of In-Firm Skill Development: The Cases of Maruti and
Telco
Despite their considerable differences in firm characteristics, both Maruti and Telco
place great emphasis on skill development for their workforce. In fact, a former CEO of
Maruti emphasized employee training as one of the three most important factors
contributing to Maruti's remarkable growth (see Chapter 2); the other two are its
technologies and its insulation from political interference.' On the other hand, Telco, a
long-term industrial leader, has committed itself to developing a skilled workforce. In fact,
when Telco set up its main plant in Pune in the mid-1960s, its Training Division was the
first unit created, more than a decade before Telco produced its first vehicle in that plant
(Puthli 1992). This study specifically focuses on five elements of in-firm training to
understand the nature of in-firm skill development in Maruti and Telco: 1) internal labor
markets and on-the-job training; 2) apprenticeship programs; 3) formal training programs;
4) overseas training; and 5) work organization. Here, I mainly focus on Telco's Pune
plant, and my discussions here may not apply to the other two plants. Discussions in this
section mainly draw on my interviews with various managers and workers in these firms,
unless otherwise noted.
3.2.1 Internal Labor Markets and On-the-job Training
Both firms have well-established internal labor markets.6 Here, I focus on three
aspects of their internal labor markets, namely, 1) recruitment; 2) promotion; and 3) wages.
1) The Case of Maruti
a) Recruitment
' A talk by Mr. R.C. Bhargava, a former CEO, Maruti, at Harvard, in February, 1998.
6 The concept of internal labor markets goes back to Doeringer and Piore 1971. See Chapter 1 for a
review.
The total number of Maruti employees has nearly doubled in the last eleven years
from 2,815 to 5,405 in 1996-97. As Table 3.1 indicates, however, this growth has been
modest, compared to the firm's remarkable growth in production and productivity (as
measured by value added per employee) during this period. This suggests a very efficient
and "lean" use of labor, leading to a high productivity growth in terms of the total number
of vehicles produced per employee per year (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 in Chapter 2).
Maruti's slim employment size also reflects a high level of subcontracting, currently at 72%
of all parts (60% of the value of a car),7 which allows the firm to concentrate on several
production areas, such as assembly (of vehicles and engines), painting, panel stamping,
machining, and welding.
Table 3.1: Employment and Production Growth at Maruti
Maruti Total Number of Number of Vehicles Value Added per
Year Employees Produced (Units) Employee (Rs. Million)
1985/86 2815 47,694 0.17
1986/87 3497 82,308 0.31
1987/88 3526 94,033 0.38
1988/89 3629 105,592 0.41
1989/90 3721 117,255 0.50
1990/91 3945 120,308 0.57
1991/92 3993 121,167 0.58
1992/93 4042 128,138 0.62
1993/94 4141 158,109 0.90
1994/95 4840 206,330 1.19
1995/96 4968 277,776 1.91 **
Average Annual Growth 5.8% 19.3% 27.4%
Rate (%) *
Note: * Calculated by the author. ** including apprentices
Source: Compiled from Maruti Udyog Ltd., Annual Reports, various years.
Maruti's employees, including production workers, are all salaried and permanent,
a common practice for Indian public sector employees. For production worker jobs, the
7 My interviews with several Maruti managers. However, the firm's share of costs of the purchase of raw
materials and parts in the total production costs for 1996-1997 is 57% (calculated from Maruti's annual
report 1995-96), which is actually lower than that for Telco at 64% for the same year (calculated from
Telco's annual report 1995-96), indicating Maruti's 'leaner' use of suppliers (see Chapter 4).
firm initially recruited workers from other industries,' but soon, it started hiring only fresh
graduates from Industrial Training Institutes (ITI)9 across the country who had served as
apprentices for a year. Maruti prefers these fresh ITI graduates over workers with
experience in other industries for several reasons. First, the skills required at Maruti are
firm-specific; as the firm uses such advanced technologies, hiring those who worked
elsewhere would require costly retraining. Second, new graduates are more receptive in
absorbing new work practices and adopting a new corporate culture. Finally, Maruti fears
that workers with experience in other firms might "contaminate" other workers with
undesirable attitudes, such as influences of highly politicized labor unions backed by major
political parties. In fact, many firms in the industry, including HML and PAL, both located
in traditional industrial regions, have suffered from such adversarial labor relations,
resulting in frequent labor turnover, low labor productivity, and disrupted production.
These new recruits are trained on the job by senior workers and supervisors who
have already been trained at Suzuki in Japan. After one year of on-the-job training as an
apprentice, they still go through another two years of probationary training before they are
placed on the regular payroll. New production workers are thus all well educated and
recruited out of a large pool of best-performing apprentices (for discussions on apprentices,
see the next subsection). Table 3.2 presents the occupational hierarchy at Maruti. At
Maruti, labor turnover is extremely low (only a few workers per year); thus new job
openings for production workers are very limited. This is partly because workers at Maruti
are extremely well-paid and well-treated, as discussed shortly.
I Some of the employees, mainly from nearby villages, were previously hired by Maruti Ltd., which was
established by Sanjay Gandhi in 1977. Some were formally landowners of the land in Gurgaon acquired by
Maruti.
9 ITI is a government-run technical school (now 100% sponsored by state governments), which offers one-
to three-year industrial training for students with 10 years of education. For instance, Delhi alone has 13
ITIs for 8500 trainees in 50-60 trades. In addition, some ITIs attach Advanced Vocational Training System
(AVTS) centers, where training for the acquisition of a higher level of craftsman skills is offered for three to
12 weeks in selected areas such as Tool Design, Tool and Die Making, Measurement Techniques, Heat
Treatment, Maintenance of Machine Tools, Production Technology, Industrial Chemistry, Process Control,
Welding Techniques, and so on (My interviews with a senior officer in the Directorate of Employment and
Training under the Ministry of Labor, March 2, 1997).
Managers and engineers at Maruti are also fairly well educated, all with college or
postgraduate degrees. In fact, Maruti's Japanese managers find its Indian engineers to be
very competent, highly intelligent, and have a higher absorptive capacity than their
counterparts in Indonesia and Thailand, though they say Maruti's production workers
perform at the same level as their counterparts in Southeast Asia. This may reflect a
relatively high level of engineering education and a large supply of engineering graduates in
India, albeit a tiny fraction of the large population. Engineers are recruited from all over the
country, through a highly competitive selection process involving interviews and tests. In
1984, only 30 engineers were selected from over 1,000 applicants. Many engineers are,
however, directly recruited from colleges nationwide, especially several Indian Institutes of
Technology (IITs), the nation's best engineering colleges. Maruti also recruits engineers in
specialized fields, such as painting, metallurgy, and design, from specialized institutes of
technology.
Table 3.2: Occupational Structures in Maruti (1996)
Occupational ranks # of Level Qualifications
Incumbents
Chairman (Indian) 1 Political appointment (usually
Sec. To Govt. of India, Heavy
Industry)
Managing Director (Indian) 1 Appointed by Govt. and Suzuki,
alternately
Joint Managing Directors / 6
Directors (3 Indian + 3 Japanese)
Divisional Managers etc. 6
Deputy Divisional Managers 14
Department Managers /DM in 89 Level 15
charge
Managers 80 Level 14 Some MBA, college degree
Deputy Manager 114 Level 13
Senior Executives 139 Level 12 When promoted
Executives 465 Level 11 Engineering degree /some
postgraduates
Supervisors (foremen) 294 Level 9-10 Diploma holders
Assistant Supervisor 104 Level 8 Promoted from technician
Technicians (operators) 3 ,616 Level 3-7 M graduates
Attendants (helper) 474 Level 1-2 Below 10th standard
Trainees 900 Not on roll Completed two-year ITI training
Sources: Maruti's internal documents. Interviews with Maruti managers and workers.
Maruti's 914 managerial and professional employees as of 1996/97 account for
about 17% of its total employee strength of 5,405 employees. The engineers all have
degrees or diplomas in engineering. Out of about 600 junior-level managers, about 500
have engineering degrees and the other 100 have degrees in business and commerce.
Those with engineering degrees mostly assume the position of production-in-charge.
Engineers go through one year of training after their recruitment. Following 15
days of general orientation, they spend five months in production, attached to different
shops, on the actual production line, and then two months in the Engineering Department.
Then, they work at service stations for 15 days to experience how the work is actually done
there, and then spend two more months on-the-job in areas such as management, value
engineering, and finance. At the end of this one-year training, engineers are assigned to
different sections, mostly in Production, Engineering, and Vendor Development
Departments (see Chapter 4).
Maruti's Engineering Department, which was relatively recently created with only
four engineers initially, now comprises such sections as technical administration, design,
quality, and service and parts inspection, with about 150 employees including 40
engineers. While the literature emphasizes the role of R&D and Engineering Departments
in deepening technological capabilities (Najmabadi and Lall 1995, Lessard and Amsden
1996, World Bank 1998), Maruti's R&D effort in its Engineering Department started only
since the mid-1990s, developing such capabilities as testing components and making minor
model changes. In fact, Maruti spends much less on R&D than most firms in the industry
(see Table 3.3), and in particularly sharp contrast with Telco (see discussions below).
But Maruti is still far from developing basic R&D capabilities, including those for
product design, as it relies totally on Suzuki for vehicle designs. The Engineering
department's Parts Inspection Section evaluates the existing components (for factors such
as friction and heat durability), and helps suppliers develop their components. When
Maruti needs to modify the Japanese design to suit Indian conditions, it seeks Suzuki's
clearance, even to modify components; then, Maruti's Vendor Development Division looks
into the matter (see Chapter 4). In terms of day-to-day problem-solving, however,
Maruti's own Engineering Department handles technical and operational problems. In
other words, Maruti has accumulated enough problem-solving skills, but not design skills.
Table 3.3: R&D Expenditures in Indian Automobile Firms: 1986, 1990, and 1995/96
Year 1986 1990 1995/96
Firms R&D R&D as % R&D R&D as % R&D R&D as %
expenditure of sales expenditure of sales expenditure of sales
(Rs. in turnover (Rs. in turnover (Rs. in turnover **
million) million) million)
Telco 115.8 1.15 144.6 0.73 1,192.9 1.56
Ashok 10.9 0.27 81.1 0.94 185.8 0.92
Layland
Premier 21.5 0.88 32.4 0.71 158.2 2.20
Auto
Baiai Tempo 12.2 0.97 19.9 0.91 119.9 1.75
Maruti 9.2 0.12 5.7 0.06 86.3 0.13
Hindustan 9.4 0.29 17.8 0.29 51.0 0.42
Motors I I
DCM * n/a N/a 2.04 0.21 2.4 0.04
Swarj Mazda 0.2 0.06 0.2 0.17 0.9 0.05
Notes: * DCM Toyota was a joint venture with Toyota producing commercial vehicles until 1995, when
the firm became DCM Daewoo, as the joint-venture partnership was taken over by Daewoo, a Korean car
manufacturer.
Sources: For the 1986 and 1990 data: Bhat 1992; For the 1996 data: AIAM 1997; ** calculated by the
author.
b) Promotion
As shown in Table 3.2, the occupational structure between unskilled workers and
Department Managers is divided into 9 categories. This is far fewer than the 90 job
classifications in U.S. plants but much more than the 2 to 4 in Japanese plants (Florida and
Kenney 1991). For production workers, there are only three levels. It normally takes four
years to move up from one level to another of the occupational ladder. Common to the
practices of Japanese, as well as Indian public sector, enterprises, promotion is primarily
determined by seniority. Better performing employees are specially promoted faster based
on the firm's assessment of their individual confidential annual performance report.
Criteria for faster promotion include attendance and work efficiency.
In order to keep motivating workers to learn new skills, in 1988, Maruti stopped
recruiting diploma holders for assistant supervisor positions, so it could fill supervisory
positions with promoted workers. As internal labor markets theorists (Doeringer and Piore
1971, Koike and Inoki 1990) argue, the main locus of workers' learning is still on-the-job
training and promotions provide an incentive for such workers' learning.
Maruti has no system to measure the extent to which individual workers have
improved their skills over time, reflecting the firm's lack of belief in the concept of trade
skills. A Japanese senior manager pointed out the difficulty of measuring each worker's
skill levels'0 and how much they have improved through training. Still, the level of
technical skills required varies depending on the department. As observed elsewhere,
assembly workers require fewer experiences or particular technical skills, compared to
workers in maintenance, painting, or die-making. Once assigned, workers rarely move to
other shops. Therefore, they accumulate skills and knowledge in the same skill areas.
Thus, the firm rewards its production workers' skills by promoting them from Level 3 to
Level 5 (see Table 3.2). Thus, in 12 years after the initial entry, competent workers
become eligible to become assistant supervisors. Those at Levels 4 and 5 are sent to a
Foremen Training Institute (FTI) in Bangalore to prepare for assistant supervisor jobs.
This training focuses on the role of the supervisor; planning; time management; material
management; labor management; and basic engineering."
However, unlike Japanese auto firms where workers can be promoted from
workers to team leaders to supervisors and further to managers, Indian workers can be
promoted only up to assistant supervisor levels, because of more hierarchical social
'0 For example, in Japan, employers often encourage workers to take a national-level skill proficiency
examination administered by the Japan Vocational Ability Development Association (JAVADA), a non-
profit organization, under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor of the Japanese government, although the
skill proficiency levels do not necessarily affect their wages and promotion opportunities. India has no such
systems for measuring skill levels in a uniform way.
relations. As academic credentials play a more important role in determining employees'
occupational level in India, internal labor markets play a far more limited role, in terms of
filling positions through internal promotion. Thus, at Maruti, even with the transfer of the
Japanese management system as described below, the prevailing social relations still play
an important role in shaping the human resource practices on the shop floor, including the
pattern of skill development.
c) Wages
Comparing wage levels across firms or industries, let alone across countries, is
difficult, due to difficulties in adjusting differences in various benefits added to the basic
salary, accounting treatments, and exchange rates. Thus, a better measurement may be the
labor costs to the firm per employee. While a serious lack of data prevents any
sophisticated analysis of wages in India, Table 3.4 provides a rough idea about Maruti's
labor costs per employee relative to Telco's; to the prevailing labor costs per employee in
the Indian industrial sector; to minimum wages in the automobile industry; and to wages in
Japan and the U.S.12 As of 1998, Maruti's average labor cost per worker was Rs. 15,000
per month," which is 1.75 times higher than the industrial average.' 4 Clearly, Maruti
employees are well paid and well treated. In particular, its production workers receive the
best salaries in the industry. In 1987, the firm also introduced a productivity-linked
incentive scheme. Therefore, workers' remuneration consists of the basic salary,
allowances, and the productivity incentive (Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 6,000), calculated monthly
using an elaborate formula to reflect a productivity increase in workers' pay. The
" Training in basic engineering is provided only for assistant supervisors who have engineering diplomas.
12 Unfortunately, however, data on this measurement, based on the firms' balance sheet, does not allow one
to separate wages for production workers and indirect (administrative and managerial) workers.
13 A talk by Mr. R. C. Bhargava, a former CEO of Maruti, at Harvard, in February 1998. This includes
income tax (approx. Rs.2,500) and fringe benefits.
14 The wage gap between Maruti and the industrial average has narrowed in recent years. As Table 3.4
shows, in 1993-94, Maruti's average annual earnings were in fact 2.5 times higher than the industrial
average. By the mid-1990s, many FDI-affiliated car manufacturers had entered the Indian passenger car
sector, raising the overall wage level (see Chapter 2).
introduction of this scheme resulted in a dramatic increase in productivity (see Chapter 2).
Small intra-firm wage differentials do exist according to the shop. For example, workers
in the stamping shop are considered more skilled than others and are therefore the best paid
among production workers.
Table 3.4: Comparison of Relative Average Annual Earnings per Employee:
Maruti and Telco
Year Average Converted Index Adjusted by Index
Annual into US (Maruti Purchasing (Maruti
Earnings per dollars (US$) 1993- Power Parity 1993-
employee 94= (PPP) (1$) 94=
100) 100)
Maruti 1996-97 Rs. 220,143 6,213 145 25,282 145
1993-94 Rs. 131,374 4,278 100 17,394 100
Telco 1996-97 Rs. 167,168 4,718 110 19,426 112
Passenger Car 1993-94 Rs. 52,798 1,719 40 6,989 40
Manufacturers (SIC 374)
Transport Equipment and 1993-94 Rs. 45,610 1,485 35 6,038 35
Parts Sector (SIC 37)
All Industrial Sector 1993-94 Rs. 32,889 1,071 25 4,355 25
Transport Equipment and 1992 Rs. 11,889 459 11 1,867 11
Parts Sector (minimum
wage earners)
Japanese Auto Employees 1993 Yen 5,593,752 50,404 1178 33,301 191
(SIC 371)
US Motor Vehicle and 1993 US $33,524 33,524 784 33,524 193
Equipment Production
Workers (SIC371)
Notes: 1) Figures represent average annual remuneration and allowances per employee, except the data on
the U.S., which represent wages for the motor vehicle and equipment sector production workers.
2) Different exchange rates apply to different years: Rs.1 = US$35.43 for 1996; Rs.1 = US$30.71 for
1993-94; Rs.1 = US$30.49 for 1993.
3) The figure for the U.S.wage was estimated from the 1994 wage differentials between U.S. employees and
Japanese employees (103%) and the average hourly earning differentials between US auto employees
($25.52) and US auto production workers ($16.10) in 1993, based on the data from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as cited in American Automobile Manufacturing Association
(AAMA) 1997.
4) See Appendix 3-2 for technical notes on more details of how these figures were derived at.
Sources: Data on Maruti and Telco were calculated from their respective Annual Reports. Other Indian
data: Government of India, Central Statistical Organization. 1996; Data on minimum wages: Government
of India, Ministry of Labor 1997a; Data on Japan: International Labor Office (ILO). 1997. For exchange
rates: International Monetary Fund 1997. For PPP: World Bank 1995 and 1997.
Maruti's high wage level creates a marked wage dispersion among auto
manufacturers as well as within the automobile industry. This high level, however, pushed
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up the wage level in joint-venture suppliers near Maruti, where production workers receive
roughly 80% of the salaries of Maruti workers. Reflecting a hierarchical industrial
structure and the highly segmented nature of external labor markets as discussed in Chapter
1, however, Maruti's good salary level stands in stark contrast with the wage level of
workers in small firms who typically receive a minimum wage of Rs. 1,200 per month on
average, only one tenth that of Maruti workers (see Table 3.4). Indeed, this high wage
level places Maruti workers in the top 5% of India's income distribution!"
Table 3.5: Regional Disparity in Wages and Value Added per Worker
in the Transport Equipment and Parts Sector, 1993-94: Selected States
States No. of No. of Annual Wage Index Net Value Net Value
Factories Workers Wages per (All Added Per Added Per
Production India=100) Worker Worker Index
Worker (US$) (All
(US$) India=100)
All India 4,180 374,852 1,248 100 4,149 100
Bihar 125 27,223 1,428 114 3,018 73
Gujarat 250 15,983 672 54 2,630 63
Haryana 220 23,314 1,140 91 8,106 195
Karnataka 190 16,609 1,536 123 4,638 112
Maharashtra 767 55,762 2,112 168 8,275 199
Punjab 772 37,892 792 63 2,440 59
Tamil Nadu 548 65,625 1,164 93 3,991 96
Uttar Pradesh 305 32,995 1,104 88 3,253 78
West Bengal 215 59,608 1,080 86 1,944 47
Delhi 381 8,201 1,152 92 2,819 68
Notes: 1) Workers refer to all persons directly engaged in any manufacturing process, and do not include
indirect workers or administrative and managerial staff.
2) The exchange rate is US $1 = 30.71 for 1993-94.
3) The total numbers of factories (4,180) and of workers (374,852) do not agree with the estimates provided
by ACMA. This is partly because the factories covered in these statistics are only those registered with the
government and do not include informal sector firms.
Sources: Constructed and calculated from Government of India, Central Statistical Organization, 1996.
Annual Survey of Industries 1993-94: Summary Results for Factory Sector: Table 6-13.
Why are Maruti workers so well paid? This may be worth considering, as Maruti's
high-wage policy contrasts markedly with the experience in some emerging economies.
1s According to a recent national household survey conducted by the National Council of Applied
Economic Research (NCAER), only 2.48% of the sample households earn annual incomes of Rs.86,000 or
For instance, in Mexico, government policy keeps wage levels low, and auto firms, to cope
with the problem of high labor turnover, deliberately pay low wages to attract less educated
workers who are unlikely to leave jobs (Shaiken 1994).16 Indeed, Maruti's high wages
stand out even in the Indian context with its large regional wage disparity: Haryana, where
the firm is located, is not a very high-wage region compared to Maharashtra and Karnataka
(see Table 3.5).
Interestingly, Maruti's union (a company union) played only a small role as the firm
introduced the productivity-linked incentive scheme. Also, the high educational level of
Maruti workers does not explain the firm's exceptionally high wage level: in India, virtually
all large firms employ graduates of ITIs for production jobs, just as Maruti does (see the
next subsection). Rather, several factors led Maruti to develop its productivity-linked high-
wage policy. First, this structure is partly a legacy of Indian public sector firms. Until
1992, when the equity share between the Indian government and Suzuki became 50-50,
Maruti was a state enterprise. Because government salary rules for Indian civil servants
governed Maruti's wage setting and prevented the firm from increasing wages to attract
better-qualified workers, the firm chose to provide incentives.
Second, this kind of productivity-linked incentive has greatly increased productivity
by boosting workers' motivation, thus bringing the company's interests in line with its
workers'. While Maruti employees do not receive any bonus as such,'7 this productivity-
linked salary system not only attracts well-motivated workers to begin with, but also
motivates them to improve their performance. In fact, one worker commented, "our salary
goes up day by day, as our productivity increases every day."'" This productivity-linked
incentive mechanism has worked very well, given the national context in which protective
more (Rao and Natarajan 1996: Table 5.21.3).
16 The evidence on wages varies among emerging countries. Amsden (1988, 1989) argues that in Korea,
workers have been paid relatively high wages during the process of rapid industrialization not because of a
shortage of skills but in order to induce them to exercise their intelligence and make imported technology
work (1989, p 190).
Indian law forbids paying bonuses to workers who receive more than Rs. 3,000 as a monthly salary.
"Interview with a Maruti employee in January 1997.
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labor legislation provides few incentives for workers in the organized sector to work hard
and to increase productivity.
Third, because income tax rates are high in India, substantial portions of wage
increases would be taken away as taxes. Thus, workers prefer to receive incentives rather
than basic wage increases. Fourth, such good wages, in fact the best in the industry,
successfully discourage labor turnover.
Finally, despite this high wage, the total labor costs to the firm are surprisingly
low, at only 1.8% of sales turnover as of 1997.'9 By comparison, at Telco, labor costs are
8% of sales turnover. Two factors have helped Maruti achieve this low figure: first, its
relatively small size of employment, only one eighth that of Telco despite their sales
turnover being almost at the same level (see Appendix 3.1); and second, a high rate of
subcontracting, at 72% of a car's components (60% by value). This figure is as high as the
figure for Japanese (70%) and much higher than that for U.S. auto firms (30% to 50%).
These two factors, taken together, clearly indicate the leanness of the firm's use of labor.
Given the wide wage dispersion within the industry as discussed above, Maruti could take
advantage of the extremely low costs of components produced by its suppliers that use
much cheaper labor.
Moreover, Maruti's wage structures are relatively flat. Interestingly, unlike
Maruti's blue-collar workers, Maruti's managers and engineers are not the best paid in the
industry; newcomers such as GMI and Daewoo offer higher wages to these categories of
employees. Hence, since the beginning of the 1990s when many FDI-related firms started
operation in India, Maruti has experienced a high labor turnover among its engineers, in
sharp contrast with extremely low turnover among its production workers, as mentioned
earlier.
19 Calculated from Maruti's Annual Report 1996-97. This figure was also confirmed during my interviews
with several Maruti managers. However, this figure rose to 2.1% in 1998 because of a recent salary
increase.
20 The figures are cited from Florida and Kenney 1991.
At Maruti, the wage differential between labor and management, if measured only
by the basic salary, is about a factor of 10, as managing directors receive Rs. 40,000 per
month. But, the actual differences between the two are even much smaller, because of
productivity-linked incentives for production workers. Its managers receive higher salaries
than its directors, because a cap on government salaries affects the salaries of Maruti's
directors--government officials appointed by the government." These directors tend to
suppress efforts to increase managers' and engineers' salaries; they do not like seeing
Maruti managers and engineers receiving higher salaries than their own, even though
Suzuki supports it. The result is flatter wage differentials between management and labor
within the firm. This is unusual in a society like India, where labor markets are highly
segmented and society at large is highly stratified. But this flatter wage structure has given
the firm's production workers a feeling that they are equally treated, further boosting their
motivation and commitment to the firm.
In addition to basic salaries and production incentives, workers receive fairly good
allowances as part of the labor costs to the firm, such as dearness allowances
(compensation to reflect a rise in inflation); house allowances; and many other fringe
benefits. 2 For instance, Maruti has formed a cooperative society to encourage home
ownership among its employees, offering low-interest loans and bearing the construction
costs of cooperative apartment buildings.2 ' These generous labor welfare measures differ
drastically from the prevalent labor practices in India, and have helped Maruti workers
develop a strong sense of identity with the company.
1 In the theory of wage determination, the wage serves as an indicator of social status; thus employees
become accustomed to certain levels of income relative to the income levels of those around them, and it
becomes as important to maintain these income levels as to exceed them (Doeringer and Piore 1971: 88).
22 These fringe benefits include allowances and subsidies for house rent; uniforms; child education (Rs.100
per child); meals; leave travel (employees can retum to their regions of origin every two years); transport;
medical treatment (both outpatient and hospitalization); Provident Fund (retirement pension: 10% of basic
salary is deducted for the Fund, with the firm paying equal amount each month); gratuity (separation grant);
and consumer durable loans (to purchase large consumer durable goods).
23 Thus, virtually every worker takes housing loans from the firm at the subsidized interest rate of 4% (as
compared to 14% market rate). Thus the other 10% is in effect an additional benefit.
Some scholars attribute group-oriented behavior, such as high levels of
identification of employees with their companies and consideration of fellow workers, to
the high efficiency of the Japanese shop floor (Sabel 1994). Koike and Inoki (1990), on
the other hand, emphasize the technical content of production workers' skill, particularly
what they call "intellectual skills" in terms of the ability to handle unexpected problems and
to solve problems on the shop floor, as the most important foundation of Japanese
systems." They argue that a high level of intellectual skill among production workers can
account for small differentials in compensation, egalitarianism, and participative systems on
the shop floor. But, Maruti's case shows a rather reverse causality: Small wage
differentials between production workers and indirect employees, as well as egalitarian and
participatory practices on the shop floor, institutionalized through various measures and
rules, have induced a high level of employee identification with the company and created
incentives for workers to develop and use their skills to produce more cars and improve
their production processes.
2) The Case of Telco
a) Recruitment
Telco's Pune plant has a total of 16,132 permanent employees. Its occupational
structure, which is similar to Maruti's, is shown in Table 3.6. As at Maruti, all Telco
employees are permanent, except a relatively small number of casual laborers. As at
Maruti, Telco's production workers are also all graduates of ITIs in different parts of the
country, but mainly Maharashtra. Also, as at Maruti, Telco recruits managers and
engineers through college visits, tests, and interviews. As at Maruti, newly recruited
engineers undergo one year of training after the first eight-day induction training. As at
Maruti, labor turnover among engineers and managers, are high, especially since the early
2 Koike and Inoki (1990) argue that the real content of the shop-floor-oriented principle is an outcome of
th intellectual skill acquired by production workers. With this skill, they say, workers can devise better
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1990s, due to the entry of FDI with its higher wages. As internal promotion opportunities
are limited, and as engineers have immense opportunities outside, for example the software
industry, they tend to seek work elsewhere after several years of service. However, again
as at Maruti, labor turnover among production workers is extremely low, reflecting Telco's
high (though lower than Maruti's) wages.
Table 3.6: Occupational Structures in Telco, Pune
Occupational Category # of Incumbents Levels Qualification
EG4 (Senior Manager)
EG3 (Div. Manager)
EG (Executive) 300 EG2 (Gen. Manager)
EG1 (Asst. Gen.
Manger/ Dy. Gen.
Manager)
TM5 (Manager) College graduates
TM4 (Deputy Manager) (B.Eng., B.Tech) /post
TM3 (Assistant graduates / non-
TM (Middle Manager) 2,300 Manager) engineering post
TM2 (Senior Officer/ graduates (for TM 1)
Engineers)
TM1 (Officer)
S3 (Junior Officer / Diploma holders /
S (Supervisor) 2,600 Asst. Foremen) Promoted from operators
S2 (Senior Supervisor)
SI (Supervisor)
OP2 - OP 7 ITI and NCVT exam.
OP (Operators) 9,600 Pass for OP2; 3-year
apprenticeship for OP4
MR-Al - MR-A3
MR-A (official work/ 200 (Senior assistant)
clerk) (Parallel to OP6 to S1)
MR-B 1 - MR-B4
MR-B (official work/ 200 (Assistant) (Parallel to
clerk) OP2 to OP5)
Note: MR stands for "monthly-rated." Operators (OP) used to be called CMR ("converted monthly rated").
Those in the OP and MR categories have a right to participate in collective bargaining (i.e., an in-house
union).
Source: Interviews with Telco's Human Resources officers, Telco Pune, in August 1998.
Interestingly, Telco started its internal up-skilling in the 1970s, long before the
globalization of the Indian economy began. In response to the rapid technological change,
particularly through the process of automation, Telco eliminated the occupational category
methods of production.
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of helpers (unskilled workers), converting them to skilled workers by redesigning their
jobs, though it keeps 100 to 200 casual temporary workers. Thus, at present, Telco
employs no unskilled workers. This is not because its demand for unskilled jobs has
diminished with technological change, as some scholars predict (Prais 1994), but because
skilled workers now do what unskilled workers used to do, in addition to their skilled
work. Thus, as the literature suggests, the range of tasks performed by workers has
certainly increased on the shop floor in Telco. But, Telco's experience suggests that this
does not always mean adding more tasks which require more sophisticated skills (upward
extension). Rather, the multi-skilling can also mean a downward extension of tasks
performed by already skilled workers.
b) Promotion
Telco places a greater premium on individual trade skills than does Maruti. Telco's
system of promotion and job placement is clearly defined by the type of trade skill of each
worker. Each level in the OP grade (see Table 3.6) is established according to the skill
level assessed job evaluation. For example, production workers, turners, tool and die
makers, and machinists can go up to Level OP7, the highest level of operators, as these
skills are highly specialized and in high demand.
In 1976, in response to rapidly changing technology, which reduced the
dependence on manual skills in manufacturing processes and instead called for operational
flexibility across jobs and functions (Puthli 1992), Telco developed a well-integrated
formal system of linking skills to its promotion and wage structures. It totally replaced its
old system of multiple grades and pay-scales for production workers with a new concept of
skill levels. Until 1976, similar to practices in U.S. firms, Telco employees were
promoted to higher grades only when vacancies arose in the section where they worked
(Puthli 1992). Thus, even if an employee became more skilled in his trade, he would not
be necessarily promoted. This led to dissatisfied workers, discouraged from learning new
102
skills. In addition, fearing that technological change would make many of its workers'
skills redundant and many workers underutilized, Telco started developing multi-skilled
workers. It is striking that Telco quickly responded to the issue of "de-skilling" due to
technological change (see Chapter 1) by reforming its promotion and reward structures,
almost at the moment the issue became of concern among industrialized countries
(Braverman 1974), even though India was technologically backward and its economic
growth sluggish during the 1970s (Lall 1987; also see Chapter 2).
The 1976 change involved the creation of several new schemes to motivate its
production workers to upgrade their skills, become multi-skilled, and reward them for the
acquired skills. First, under the Skill Benefit Scheme, a production worker who has been
at the same level for two years is eligible to receive "skill benefits" for vertically upgrading
his skills to a higher level in the same trade, after applying for the benefits with the report
from his boss and taking a test, which results in two accelerated increments in the salary
scale." Second, under the Versatility Benefit Scheme, workers in one trade can apply for
the "versatility benefit" of three accelerated increments, to upgrade their skills horizontally
by acquiring knowledge of jobs in other trades (for example, a welder acquiring a turner's
skills at the equivalent level). A worker can become eligible for versatility benefits once
his/her application is accepted, after completing two years in the same trade in the same
shop. Workers rarely move from one shop to another during the course of their career.
Under the versatility scheme, they experience a sort of three-tier loop system of skill
development, while keeping their original trade identity (such as a welder or a miller).
After going through six different skill trades in one tier,2 6 workers take an exam. If they
pass, they move up to the next tier of skill levels. Again, after experiencing three or four
different skill trades at the second tier, they take a test to move up to the next tier to become
25 For example, by the time a turner would reach Skill Level VI, he would have taken four tests and earned
eight accelerated increments as skill benefits (Puthli 1992). This system has allowed Telco to separate its
promotion and reward system from the availaiblity of vacancies for a given level of skills.
26 This is explained by the concept of "mobility clusters" in Doeringer and Piore 1971.
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more advanced skilled workers in a variety of trades. The combination of particular trades
to cover varies depending on the shop. Workers may apply for versatility benefits as long
as the trades they wish to learn are required within the shop where they work."
Third, Telco introduced the Performance Benefit Scheme in 1979, similar to the
Skill Benefit Scheme, to provide growth opportunities to white-collar employees (MR-A
and MR-B), and the Cross-Versatility Benefit Scheme for both blue-collar and while-collar
employees to develop skills in a variety of trades across different functions. Under the
latter scheme, a production worker, say a borer (in the OP category) could opt for the
cross-versatility benefit in the maintenance trade of say, millwright mechanic (also OP) or
the quality assurance inspector (MR category) and vice versa (Puthli 1992: 37). He would
receive three accelerated increments as his cross-versatility benefit after passing a test.
As Table 3.7 shows, as of 1990, about 80% of Telco's 8,385 production workers
had taken one or more benefits since these schemes were introduced in 1976. Further, of
these beneficiaries, 80% (5,414 production workers) have acquired skills in more than one
trade under the Versatility or Cross-Versatility schemes. It is interesting that Telco had
already developed an institutionalized system to motivate and encourage workers to become
multi-skilled while keeping traditional job boundaries based on trade skills as part of its
internal labor markets already in the mid-1970s, when the Indian market was still heavily
protected from competition. While multi-skilling has been regarded as a key feature of
Japanese production systems, Telco adopted its multi-skilling practices, though differently,
long before the concept of 'lean production' came into the country.
In addition, in 1976, Telco instituted three special schemes to develop workers'
craft skills: Master Craftsmen, Trade Specialist, and Supervisor schemes. Workers are
free to choose different career tracks, and they voluntarily apply if they are interested in any
27 Telco has six divisions in its Production Department: 1) Auto; 2) Machine Tool; 3) Foundry; 4) Growth
(producing equipment for future manufacturing use); 5) Production Engineering (tool room); and 6)
Electronics. Required skill levels vary depending on the division. For example, the Auto Division requires
semi-skilled workers, while Growth and Production Engineering Divisions require highly skilled workers.
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of the schemes. For each scheme, applicants are screened through an entrance test. After
the training, participants take an exit test. Depending on their achievement in each scheme,
they are promoted and receive monetary compensation. So far, Telco has 103 Master
Craftsmen and 45 Trade Specialists.
Table 3.7: Multi-skilled Workers at Telco, Pune as of December 1990
Combination of Schemes No. of Production Workers as % as a share in the Total
Beneficiaries at Telco Pune Production Workers at
Telco Pune *
1. Skill + Versatility + Cross-Versatility 446 5.3
2. Skill + Cross-Versatility 445 6.6
3. Skill + Versatility 3005 44.8
4. Only Cross-Versatility 71 0.8
5. Only Versatility 1340 16.0
6. Versatility + Cross-Versatility 107 1.3
7. Only Skill 1292 15.4
Total Beneficiaries 6706 80.0
Notes: * Calculated by the author.
Source: Puthli 1992.
Under the Master Craftsman scheme, five to six workers with five to 10 years of
experience are selected each year for two-year training: one year in Telco's own training
center and the second year on the job as a probationary master craftsman. Trainees learn all
the trades and become all-round multi-skilled workers. After completion, participants are
promoted to TM1 level, and go up the career ladder through TM5 (see Table 3.6). By
contrast, under the Trade Specialist scheme, eligible workers undergo one year of training
to become a specialist in one trade--really the highest level in that skill trade. The third
scheme is to convert workers to supervisors, as a way to motivate them. Since 1973,
between 80 and 100 workers have been promoted to supervisors through this program.
To implement these schemes, Telco has developed a set of clearly defined rules and
an operating system, involving the Productivity Systems Division, which is responsible for
defining the skill and performance levels for various jobs, and the Training Division, which
actually administers tests (Puthli 1992). Those who apply for these schemes can take
voluntary after-hours tutorials, offered by the Training Division. These covered on average
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28 courses with 299 participants per year during the period between 1987-88 and 1990-
91(Puthli 1992).
These schemes have enabled Telco to "create a highly motivated pool of talent and
skills" (Puthli 1992). They have also helped Telco gain more flexibility in deploying its
manpower according to demand changes and fluctuations, and changes in production
processes and priorities. These schemes have also helped reduce the absenteeism levels on
the shop floor, as the attendance is an eligibility condition for taking a test. These schemes
encourage Telco's production workers who have developed certain trade skills to not only
to stay on the job but also advance their skills.
Compared to the well-established internal systems to promote production workers
and clerical staff, those for managers and engineers are more flexible and thus closely
linked with external labor markets. For any vacancy, through internal advertisements,
those who meet the minimum qualifications apply, are interviewed, and if successful, get
the job. If the right candidates are not available, the firm recruits outside people through
advertisements. Engineers also go through two-year training programs, including two
months of on-the-job training to gain hands-on experience and learn how workers are
working, including the cleaning of machines.
c) Wages
Telco employees are well paid and well treated, though not as well-paid as
Maruti's. Telco's labor cost per employee is approx. Rs. 167,000 per year, as compared
to Maruti's Rs. 220, 000 per year: 32% higher than Telco's (see Table 3.4).28 Telco's
high wage level is partly because its Pune plant is located in a high-wage region,
Maharashtra (see Table 3.5), and partly because Telco's corporate management tradition
treats its employees well. Workers' wages increase annually based on seniority and
experience. Unlike Maruti, however, this increase reflects not just years of service but is
28 Calculated from Maruti's and Telco's Annual Reports 1996-97 respectively.
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closely tied to the internal skill-based career development systems described above. The
average worker at the entry level (OP2) receives Rs.5,500 per month as basic salary, and
those at the highest level receive around Rs.7,000 per month. Like Maruti, Telco provides
a good set of benefits, such as hostels for workers, medical allowances, and meal
subsidies.
3) Discussion: Collective vs. Individual Skill Development
As seen above, despite considerable differences in their characteristics, such as
ownership, firm size, product mix, and locations, Maruti and Telco share surprisingly
similar characteristics in their practices concerning skill development, such as recruitment,
promotion, and wages. First, both firms provide their employees with permanent, long-
term, stable employment. Second, both rely on a highly educated workforce. Both finns
hire production workers with two years of post-secondary industrial training. Their hiring
practices are almost identical, both searching out the best-qualified ITI students from all
over the country. Managers are all professionally-trained, with university or postgraduate
degrees. Entry into the job in each occupational category is highly competitive in both
firms. Third, both provide extensive in-firm training for new entrants before they are
assigned to one department. In both firms, production workers undergo three years of
training before they become regular workers (see the next subsection for more details).
Fourth, in both firms, turnover is extremely low among production workers and very high
among engineers and managers. Finally, unlike Japanese employment practices, where
production workers can sometimes be promoted to lower-level managerial positions, both
Maruti and Telco provide their production workers with limited promotion opportunities,
only up to the level of assistant supervisors, despite their high educational attainment, even
higher than among Japanese workers. Thus, in both Maruti and Telco, internal upward
mobility is limited.
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Some of these features resemble those often associated with the adoption of
Japanese production and employment practices elsewhere (Florida and Kenny 1991,
Kochan et al. 1997). However, Telco had developed these practices long before Maruti
entered India. Rather, the commonality in employment practices between the two firms
suggests the existence of a robust local institutional framework in which even an FDI-
affiliated firm becomes embedded. In fact, the Indian labor market is very rigid, because
the labor policy makes it extremely difficult for employers to fire workers-and has made
firms very prudent about hiring their production workers.2 9 Many studies report that these
constraints have often caused overstaffing, stagnant labor productivity growth, and
inefficiency (Eurotech International 1993). Nevertheless, this rigidity of the external labor
markets has actually made the long periods of initial in-firm training ever more critical as a
screening device to recruit the best-performing workers from a large pool. This has in turn
made stable employment practices viable, while in effect reducing the cost of retraining.
Clearly, both Maruti and Telco use high wages and excellent benefits, far beyond
those required by labor regulations and market-determined wage levels, not only to attract
and motivate high-quality workers but also to reward their efforts to improve their skills
and thereby performance (see Table 3.4). Given the rigid external labor markets, this high
wage has been important to motivate their production workers, who otherwise have few
incentives to work harder and better. At the same time, both firms could afford such high
wages, because of high levels of local contents (96% for Maruti and 95% for Telco) and of
subcontracting (72% for Maruti and 65% for Telco).3 0 This allowed both firms to take
29The Indian labor legislation of 1976 required large firms with 300 employees or more to obtain
government permission to fire any worker who has been employed over 240 days. In 1984, this
requirement was extended to firms with 100 employees or more. This rule does not apply to managerial-
level employees. If such permission is granted, the firm must give three month's notice to workers, as
well as retrenchment compensation of 15 days wages for each year of service with the employer. However,
in reality, such government permission is never granted due to political pressures from unions which are
backed by major political parties. Small-scale firms with less than 100 employees may fire workers but
they must give one month of notice in writing and compensation equal to 15 days' pay for each year of
service if employed at least 12 months (Agarwal 1997: 161).30Telco plans to increase this share for its passenger cars.
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advantage of low wages among their subcontractors, given the wide wage dispersion
within the Indian manufacturing sector (see Table 3.4).
Despite considerable similarities in the characteristics of the internal labor markets in
both firms, their patterns of skill development differ significantly. First, though the two
firms produce about the same value of outputs annually, Maruti has far fewer employees,
thus achieving much higher productivity. Second, while the two firms have similar
occupational structures, their occupational mix differs. The proportion of shop floor
workers is much higher at Maruti (76%; including apprentices, 79%), compared with that
of Telco (60%), suggesting Maruti's flatter organizational structure. Third, with a higher
proportion of engineers, including many assigned to R&D, Telco's organizational structure
focuses more on technological deepening, helping the firm develop its design capabilities.
In fact, Telco's Engineering Research Center at Pune (an R&D facility) employs about 800
highly trained technicians, engineers and scientists, by far the largest R&D staff in the
industry (see Table 3.8)." However, Table 3.8 also shows that in terms of the proportion
of R&D personnel to the total workforce, there is no clear difference between FDI-affiliated
firms and local firms. Clearly, however, Telco's investment in R&D has been critical for
developing its competitiveness, as it has significantly contributed to product development,
such as the first indigenously developed light commercial vehicles in 1986, three multi-
utility vehicles in the early 1990s, and small passenger cars in the mid-1990s (Bowonder
1998)."
3 Telco currently has a strength of 1,100 in its Engineering Research Center (Bowonder 1998).
* For the details of Telco's product development, see Bowonder 1998.
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Table 3.8: Ratio of R&D Personnel to Total Employees
in Selected Automobile Firms : 1990
Name of Firms Total No. of Employees No. of R&D Personnel Ratio of R&D Personnel
to Total Employees
TELCO 36,321* 800 2.2
PAL 11,027 252 2.3
Ashok Layland 10,720 242 2.2
HML 17,924 212 1.2
Bajaj Tempo Ltd. 5,172 173 3.3
Maruti 3,636 66 1.8
Swaraj Mazda 501 26 5.2
DCM Daewoo 500 15 3.0
Note: * The figure covers all three plants.
Source: Bhat 1992
Fourth, to cope with the rigidity of the external labor market, which provides
workers with few incentives to learn more, both firms came up with a different strategy to
motivate workers and develop their skills. At Maruti, various measures link workers'
collective performance with its reward system and on-the-job training systems. In other
words, decentralized learning, which is described as distinctive in the Japanese production
system (Sabel 1994: 141), was designed to involve the firm's wage and training systems.
Maruti's productivity-linked wage system has effectively created a condition where "the
interests of the parts are consistent with the interests of the whole" (Sabel 1994: 141).
Maruti's on-the-job training focuses on behavioral and attitudinal aspects to improve
collective efficiency and productivity. This mechanism of skill formation motivates
workers to acquire skills to produce more in quantity rather than in variety.
By contrast, Telco focuses on upgrading individual trade skills to promote multi-
skilling. Clearly, Telco places a higher premium on individual skills, and its skill
development system is directly reflected and built into the firm's wage and promotion
systems. This skill development system, instituted in the mid-1970s, was an
organizational adjustment to external institutional conditions (technological change),
redefining workers' skill development within its internal labor markets; workers move up
the occupational ladder as they acquire and upgrade their trade skills. The emphasis is on
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multi-skilling, in terms of a mastery of various trade skills, which are ranked in
juxtaposition horizontally and in gradation vertically.
Finally, the two firms have very different concepts of flexibility and "multi-
skilling": in order to achieve more flexibility despite the rigidity of the external labor
market, these two firms sought different kinds of multi-skilling. Maruti, like many
Japanese auto manufacturers, attained flexibility by allowing a worker to exercise his
judgment in performing his tasks while using different machines and increasing the level of
mutual monitoring. On the other hand, Telco attained flexibility by increasing the
deploiability of workers in a variety of tasks and trades. Taken together, Maruti and Telco
have different models of skill development. One focuses on production capabilities and the
other on innovation capabilities, hence requiring different types of skills and developing
different modes of training. Thus, this study does not necessarily support the cultural
argument in the literature (Dore 1973) that idiosyncratic cultural factors inherent in different
countries shape distinct employment practices in each country.
Telco's innovative skill development schemes have enabled it to develop the
dedicated skilled workforce it needs for its tradition of "self-learning" technological
development. Indeed, the firm has intensively invested in the critical technological
elements such as gear box and direct injection engine (Bowonder 1998). A closely linked
feedback system among R&D, engineering, production, and training has facilitated the
firm's technological development. For example, at Telco, new design specifications
developed by Design Division are sent to the Autoprojects Division and the Prototype Shop
for analysis and modification. After incorporating their repeated feedback and testing
results from the Engineering Research Division, new models are sent to the Manufacturing
Division (Bowonder 1998). These new projects and new production processes are in turn
incorporated into training subjects for disseminating necessary knowledge and skills.
Despite enormous changes in the Indian economy and rapid transformations of the
automobile industry in the 1990s (see Chapter 2), however, Telco has made no significant
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adjustment in its wage and skill structures since the mid-1970s, as these are now so well-
established and costly to alter. Even after Telco introduced some elements of the lean
production system, however, its robust feedback system of skill development remained
unchanged, so deeply was it embedded in its job and reward structures. However, the
system allowed the firm some internal flexibility to deploy labor in response to changes in
the external institutional environment.
The literature suggests that while they impart training in specific skills, employers
may not raise employees' wages, since there is no alternative demand for such skills (Prais
1995). Telco, however, kept encouraging its workers to upgrade their specific skills and
kept rewarding the efforts by increasing their wages. Wages not only served as a premium
for skills but also as an incentive to motivate the workforce. Internal labor market theorists
(Doeringer and Piore 1971) argue that in long-term employment relations, wages are not
determined by an individual's productivity but correspond with the job classifications so
carefully designed internally. In Telco, however, such wages are determined by
individuals' achievement in skill enhancement, not just reflecting job classification or
outputs. On the contrary, in Maruti, wages are mainly determined by collective
performance (i.e., the firm's productivity), in addition to job classifications, seniority and
attendance.
3.2.2 Apprenticeship Training
In many developed countries, apprenticeship is often considered a "last resort" for
academically and/or economically disadvantaged young people to learn skills and get a job,
mainly in small firms (Merle 1994: 33, Prais 1998)." In India, however, apprenticeship
can be a springboard to a well-paid job in a large firm. India's 1961 Apprenticeship Act34
" An important exception is the "dual systems" of German-speaking countries, and particularly that of
Germany; the German "dual system" links general schooling with vocational apprenticeship in enterprises
and workshops in a parallel way.
I The Act has been amended in 1964, 1973, and 1986, and the Apprenticeship Rules enacted in 1991
supplements the Act.
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mandated that each year, the large firms take, depending on the size of the firm, a fixed
number of apprentices, who have completed one- or two-year post-secondary industrial
training at the Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs).3 s Recent literature, with its renewed
interest in training (see Chapter 1), focuses on an alternative form of apprenticeship
involving both school and firm, particularly in developed countries (OECD 1994).36 Such
partnerships have already existed in India for nearly forty years! This section illustrates
how differently Maruti and Telco implemented their apprenticeship programs as part of
their efforts to foster skill development among their workers.
1) The Case of Maruti
In addition to its formally employed production workers, Maruti took on about 900
apprentices as of 1996-97,37 accounting for about 15% of its total workforce (see Table
3.9). Apprentices, who have completed two-year training courses at ITIs, undergo on-the-
job training for one or two years, depending on the type of skills they acquire.3 ' For
instance, trainee welders and fitters spend one year, whereas those in tools and dies or
plastic molding spend two years.39 Maruti has a small training facility,4" but training is
conducted mainly on the job. Apprentices are assigned to different shops, such as
welding, assembly, paint, machine, vehicle inspection, and service shops. After a one-day
orientation and one-day session on safety, they are placed with a more experienced worker
* A firm has to take one apprentice for every seven production workers.
3 Interests in apprenticeship are particularly strong in Europe, where a high rate of unemployment among
the youth has created serious social problems, and in the U.S., where the issue of skill mismatch has
generated a public policy debate even at the national level.
" Maruti further increased its apprentices to 1,300 as of March 1997.
" The apprenticeship program consists of three parts: 1) basic training; 2) shop-floor on-the-job training;
and 3) related instruction training. Two-year basic training takes place at ITIs, while one-year on-the-job
training occurs at firms. Employers can freely select either fresh or former ITI graduates.
39 The duration of apprenticeship training is fixed by government rule for each of the 145 trades that the
scheme covers.
4 According to the 1961 Apprentices Act, any enterprises with 500 workers or more must create a separate
training facility from the workshop. Enterprises with less than 500 workers can depute their apprentices to
local ITIs for in-class basic training sessions. As of 1996, 869 central government enterprises and 25,332
state government enterprises and private firms have in-house training facilities to accommodate apprentices
(Government of India 1997b).
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to learn the tasks they need to perform to get the work done in that particular shop.
Apprentices learn their skills on the job from their co-workers and superviors, as they
spend their training days exactly like the rest of the production workers. Thus, the mode of
training is largely "learning by doing."
Table 3.9: Share of Apprentices in Total Workforce: Maruti and Telco-Pune
# of Apprentices # of Total formal % of Apprentices % of Apprentices
enrolled per year employees in total workforce in total production
(# of production workers
workers)
Maruti (1996/97) 900 5,403 14.3% 15.3%
(4,995)
Telco-Pune Plant 150 (100 for 16,132 0.9% 1.5%
(1997/98) three-year program (9,600)
and 50 for one-year
program)
Source: Maruti, Telco.
Maruti obviously implements the apprenticeship scheme because it is statutory, but
Maruti takes positive advantage of it in several ways. First, Maruti's extensive use of the
apprenticeship, more than required by the government quota,4 1 substantially lowers its
labor costs, to only 1.8% of its annual sales turnover in 1996-97 (even lower at 1.4% in
1995-96), as apprentices actually substitute for regular production workers, thus offsetting
Maruti's high wage bills for its regular employees. While regular production workers
receive Rs. 15,000 per month as salaries and allowances, apprentices receive only Rs. 770
per month as stipends. Moreover, as trainees, apprentices are not entitled to incentive
bonus, provident funds, and health insurance schemes.
41 To take on more apprentices than the quota allows, the firm must cite justifiable reasons and get
approval from the government for each year.
4 According to the government rule, apprentices receive from employers minimum stipends of Rs. 580
per month in the first year, Rs. 670 per month in the second year, Rs. 770 per month in the third year, and
Rs. 880 per month in the fourth year. In addition, employers with 500 or more workers bear the recurrent
costs, including tuitions for basic training at ITIs, while those with less than 500 workers share the
recurrent costs with the Central Government according to a fixed formula (Government of India 1997b).
" But, they are entitled to a maximum of 15 days of medical leave and 12 days of annual leave.
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Second, Maruti currently uses the apprenticeship scheme to screen for good
apprentices for longer-term formal employment, as discussed earlier. Until 1994, 80% to
90% apprentices were retained as regular employees after the apprenticeship; the current
retention rate is only about 10% to 20%. Third, Maruti uses apprentices as a labor
reservoir for its phased plant expansions. Many apprentices became employed when the
firm's second plant started its operation in 1996, because they had already acquired
considerable firm-specific knowledge and skills. The current apprentices are also expected,
on completing their apprenticeship training, to work as regular production workers in its
third plant when it starts in 1999.
Finally, apprenticeship also serves as an important source of spillover of
knowledge and skills to other firms as most apprentices must seek jobs elsewhere after
their apprenticeship ends. Many are absorbed by Maruti's suppliers which have emerged
in close proximity to Maruti. Some are recruited by Maruti's new competitors such as
Daewoo, GMI, and PAL-Fiat, but many others are absorbed by Maruti's authorized service
networks, which prefer Maruti-trained apprentices, who know exactly how Maruti cars
work. In fact, they obtain a list of Maruti apprentices for their priority recruitment.
Because Maruti brought about a major technological breakthrough in the Indian automobile
industry, its service stations require workers with a higher level of technical skills than
those trained elsewhere. At the same time, before Maruti's entry, other car manufacturers
had paid little attention to servicing. A high level of customer services even after the sale,
by high skilled workers, was a totally new concept for the Indian consumers as well as
domestic producers. Thus, quality service by the workers trained at Maruti have certainly
added to its competitiveness. Thus, knowledge and skill spillovers through the
apprenticeship at Maruti actually benefit the firm, in terms of higher quality of components
and a higher level of servicing of its cars, and this benefit appears to outweigh the cost of
training, including the gains captured by its competitors.
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Further, after this one-year apprenticeship, trainees still go through two more years
of probationary training before they become regular employees. During this period, shop-
floor supervisors closely monitor their attitudes, behaviors, and ability to perform given
tasks in every six months. Thus, by the time they are formally recruited as regular
production workers, they are fully skilled and familiar with their respective skill areas, their
tasks, and the way the firm operates. During these two years, they receive stipends of only
Rs. 1,250 to Rs. 2,000 and 50% of incentives, with some fringe benefits. This extensive
on-the-job training without legal protection has let Maruti hire reliable and competent
workers with considerable firm-specific skills, while lowering labor costs.
2) The Case of Telco
Telco has historically taken an active initiative in implementing the apprenticeship
program. Like other firms, the 1961 Apprenticeship Act required Telco to take a fixed
number of apprentices each year. But, Telco did more than required under this Act: not
only does it train apprentices, but it also runs an industrial training institute (ITI) of its own
within its main plant premises. In fact, Telco was one of the first Indian firms to introduce
the apprenticeship scheme (Bowonder 1998). It had a strong sense of corporate mission to
train workers, as the then chairman of the firm, Mr. Moolgaokar, considered the
development of skilled labor to be of utmost importance for the country's industrialization,
as skilled labor were not readily available in India in the 1950s and 1960s. He had a clear
vision that all future Telco workers should be trained to become skilled. Telco's top
management thought that in-firm training would provide the firm with a workforce that
could be easily molded as the firm required specific knowledge, skills, and behaviors,
which was particularly important given its high degree of vertical integration. In 1966,
Telco created a state-of-the-art training center, far better than most government-run ITIs
anywhere in the country. The training facility is almost one-fifth the size of Maruti's main
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plant,44 with advanced training equipment, specifically designed to cater to Telco's
production needs, as well as well-equipped classrooms.
Since 1966, Telco has been running two programs for apprentices in its training
center: a three-year Full-Term Apprenticeship (FTA) program, and a one-year job trainee
program. Since 1967, 2,741 workers have completed the FTA program and a total of
1,254 have been trained under the job trainee program. Of 16,132 current employees,
about 10% are graduates of the FTA, of whom many have become supervisors by now.
Thus, Telco used the apprenticeship program to develop "core" skilled workers from
whom other workers can learn. The FTA program takes 100 fresh high school graduates
each year, from a pool of 5,000 to 6,000 applicants responding to local newspaper
advertisements. 4 5 They offer hands-on training in 13 specialized trades, 4 6 at the in-house
training center for two years (one year for welders and three years for die-makers), using
the standard syllabus designated by the government for ITI use. To attend some classroom
lecture sessions, trainees are sent to a local ITI once a week.47
The first year entails basic training for three months, training in a specific trade for
four months, and multi-skill training for five months; trainees experience different skill
trades in rotation.4 8 In the second year, they specialize in their own trades. During the
third year, trainees experience in-plant on-the-job training; they are assigned to all different
divisions, including R&D division. Faculty of the in-house training center are 47 training
officers selected from Telco's master skilled workers, most of whom themselves graduated
I Telco's training center has 52,000 m2 workshop space, plus 1,600 m2 classrooms and 1,400 m2 for a
hostel; Maruti's main plant (building) is 270,000 m2.
4 The selection process involves 1) screening based on criteria such as a high school diploma in that year
or the previous year, a 60% pass in science and calculation on the SSC exam, and an age range of 16 to 20;
2) a written aptitude test; 3) interviews by Telco's training committees; and 4) a medical checkup.
4 These 13 trades are : fitter; turner; machinist; sheet metal; tool & die making; maintenance; electrician;
electronic mechanic; motor vehicle mechanic; welder; painting; molder; and grinder.
* The Indian apprenticeship program was modeled after the German dual system of apprenticeship. But, in
the German system, apprentices are mainly taken by small-scale craft production firms, whereas in India,
apprentices are mainly absorbed in large-scale firms. For a review of the German dual apprenticeship
system, see OECD 1994, Tsuchiya 1998.
4 The syllabi for different trades are prepared by the respective Trade Committees comprising trade experts
from the industries (Government of India 1997b).
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from this in-house training center some twenty or thirty years ago. This training center
focuses on trades directly related to those required in Telco's production processes.
Telco's in-firm training thus overcomes a common problem of a wide gap between the
content in the textbooks and the actual practice on the shop floor. Even outside the official
coursework, instructors provide some trainees with one to two hours of special coaching to
"make them become 100% skilled artisan."49 In accordance with government rules,
trainees receive small stipends: Rs. 600 per month for the first year; Rs. 700 per month for
the second year; and Rs.900 per month for the third year, in addition to free
accommodation and subsidized meals. Telco's excellent apprenticeship training has
resulted in 24 awards in national annual competitions and 57 awards in regional annual
competitions for best apprentices, as well as 5 awards in national competitions and 17 in
regional competitions for best training establishment. Somewhat surprisingly, Telco does
not permit apprentices to substitute for production workers during the first two years, even
at times of sudden demand fluctuation, allowing them to be totally relieved from any
activities directly related to actual production. After trainees complete their three-year
training at this in-house ITI, they take a national-level test administered by National Council
for Vocational Training (NCVT)."
In addition, Telco offers a one-year job trainee program, which is equivalent to
Maruti's apprenticeship training: 50 trainees each year receive practical hands-on training
on the actual shop floor, after their two-year training at ITIs. They specialize in one of five
trades: drawing man, grinder, sheet metal, welder, and iron machinist. Like FTP trainees,
trainees under this program are also provided with hostel facilities, subsidized meals, and
sports facilities.
Until 1984, all apprentices were absorbed as regular employees in Telco. Since
then, the retention rate has declined, due to a lack of vacancy within the firm. In 1996,
49 Interview with a training officer of Telco, Pune, in August 1998.
50 Apprentices who completed the apprenticeship training appear for the All Indian Trade Test conducted by
the NCVT.
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Telco retained only 30% of its apprentices in particular skill trades. According to Telco's
Human Resources manager, graduates of the three-year FTA have shown higher
productivity than other workers. Clearly, Telco's skill formation system is more thorough
than Maruti's and oriented toward individuals' acquiring specific trade skills. The
remaining 70% are quickly absorbed by the surrounding industries, including other
automobile manufacturers located in Pune (such as Bajaj Auto and Bajaj Tempo). About
25% to 30% of Telco apprentices find jobs in Telco's suppliers, most of whom are small-
scale, in the region. Like Maruti's trainees, Telco's trainees have a high premium because
of the "Telco Stamp": Apprenticeship at Telco provides them with a credential additional to
their academic certificates in the external labor market." As at Maruti, Telco provides a
ready-made trained and skilled workforce for local industries, serving as an important
source of skill spillover to its suppliers in the region.
3) Discussion: Apprentice Training as Government-Private Institutional
Synergy
Clearly, both Maruti and Telco have utilized apprenticeship schemes beyond what is
required as statutory, albeit differently. They have adapted the scheme to suit their
respective internal labor markets. The 1961 Apprenticeship Act has in effect set the
educational standard of production workers in large firms at the level of post-secondary
industrial training plus a one- or two-year industrial apprenticeship throughout the Indian
industries, ensuring the secure supply of high-quality industrial labor, with ready-to-use
firm-specific skills. At the same time, the imposition of apprenticeship by the government
rule, which, on the surface, appears to have served as a large constraint on firms, actually
provides firms with flexibility in deploying labor. Both firms effectively use the
apprenticeship schemes as a buffer to adjust to changes in demand for production labor; as
a screening device to select the best-performing workers for long-term employment; and as
a source of knowledge and skill spillover to their suppliers and service stations. These
" Interviews with a senior manager of Telco, Pune, in August 1998.
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gains from spillovers certainly makes the firm's return on investment in training greater
when the ratio of local contents is so high, as in the cases of Maruti and Telco. Human
capital theorists fail to capture these increasing returns (rather than just costs) on investment
in training accrued to the firms through spillovers to the supply chains.
Indeed, for both Maruti and Telco, the extensive three-year in-house training (one-
year apprenticeship and two-year probationary training in Maruti and three-year
apprenticeship in Telco) without full commitment for long-term employment, legal
protection, or handsome remuneration, has helped the firms employ workers of good
quality, while using their labor at an extremely low cost as only a tiny fraction of regular
salaries. Their high-wage policies have also ensured a low rate of labor turnover, thus
keeping the cost of training low in the long run.
Neo-classical human capital theorists regard labor legislation like the 1961
Apprenticeship Act that imposes a quota of apprentices on large firms, as distorting the
functioning of the labor market (Middleton et al. 1993). However, this firm-level study
finds that the firms have actually turned the imposition into a means to efficiently recruit
workers trained in firm-specific skills. Indeed, both Maruti and Telco have developed a
successful institutional alliance linking them directly with local vocational training
institutions, i.e., ITIs. This institutional arrangement has certainly worked well, in terms
of developing worker skills, particularly firm-specific skills, based on their own needs.
Thus, in effect, it has created an efficient mechanism for supply of and demand for skills to
meet. Moreover, it has effectively standardized the academic level of industrial workers as
post-secondary industrial training at ITIs among all large firms throughout the country.
This institutional mechanism was in place long before the Indian economy became
globalized, but certainly became more effective after the industry started growing.
3.2.3 In-firm Formal Training
1) The Case of Maruti
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Maruti has very well-organized in-firm formal training programs. New workers
first participate in induction training, conducted by Maruti's training department.
Newcomers spend one day to learn about the company, and another day to learn about
Maruti's production processes. This is followed by one week of training on the line to
observe how things work on actual lines. Following this induction training, they spend
two years in probationary training, as discussed earlier," learning about the operation of
machines, production processes, material, and maintenance. Also, they learn from their
shop floor supervisors about the Maruti Operation Standard (MOS), a particular sequencing
of tasks and procedures. This standardization of work design and its thorough diffusion
throughout the shop floor is a key strategy to induce firm-level learning." In Maruti, the
training on the MOS is standardized and procedurized through manuals. Paradoxically,
while the literature often argues that knowledge required on the contemporary shop floor is
increasingly becoming tacit, in-firm training actually increasingly requires a more and more
codified method (see Chapter 4 for more discussion on this point).
Some scholars argue that flexibility in adjustment procedures, often seen as a main
feature of Japanese production systems, makes production processes much more efficient
than any standardization of adjustment procedures, because flexibility allows workers to
make more use of their intellectual skill (Koike and Inoki 1990). Maruti's experience,
however, shows that to achieve flexibility on the shop floor, the firm used in-firm training
to introduce highly standardized procedures, which were thoroughly internalized by
production workers. Such training has thus had a tremendous impact on labor
productivity, because workers understood what to do when problems occurred, what to
attend to, and how to solve such problems. In other words, Maruti's skill training also
involved codifying knowledge to make tacit knowledge accumulated within the
organization sharable among workers.
2 In 1997, Maruti extended this probationary training period from one year to two, because "there is so
much more to learn for new comers," as a Maruti manager commented.
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Maruti's regular training programs for production workers aim to upgrade skills,
bring about attitudinal change, promote personal career growth, and develop
communication and interpersonal skills to facilitate team work. Training for production
workers is conducted by their own department on the shop floor. Interestingly, until 1988,
the acquisition of technical skills was less of a focus than attitudinal changes and problem-
solving skills. However, at present, production workers in specific skill areas are often
sent to other Indian firms (such as a manufacturer of special types of electrical equipment),
or to specialized training courses outside the firm, arranged by Maruti's Training
Department, to enhance their specific skills.
For existing employees, every employee in each occupational group is trained
regularly according to an individual annual training plan. The plan is prepared each year by
the worker, his supervisor, and his division manager in consultation with the training
department, through which the individual's training needs are identified. This annual
training program is well-reflected and embedded in Maruti's wage and promotion
structures. Unlike many other firms, even unskilled workers (called "attendants" at Maruti)
are trained. All employees are trained in a classroom around the year on various subjects
such as management, awareness, production systems, health, safety; and company future/
company targets (see Appendix 3.2 for the subjects covered in-firm training in Maruti and
Telco)." Workers commented that they are most interested in topics on the company's
future plan, because "if the company's future is better, workers' future is better." Such
training apparently motivates Maruti's employees and implants a strong sense of corporate
identity among its employees.
Interestingly, Japanese and Indian managers have different perceptions on what
motivates workers to learn. Japanese managers find it difficult to motivate Indian workers
to learn new knowledge and skills to widen their tasks without monetary rewards, in the
absence of a system to publicly recognize an individual's efforts to improve his skills. On
"1 A similar observation is reported about NUMMI in the U.S. (see Adler 1993).
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the other hand, Indian employees, both management and labor alike, think that they have
been greatly motivated, because they identify the company's future with their own. They
see their future career growth as totally dependent on the future of the company. They
think that if Maruti fails, they will be the ones to lose jobs. This strong sense of identity
with and commitment to the firm among Maruti employees is demonstrated by Maruti's
workers' exceptionally high attendance rate of 93%, compared to the average attendance
rate of 80% for other Indian firms." This has also helped the firm create an environment
conducive to organization-wide collective learning through the development of shared
expectations and goals, as well as the diffusion of norms regarding expected standards of
performance. Clearly, Maruti's in-firm training programs have been oriented less toward
technical skills and more toward the infusion and diffusion of values and norms that help
raise the firm's productivity.
Several additional factors have also helped create attitudes among Maruti employees
that are conductive to collective learning. First, relatively cordial labor relations at Maruti
have helped; initially, Maruti's union was affiliated with the Indian National Trade Union
Congress (INTUC), which represented the unions in the automobile industry. But, after a
serious labor dispute in 1987, Maruti created its own company union, resulting in more
harmonious relations between management and labor. Second, as discussed earlier, Maruti
recruits only fresh ITI graduates. This has made it easier for Maruti to infuse corporate
values that motivate workers to improve their performance, because they are more receptive
to learning Maruti's styles of operation, rules and procedures, that are far more efficient
than existing firms, and because they are free from those in existing labor unions which
have been so politicised in India.
For supervisors, executives, and managers (see Table 3.2), professional
consultants and already trained managers conduct separate training programs to improve
their managerial skills. The objective of this training is to raise quality awareness in the
" Each class has about fifty participants.
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workplace: managers learn why improving quality is important and how to improve
quality, through subjects such as quality, tools, monitoring, how to detect defects, man
management, leadership training, and team building. The focus is particularly on
developing diagnostic and problem-solving skills: they are taught, with the data, how and
why things went wrong. This has led the firm to enormously improve both product and
process quality, and safety in Maruti. Managers are also sent to training offered by
industrial associations (such as CII) on selected topics.
Moreover, Maruti was the first Indian car maker to conduct training for managers,
customer service personnel, and technicians from more than 1,000 authorized service
stations and dealers. With intensified competition, car makers started focusing on not only
producing and selling, but also servicing and other types of customer services. This was a
totally new concept in India, where highly protected and regulated domestic markets had
long been "sellers' market" rather than a "buyers' market." Thus, Maruti's training also
ensures increasing returns through skill development among its workers at its authorized
service stations.
2) The Case of Telco
Since 1973, Telco evolved an elaborate formal training program of its own,
covering 60 subject areas. In contrast with Maruti's in-firm training, Telco's training has
traditionally focused on upgrading technical skills. In addition, Telco runs one-time need-
based training programs when it installs new machines at the request of each department.
Often the trainers are Telco's own employees. In some cases, however, outside specialists
are brought in to conduct training in such areas as welding technology.
In 1996, Telco made some important changes in its training policy as intensified
competition in the domestic as well as international markets forced the firm to improve its
product quality. Telco appointed a new manager in charge of training, who drastically
" A talk by Mr. B.C. Bhargava, a former Maruti CEO, at Harvard, February 1998.
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reformed the firm's training activities. He reorganized both the content and extent of in-
firm regular training programs, reflecting the introduction of new management techniques
based on the principles of the Japanese production systems. In the 10 months after his
appointment, his department trained 11,615 employees, 72% of the total. The training
expenditure amounted to Rs. 60 million in 1997-98, a little less than 0.05% of Telco's
annual sales.
Table 3.10: In-firm Training Participants: Maruti and Telco, Pune (1994-95 - 1997-98)
(No. of participants)
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 Total No. of
Employees
1997-98
Telco, Pune 11,999 (79%) 23,285 (150%) 27,119 (169%) 40,507 (251%) 16,132
Maruti 20,036 (414%) 10,309 (208%) 10,886 (205%) 8,278 (145%) 5,690
Notes: (%) refers to a share of employees trained in total employees.
Source: Maruti and Telco.
The number of Telco's participants in training has rapidly increased in recent years
(see Table 3.10), though the average number of days spent on training per employee
remains much lower, 3 days at Telco, compared to 10 days at Maruti.
Since 1996, the new manager has introduced new subjects such as "5S," Total
Productive Maintenance or TPM (how to maintain own machines), benchmarking, safety,
housekeeping, more computerized technical skills such as Statistical Process Control
(SPC), Geometric Diametering (GD), and Computer Aided Design (CAD), in addition to a
environmental and behavioral focus in training. Thus, the focus of Telco's training
programs has shifted from technical aspects of training, such as the use of cutting tools,
engineering drawings, painting techniques, and welding defects and inspection, to new
areas. These include 1) a customer-driven and customer-focused operation; 2) physical
environment and safety (e.g., precautions for eye, finger, and hand injuries); 3) operational
performance and environment (leadership/communication); 4) employee involvement and
physical fitness (health/stress management/backache); and 5) materials handling. Also, like
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Maruti, Telco recently promoted an extensive use of computers in the workplace, and hence
increased more computer-related training, in such areas as painting and molding.
Computer skills have become essential with the introduction of such techniques as Program
Logic Control (PLC) and Computer Numerical Control (CNC), as well as the increased use
of computer network among different departments (Bowonder 1998). Clearly, the nature
of skills has changed due to technological change in recent years, which in turn changed the
subjects covered in in-firm training. But, increases in the amount of training resulted from
the changes in its institutional environment, and particularly the intensified competition
within the domestic markets (see Chapter 2).
Despite the introduction of such new training components, however, Telco saw no
visible sign of change in the performance of its workers or of the firm. Telco's new
training manager diagnosed that no change had occurred because individuals were not
sensitive enough to convert knowledge into action. Therefore, Telco started sensitizing its
employees to promote organizational change. The management recognized the importance
of creating an organizational culture to promote the diffusion of a norm that values higher
product quality; then, he felt, employees would slowly respond to a change in the
organizational culture. The department started requiring "implementation reports":
individuals who participated in training activities were to state how they used their newly
acquired knowledge in their own workplace.56 Moreover, in 1997, Telco started an
additional campaign to promote a different theme each year across both management and
labor, such as "5S" for 1997 and "safety of hands and fingers" and "pokayoke " (a
Japanese management technique to make workers alert to avoid errors to reduce defects on
the line) for 1998.
Moreover, Telco's recent introduction of simultaneous engineering led its training
to focus on the standardization of operation with a greater emphasis on quality control
(Bowonder 1998). As at Maruti, reflecting the adoption of international quality standards
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such as QS 9000 and ISO 9002, and a greater need for intra-firm coordination (Bowonder
1998), in-firm training has become more critical as a means of internalizing the procedures
and disseminating knowledge throughout the organization (See Appendix 3-2).
As changes since 1996 suggest, the content of training has become more oriented
toward changing behavioral traits, which requires a diffusion of values and knowledge in
the workplace, rather than the improvement of technical skills, which would be embodied
in individual workers. Thus, the focus of in-firm training has shifted from the acquisition
of individual technical skills to the better utilization of individual cognitive skills in the
workplace. As a training manager puts it, "Every worker must put skills into action; it is
not enough to acquire his skills." Telco also started reorienting its training toward
organizational skills; as the training manager put it, "Not only changes in the formal
structure of the organization, but also it is important to recognize people. By changing the
environment, people's behaviors can change and changes are actually happening."57
3) Discussion: The Diffusion of Values and Norms
As described above, both Maruti and Telco have well-organized formal training
programs for employees in different occupational categories, based on individual annual
training plans developed among the individual, his supervisors, and respective training
departments. Both firms have measures to evaluate the effectiveness of individual training
sessions. Both firms primarily use their own employees as trainers. Such institutionalized
forms of in-firm training had evolved over time long before liberalization policy was
introduced, and have served as an integral part of the firms' efforts to develop workers'
skills and hence the firm's organizational capabilities.
However, in response to transformations in the industry, in the mid-1990s, both
Maruti and Telco quickly introduced some new subjects to their training curriculums,
56 Also, at the end of the training, participants must give feedback on the content of the training, which is
reflected in a meeting for divisional representatives for improvement.
"1 Interview with a Telco manager, August 1998.
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reflecting the introduction of some management techniques, often considered a salient
feature of Japanese production systems, such as TQM, 5S, and kaizen (or continuous
improvement). Somewhat surprisingly, however, despite Maruti's presence in India since
the early 1980s, only in the mid-1990s did the firm actually introduce these management
techniques. Clearly, both firms have adopted the principles of "high performance
organizations" (Doeringer et al. 1996, Adler 1993), with a greater focus on quality
improvement and behavioral change.
On the surface, therefore, the cases of Maruti and Telco support the "convergence"
argument in some recent literature, as discussed earlier (Womack et al. 1990, Florida and
Kenney 1991, MacDuffie 1996). However, a closer examination still finds considerable
differences between the way training programs are conducted in the two firms. First,
Maruti's training has focused on the diffusion of values and norms about operational and
quality standards, while Telco has focused on enhancing individual skills. Second, while
both firms stress the standardization and use in-firm training to achieve the standardization,
they in fact focus on very different dimensions: Maruti is concerned with the
standardization of procedures related to line management, whereas Telco is more concerned
with design specifications and protocols (Bowonder 1998). Finally, Maruti's in-firm
training has facilitated a gradual diffusion of procedures through standardization and
formalization of procedures, while Telco's in-firm training induced a rapid change in
employees' attitudes and norms.
3.2.4 Overseas Training
1) The Case of Maruti
Maruti allocates considerable resources to overseas training activities in Suzuki,
Japan, and relies heavily on Suzuki's cooperation in training.58 When the Maruti project
* In fact, Maruti's balance sheets have a separate line indicating the amount of expenses allocated for
overseas training in Japan.
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started in 1982, many managers were sent to Japan. They laid out the project with their
counterparts from Suzuki. Maruti was designed to be almost a replica of Suzuki's Kosai
Plant, including the plant layout and the form of work organization. This initial dispatching
of many managers, engineers, and supervisors, who learned how the Japanese plant
actually operated helped the firm acquire project execution capabilities. 9
As of 1998, a total of 1,380 Maruti employees at all levels including production
workers, or a little more than one fourth of its total workforce, have been sent to Suzuki in
Japan for training. As Table 3.11 shows, the majority of training for Maruti employees
actually takes place in Japan. In addition, a total of over 834 Japanese engineers came to
Maruti to transfer knowledge and skills to Maruti employees. At present, 10 Japanese are
stationed in various functions at Maruti on a long-term basis (for 3 to 4 years), and another
10 Japanese are on short-term missions to Maruti, usually for 3 to 6 months. Maruti (and
its partner the Indian government) and Suzuki have deliberately agreed that technology
transfer between the two firms should occur by way of skill development through direct
exchange of employees between the two firms.
Table 3.11: Maruti's Investment in Training: Training Manhours by Training Types
(manhours)
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Annual Training
Plan 12,698 37,316 34,913 56,975
External Training
14,504 7,716 13,640 13,248
Training in Japan
207,384 210,008 38,736 212,568
On-the-job
Training (excluding
on-line training 1,627 15,109 8,964 14,856
Total 236,213 270,149 96,253 297,647
Source: Maruti's internal documents.
59 For discussions on project execution capabilities, see Amsden and Hikino 1994.
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Two intermediary training organizations have facilitated and coordinated Maruti's
training for managers, engineers, and supervisors in Japan: the Association of Overseas
Technical Scholarship (AOTS), Tokyo, a non-profit organization sponsored by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); and the Japan Vocational Ability
Development Association (JAVADA), Tokyo, a non-profit organization sponsored by the
Ministry of Labor of the Japanese government (see Appendix 3.3 for details of AOTS
training schemes). In both cases, after the initial two-week introductory sessions,
participants are sent to their respective "host" firms (i.e., Suzuki in the case of Maruti
employees) for their on-the-job training. The duration of the overseas training varies
depending on the occupational category of employees. In addition, each year, about 15 to
20 managers are sent for managerial training under the AOTS scheme. Clearly, AOTS and
JAVADA as a training intermediary have played an important role in facilitating skill
transfer between the two firms, and disseminating Japanese work organization, norms
pertaining to process and product quality, and work culture among Indian managers and
workers.
Moreover, about 120 production workers go to Suzuki each year for six-month
training. It is a common practice for Japanese supervisors to visit their foreign affiliates'
plants in developing countries and for supervisors from their transplants to work for short
periods in their Japanese partner's factories (Koike and Inoki 1990). But, Maruti sends not
only supervisors but also production workers to Suzuki on a massive scale for an extensive
period. They are assigned to Suzuki's two plants in Japan, where they undergo on-the-job
training in areas related to their tasks in Maruti, to gain "hands-on" experience and learn
about new technologies and production processes. In addition, trainees in specialized skill
areas (such as painting and die-making) participate in six-month on-the-job training and
three-months off-the-job training.
Their training involves actual observation and experiences with Japanese shop floor
practices, and in particular, in the areas of line management, safety management and quality
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control. The main focus of training includes: 1) how to maintain and improve their floor
and workplace (based on the concept of "5S",60); 2) how to distinguish good and
components; and 3) the right sequence of procedures in the production processes; 4) how
to improve the workplace (through kaizen ); 5) how to find and handle problems when they
occur, and 6) the importance of being punctual. Suzuki's managers maintain that "unless
trainees actually see how the line flows and what happens, they cannot acquire real
knowledge on a long-term basis." 61 The main objective of the training is to let workers
understand the importance of "full proofing" in the production processes, particularly in the
aspect of process control. Workers thus learn "to go back to the men who are sitting there
to identify what's wrong and fix the problem right there,"6 2 to acquire diagnostic and
problem-solving skills. For example, suppose a trainee finds oil leaking through his
cleaning as a part of "5S." Then, he would learn why the leak occurs, and how to fix the
problem. He would then learn how to prevent a situation where he would otherwise have
to stop the line. Or, he would use gauges and learn how to keep items within the expected
standard, and how that affects quality. Or, he would learn what types of drivers they need
to use to fasten certain bolts. This way, trainees eventually learn that product quality is
actually determined by how they operate on the line. They also observe what group leaders
do and how they behave when the line stops to solve problems.
All Maruti engineers, after one-year of initial training at Maruti and another year on
the shop floor, are sent to Suzuki for three months of training through AOTS. Maruti
believes that because its technologies are far more advanced than those in other Indian
firms, the direct exchange of people between Maruti and Suzuki is the only way for
workers to understand the nature of advanced technologies and how they work. Overseas
I "5S" is a slogan widely diffused on the Japanese shop floor for improving safety, preventive
maintenance, and efficiency. It stands for five Japanese words all starting with the letter S, namely, "seiri"
(putting things in order), "seiton"(neatness), "seiketsu"(cleanliness or hygienic), "seisou"(cleaning), and
"shitsuke"(discipline). Japanese managers emphasize "5S" as the essence of Japanese production principles.
61 My interviews with a Suzuki manager.
62 My interviews with a Maruti engineer.
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training has helped employees realize that standards expected of them differ from those in
other domestic firms.
Only in the last four years has Maruti started sending 4 to 5 design engineers to
Suzuki for two-year training on the job in Suzuki's R&D department to develop Maruti's
own design capability. Engineers who have returned from Suzuki have played a key role
in accomplishing Maruti's recent first minor model change of "Maruti 800" on its own.
Thus, overseas training contributes to gradual technological deepening in Maruti.
How can Maruti afford to invest so much in training in Japan? The cost of training
is shared among Maruti (one-way airfare), Suzuki (25% of the return airfare) and AOTS
(75% of the return air fare). Participants in the overseas training still receive salaries from
Maruti during their training in Japan and receive allowances from Suzuki (including
boarding costs). They stay at Suzuki's company dormitory with their Japanese co-workers
and receive the same treatment. AOTS looks after other costs incurred on the introductory
training sessions and other events for participants.
Moreover, this is a win-win arrangement for all the parties involved: Maruti
workers gain new skills, and a six-month overseas living experience including free
weekends in Japan; they bank their salaries from Maruti for these six months. Maruti
keeps its otherwise expensive overseas training costs relatively low because of a heavy
subsidy from AOTS and costs borne by Suzuki, and gains a long-term productivity
increase from the overseas training. Maruti also uses this overseas training scheme as an
incentive to motivate workers: only "good performers" are selected for overseas training.
Simply being selected for overseas training carries some prestige. Finally, Suzuki saves on
labor costs by accepting these overseas production workers, as cheap labor: paying
allowances to them is much cheaper than hiring Japanese temporary workers.
Therefore, this training scheme is not just a two-firm partnership, but, a tripartite
institutional arrangement among Maruti, Suzuki, and intermediary training organizations in
Japan, well-institutionalized to facilitate the cross-country transfer of knowledge and skills.
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These arrangements with AOTS and JAVADA are available to any firms in India as well as
in other developing countries, regardless of whether they have FDI partners in Japan or
not. But, Maruti and Suzuki apparently have made exceptionally good use of them to the
extent that Maruti employees account for nearly one fourth of all trainees from India sent to
Japan under the AOTS scheme and that Maruti institutionalized this arrangement by
externalizing its internal labor markets beyond the boundary of the firm.
Such massive overseas training has provided trainees of all levels with instant
exposure and access to "better practices" the latest technology, production processes, work
practices, and working environment. Exposure lets workers observe Suzuki's production
processes, how to handle problems, and what quality standards are required. They also
realize what their future workplace could be like if they improve their performance (they
visually realize that "they can work more accurately, use fewer movements, incur lower
costs, and work faster to achieve the same outcomes. It will actually be easier to perform
the same tasks, than the way they did it in India"). Exposure itself broadens the mindset of
Maruti employees. For instance, at Suzuki, different types of cars are produced on one
line; Maruti workers can imagine this will be introduced in Maruti in the future. Workers
realize that "we should be getting there in the near future."6 3 As a Suzuki manager pointed
out, these outcomes of training cannot be obtained even if trainers are sent from Suzuki to
overseas affiliates, because local workers cannot really grasp, understand, or believe in
what the trainers tell them.
Thus, overseas training in Japan also serves as a constant reminder for Maruti
workers as to how different Maruti practices are from those of existing Indian firms: more
efficient, more disciplined, and more participatory in day-to-day operations. Maruti's
training department manager emphasized, "from day one, Maruti workers learn three
aspects: to feel part of the company; to respect Maruti culture, and to believe in teams."64
Such exposure has also helped Maruti employees understand why the kind of change
63 Interviews with the Manager of Maruti's Training Department, in May, 1997.
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introduced in Maruti yields better plant performance than conventional practices in India.
In other words, this overseas training facilitates a change in the value and behavioral norms
of Indian workers. A Maruti worker who joined the firm in 1984 commented, "at Maruti,
the environment was very different from other firms in India, in terms of more discipline
and more uniformity. Many workers liked this new culture, because they believed that it
would be essential to adopt such new practices for the development of India." Another
worker said, "when I was sent to Suzuki in 1995, everything looked new. Even the
loading of materials was done on the conveyer, which has been done manually in India.
But, gradually I see the system that I saw in Japan is being introduced to Maruti.",6
Clearly, constant exposure to foreign practices by all levels of employees has enabled
Maruti to speed up the process of diffusing ideas, knowledge (both tacit and codified), and
behaviors within the firm, and building a collective and less hierarchical learning
mechanism.
Therefore, a focus on team work, which has often been claimed in the literature to
be a salient feature of the Japanese shop floor, is not just about forming groups among the
workforce; it requires the thorough dissemination and diffusion of information and
understanding across all levels of employees. Transferring knowledge from Japan to India
therefore has necessarily involved creating an institutional mechanism to allow such
dissemination and diffusion.
Another focus of overseas training has been to let Maruti workers understand the
importance of keeping the workplace and equipment clean, neat, and tidy, a new concept to
Indian plants before Maruti's entry. Naturally, work organization affects productivity,
through a reduction of waste in materials, change-over time, and rework, and thus a
reduction in defect rates, but workers in India had not seen this positive link clearly.
Particularly, in India, sweeping has long been considered a job of the lowest caste, in the
caste system which has largely determined India's highly-stratified social relations. Thus,
* Interviews with a training manager at Maruti, in March 1997.
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to see the workplace in Japan, where Japanese managers actually clean the line themselves
after workers go home has enabled Maruti workers to conceptually link a cleaner workplace
with a higher productivity (thus higher wages), helping to break cultural values embedded
in the dominant social relations.
After their return to India, trainees are required to make at least two suggestions to
improve the way they work, under Maruti's suggestion scheme, to save costs. They are
also expected to serve as a focal point in imparting knowledge to their co-workers who
have not gone to Suzuki. Therefore, Maruti's overseas training has served not only as a
means of direct knowledge and skill transfer and indirect skill spillovers but also as a
reward, motivating workers to perform better. In short, this overseas training provides
three benefits to workers: 1) skills (both analytical skills and behavioral traits); 2)
motivation through incentives; and 3) realization of long-term corporate visions of where
they (or the workplace) will be in the near future, helping them develop a sense of
commitment to the firm.
2) The Case of Telco
Unlike Maruti, Telco provides its employees with few opportunities to train abroad.
As a domestic local producer, Telco has had no direct collaboration with foreign firms in
the area of training. Telco Pune plant sends only three or four engineers overseas a year to
attain specific skills related to particular technologies. Typically, when a new piece of
equipment is installed, a few engineers are sent to the foreign equipment suppliers; For
example, when a German-made aluminum foundry was installed, some engineers were
trained in Germany. In addition, only senior managers visit foreign firms or exhibitions,
and only occasionally. Most Telco's employees' only exposure to foreign practices is the
AOTS correspondence course, administered by the AOTS office in Delhi; about 150 Telco
employees have participated so far.
65 My interviews with a Maruti worker in January 1997.
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3) Discussion: Exposure versus Internalization
These differences in the amount of exposure to foreign practices actually reflect
different patterns of learning in these two firms. At Maruti, learning involves a direct
transfer of knowledge and skills through individual exposure, concrete instruction, and on-
the-job training at the work site among employees at various levels, as was the case of
other Japanese transplants in Southeast Asia (Koike and Inoki 1990). This allows
employees to instantly visualize and realize what they should aim at; and easily convince
them of the outcomes of the knowledge transfer while they are still undergoing that
knowledge transfer (i.e., "seeing is believing"), thus achieving speedy dissemination of
knowledge and skills. Indeed, the less time spent on diffusing information and
knowledge, the more the firm can improve their productivity. In other words, in Maruti,
overseas training on a massive scale, along with its flatter hierarchical structure and more
participatory management, has facilitated a faster information flow within the firm and
between Maruti and Suzuki.
On the other hand, at Telco, senior management first has to be convinced of the
merits of certain knowledge, skills, and techniques, either embodied in foreign
technologies that it purchases or disembodied, to determine whether to adopt them. The
decision of senior management is influenced by the degree to which such knowledge,
skills, and techniques have been diffused in the industry as a whole, at home and abroad.66
In fact, Telco's decided to adopt certain new production techniques such as Total Quality
Management (TQM), Statistical Process Control (SPC), and kaizen as a result of its
benchmarking against the practices in the U.S. auto manufacturers (i.e., GM, Ford, and
Chrysler).67 Telco had no direct influence from Japanese-related firms in India, including
* The concept of industry-wide institutional isomorphism is articulated in the recent literature on the new
institutionalism in organizational sociology (see Powell and DiMaggio 1990).
67 For discussions on the nature of organizational changes in terms of the adoption of some Japanese
production techniques by the U.S. auto manufacturers, see Womack et al. 1990, Adler 1993, MacDuffie
1996.
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Maruti, except for the introduction of kaizen activities, for which Telco has hired a short-
term Japanese consultant.
The lack of direct exposure and/or contact with foreign practices among most Telco
employees means a very different mechanism of intra-firm diffusion of knowledge in Telco
from that in Maruti: Telco has fewer entry ports for acquiring foreign knowledge. This
also reflects Telco's long tradition of self-learning with a strong focus on the internalization
of bought-out foreign technologies. Therefore, any intra-firm diffusion necessarily
requires indirect transmission of the experiences of a llimited number of senior managers
and engineers, which necessarily involves the codification of that knowledge and skills:
New ideas, knowledge, and practices brought into the firm by a few senior employees are
gradually translated into policies, rules, documents, manuals, and so on, which in turn
diffuse and filter down across organizational hierarchy to the level of production workers.
In-firm training serves a means of this diffusion and subsequent embodiment of such ideas,
knowledge, and practices in employees.
In short, Maruti's strategy in training was to externalize its on-the-job training
beyond the boundary of the firm, while Telco's strategy was to internalize its technological
development through training. In turn, these differences may also reflect different
orientations in technological development: Maruti focuses on production capabilities,
whereas Telco focuses on innovation capabilities.
3.2.5 Work Organization
1) The Case of Maruti
From the outset, Maruti consciously chose to create a corporate culture and work
organization different from those of other Indian firms. The first managing director, Mr.
Krishnamurty, sat down with workers to discuss issues related to organization of work,
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which was a quite unusual, given the prevailing labor relations in India, often characterized
as "hostile and a total distrust between management and labor.",6
However, although various techniques and measures of Japanese production
systems were transferred to Maruti from Suzuki, it turned out to be hard to create flexibility
in the execution of various tasks by relaxing the clearly defined job description. According
to a Japanese manager of Maruti, Indian workers do not like to become multi-skilled,
because they tend to feel deprived and exploited if they do more than they were paid for.
Thus, it has been very difficult to motivate workers to become multi-skilled. Moreover,
job rotation, which is often considered a key practice in "lean" production systems, has not
been introduced in Maruti (Chatterjee 1993).
Maruti introduced "QC circles" and "suggestion schemes" right from the outset to
duplicate Suzuki's culture. The QC circles meet once a week during working hours to
discuss problems encountered in the group and suggest improvements.6 9 But, until 1995,
the suggestion scheme merely required each employee to write down an idea and receive a
token reward of Rs.2 per suggestion; the scheme rarely implemented those ideas but merely
tried to keep workers thinking.
In 1995, Maruti introduced kaizen activities and modified its suggestion scheme;
together these moves made Maruti's employees realize the importance of workers'
participation. Newly recruited engineers participate in kaizen groups, composed of the
best-performing employees in each department. Those who make many suggestions are
usually included in the kaizen groups. Simply being selected for the kaizen group itself
generates a source of motivation for employees. Suggestions from employees are graded A
through E, depending on how much cost saving and performance improvement it will
generate when implemented. Monetary rewards are granted according to the grade for each
68 A talk by Mr. B.C. Bhargava, a former CEO, Maruti, at Harvard, February, 1998.
69 In Japan, QC circles meet after working hours. But, this was not acceptable to Indian workers.
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suggestion.70 In 1996-97, employees in the production division were given targets of 9
suggestions per year, which led to the implementation of 33,176 suggestions during the
year, and Rs. 510 million in cost savings." As a result, some of Maruti's procedures and
practices have now been modified to fit in Indian conditions, some even deviating from
standard practices at Suzuki. According to a manager, the philosophy behind this scheme
was to keep its employees, even production workers, alert, as "thinking human beings,"
because "if they improve, the company will grow." 72 This feeling of organizational change
occurring with workers' involvement and participation, that momentum is being created
from the bottom, rather than top-down, through team work, and that change has to come
from the people, seems strong and well embedded within the firm.
Maruti also introduced the "5S" scheme in 1995. To continuously motivate
employees, Maruti rewards the "best" department for cleanliness, and keeps putting up
posters. Likewise, its QC circles induce group competition for better group performance
within and between divisions. In fact, the Best QC Division is annually awarded a free trip
to Suzuki, Japan to attend the Best QC International Competition organized by Suzuki. The
organization-wide incentives and pressures to improve Maruti's collective performance
have clearly contributed to Maruti's remarkable productivity growth (see Chapter 2).
Maruti also implemented the Taylorist scientific management in terms of reduction in space,
in human movement, and material movement, to improve plant-level efficiency, all totally
new to the existing Indian corporate cultures. Indeed, when Maruti started in India, many
of the production process techniques brought in by Suzuki, such as quality control,
preventive maintenance, and inventory control, were totally new to the Indian workforce.
Therefore, Maruti needed to let its workforce understand new concepts and principles
70 Suggestions are graded and given points on the basis of 1) cost saving; 2) ingenuity of suggestion; and
3) applicability. Then, rewards for suggestions are classified into seven categories depending on the points.
Rewards therefore range from Rs. 3,000 to Rs.10.
" Maruti's internal document.
72 At Toyota group firms, performance improvement is also measured by the standard operation chart. But,
this practice has not yet been introduced at Maruti (though Denso India, a key Toyota group firm, has
introduced it in India).
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underlying these techniques, which in turn determined the nature of its skill development as
discussed earlier.
At the same time, the diffusion and penetration of both technical standards and
behavioral norms involves a considerable degree of standardization and formalization of
rules and procedures, such as the Maruti Operation Standard (MOS), which sets out
parameters, temperatures, speed, and quality, for each line." This standardization and
formalization in turn has required that the firm develop a way to diffuse it throughout the
organization, which determined the nature of in-firm training. This has tremendously
improved product quality, as their improved awareness of quality has led to thorough
implementation of the preventive maintenance. 4
However, a closer examination reveals that the nature of teamwork at Maruti still
differs significantly from that at Suzuki. At Maruti, teamwork involves small group
activities organized for QC circles and suggestion schemes, but work on the line itself is
not coordinated on a group basis. On the other hand, at Suzuki, group activities involve
every aspect of the workers' lives in factories. Indeed, at Suzuki, production-related shops
are divided into small groups or han, consisting of 6 to 10 members. Three to five hans
comprise a larger group or kumi. When problems occur on the line, team members report
to their team leader, who in turn diagnoses and solves the problems, often before calling
maintenance workers. They also give group members guidance and instruction as to
change-over procedures and machine operations. Team leaders even look after the health,
safety, and mental conditions of workers in their groups, acting as mentors for their team
members. In short, team leaders, though not part of management, actually assume
significant responsibilities on the shop floor. This degree of decentralization in the
organization of work, a basic feature of the Japanese (Toyota) production system, has not
yet been adopted at Maruti.
" A similar observation is made about NUMMI in the U.S. where a highly bureaucratic organization
characterized by high levels of standardization and formalization actually encourages learning by a workforce
assigned to share a common goal of production efficiency and quality (Adler 1993).
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In addition, Maruti introduced a Japanese-style human resources policy, including a
common canteen for managers and labor, same uniforms across the hierarchy from the
CEO down to unskilled workers, and a single open office for all levels of employees,
where even managers do not have individual offices." These egalitarian gestures have also
created a sense of confidence and trust among labor, with all levels of employees showing
signs of bonding and identity with the firm. Both management and labor have been very
clear that Maruti is totally unconventional compared to existing Indian firms. They see
Maruti as a "model for change," not only in the automobile industry but also in the Indian
industry as a whole; this has generated great pride and momentum for learning among
Maruti employees. These changes were revolutionary given prevailing labor relations and
the hierarchical social relations in the Indian workplace.
Maruti's remarkable success in adopting the new models of work organization,
management, and production processes, has brought much attention at the national level,
from government officials, managers of public-sector enterprises, small firms, training
institutions like ITIs, and private firm executives, particularly those interested in joint
ventures with Japanese firms. In fact, Maruti received so many daily visitors that it decided
to designate Saturday as "visitors' day" to let them observe and learn its way of doing
business. Thus, Maruti has also facilitated learning across the industry, and the economy.
2) The Case of Telco
While Telco has also adopted new forms of work organization in recent years, its
processes of adopting and diffusing these new forms differ considerably from those of
Maruti. Among Telco's three plants, its Pune plant was the first to start its recent
organizational change; once it succeeds, Telco plans to extend its practices to other plants.
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74A talk by Mr. R.C. Bhargava, a former CEO, Maruti, at Harvard, February 1998.
* For details, see Chatterjee 1993.
The main aim of such changes is to sensitize its employees toward quality improvement to
"make them feel that they can make a difference." 76
Since the mid-1990s,Telco has introduced various new schemes to change its work
organization. It introduced the suggestion scheme in 1995, and "5S" and kaizen in 1996.
Interestingly, Telco did not adopt these new techniques from Maruti directly, though
Maruti's different production practices have had a large impact on industry-wide learning.
Rather, Telco adopted these practices from U.S. auto makers after conducting a
benchmarking exercise against them. Telco incorporated these schemes into its formal
training programs and apprenticeship programs to sensitize its employees. About 25,000
employees learned about "5S" in 1997, resulting in visible changes: in just one year, all
shops and offices became much cleaner. Operators started cleaning their own machines, a
task sweepers had done before. They are now more careful about how they maintain and
use their machines and work spaces. Operators became more careful about the use of their
machines and equipment. Moreover, in the FTP program as described earlier, it became
compulsory for trainees to make suggestions; they get Rs.25 reward for an implemented
suggestion, and Rs. 1,000 for a cost-saving one. In addition, many visual displays, like
posters, were introduced to make workers more aware of the importance of quality.
To implement the kaizen scheme, Telco hired a Japanese consultant on a two-year
contract to work with its kaizen team consisting of 7 persons from the Kaizen Department,
and several employees from different parts of the organization.7 7 Since 1996, kaizen
activities have yielded a remarkable improvement: a 69% increase in productivity in one
year, 43% inventory reduction in one year, fatigue reduction, and a reduction in idle
waiting time on the production line.78 Employees expressed little resistance: they saw
visible benefits.
76 Interview with a training manager at Telco.
7 The Kaizen team includes 3 employees from the Auto Production Department--I line supervisor, 2 line
operators, and 1 master craftsman, plus 1 from Quality Assurance Department, and others, to get the
message across different departments within the firm.
78 Telco internal documents.
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On the other hand, as described earlier, Telco had already developed an elaborate
system of job rotation and multi-skilling, often regarded as a salient feature of the Japanese
production system, long before its more recent introduction of various other production
management techniques. Thus, a simple focus on the recent adoption of such Japanese
management techniques may overlook the robust system of skill formation that has evolved
in Telco over many decades.
3.2.6 Summary: Different Paths to Skill Development
The cases of Maruti and Telco have shown the critical role of training in knowledge
transfer and skill development. Certainly, one cannot attribute the firms' productivity
growth solely to training, as productivity growth results from a combination of many
factors: reduced waste, technological improvement on the shop floor, process improvement
and innovations, and training, which reduces worker error. At the same time, training
changes the very way workers do their jobs, by changing values and behavioral norms,
standardizing procedures, thoroughly diffusing quality awareness, and instilling "forward-
looking" visions.
A closer examination of these two cases reveals that such training effects have been
achieved through the interplay of various institutional factors; stable employment practices,
and a well-established apprenticeship systems that link government-sponsored industrial
training with in-firm on-the-job training, which in turn helps supply a high quality
workforce for long-term employment. Such stable employment has in turn been aided by a
set of labor policies and the firms' deliberate high-wage policies. The both firms have
improvised elaborate internal mechanisms to motivate workers and reward their skills,
albeit defined differently, including productivity-linked or skill-linked incentives,
suggestion schemes, and overseas training opportunities.
Yet, Martui and Telco have developed different kinds of institutional arrangements
for skill development, due to the different conditions under which they have operated. The
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pattern of skill development at Maruti is largely shaped by its institutional alliances with its
joint venture partner and training intermediaries, which have become part of its internal
labor market. These institutional alliances made the direct exchange of employees easier,
less costly, and safer in terms of information leakage, and administratively less
cumbersome. On the other hand, Telco, as a local firm with little direct exposure to foreign
practices for engineers and workers, has had to develop its own capabilities to diffuse what
the organization learned from imported technologies among its employees. The firm has
used training as a mechanism to internalize the organizational learning, in terms of reading
and studying the drawings, and reverse engineering, which was in turn translated into
training manuals and subjects, all the while linking this training to its internal incentive
structures. Such internalization has required the firm to develop the technical skills of
individual workers. While both Maruti and Telco introduced and incorporated new
management techniques such as TQM, QC circles and kaizen into their training activities in
both around the same time, the direction of diffusion of knowledge and skills within each
firm differed: in one horizontal, and in the other vertical, resulting in different types of
capabilities developed: one on production capabilities, and the other innovation capabilities.
These differences in the learning models are also reflected in a different way of
developing multi-skilled workers to increase flexibility. Maruti develops multi-skilled
workers who can handle many standardized tasks on the production lines, whereas Telco
increases the deployability of multi-skilled workers who have mastered various trade skills.
The two different models of skill development, as illustrated by the cases of Maruti
and Telco, are summarized in Table 3.12 below. These models may or may not be
generalizable for analyzing the patterns of in-firm skill development in developing
countries, and thus await future research.
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Table 3.12: Two Models of In-firm Skill Development and Learning
Maruti Telco
Learning Model Exposure-based Experience-based
Objective of Training Production Capability Innovation Capability
Development Development
Goal of Training Collective skill enhancement Individual skill enhancement
Focus of Training Knowledge diffusion Knowledge accumulation
Type of Skills Emphasized Behavioral traits Trade skills
Directions of Intra-firm Horizontal Vertical
Diffusion of Knowledge and
Skills
Sources of Motivation for Recognition of collective Recognition of individual
Learning (group) performance performance
3.3 What Shapes the Patterns of Skill Development?
This section summarizes the findings while exploring possible explanations for
what has allowed the firms to foster skill development as described in the previous section.
Four factors have played an important role in shaping the patterns of in-firm skill
development: 1) historical imperatives; 2) the role of the government; 3) the development of
institutional alliances; and 4) firm-level strategies for technological capability development.
3.3.1 History Matters
Why did Maruti and Telco develop such elaborate internal training systems even
when they faced virtually no competition in the Indian automobile industry? One
explanation lies in the historical imperatives that dictated the firms' direction of skill
development. Both firms' experiences show that the pattern of skill development was
shaped by the historical conditions under which they needed to acquire knowledge and
skills. 9
" North (1990) constructs a theory of path-dependent institutional change, using the frameworks of
transaction costs economics and property rights. He argues that the two forces of increasing returns and
imperfect markets characterized by significant transaction costs shape the path of institutional change (North
1990: 95).
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Telco's strong emphasis on developing individual specific trade skills partly reflects
the firm's historical tradition of "self-learning" technological development. From the mid-
1960s through 1980s, the "License Raj" regime (see Chapter 2) restricted the import of raw
materials, equipment, and components, and the purchase of foreign technologies; this
pushed Telco to develop specific strategies regarding product development, production,
and organizational capability development (Bowonder 1998); these, in turn, determined
how the firm allocated labor and developed skills. When Telco started commercial vehicle
production in the mid-1950s, the only auto component industries in India were those
producing tires and batteries. Telco had to produce a wide range of components,
particularly mechanical parts, in house. For basic items, Telco developed proprietary
design capabilities with its suppliers for such items as injection pumps, alterators, tail
lamps, braking systems, and steering systems. Yet, imported contents remained high until
1970.
When Telco set up its second plant in Pune, in 1970, the government did not
approve its expansion there until 1977, to protect three other commercial vehicle
manufacturers under the MRTP Act (see Chapter 2), as Telco was more efficient than the
others. Hence, from 1970 to1977, Telco was making only components in the new plant,
while waiting for the government's approval to produce vehicles; thus it developed its
capacity to produce components. Telco internally developed its capabilities in design,
R&D, manufacturing of engineering equipment and tools, and large tool rooms. Thus, the
Telco Pune plant even has in-house foundry, machine tooling, and casting and forging
shops, a unique feature among vehicle manufacturers. The global trend among auto
manufacturers, including Maruti, has been increased outsourcing of nearly all components
to concentrate on assembly, but Telco could not follow this trend. While this high degree
of vertical integration has inevitably raised its production costs, it also created a strong
foundation for developing own technological capability in house.
146
-- -1 - 1,
This means that Telco has a wider range of internal division of labor, and therefore,
specialization, than firms like Maruti. Restricted in its access to foreign technologies has
led the firm to develop its own R&D capabilities involving a great deal of reverse
engineering, which in turn required competent workers with a wider range of engineering
skills, than contemporary assemblers like Maruti. This meant that the firm needed to
develop the skills and knowledge necessary to produce those components, and
subsequently commercial vehicles, given the absence of workers with those skills in the
external labor markets. This experience led the firm to focus on developing skills in its
workforce through its extensive training, and in particular, in developing individual
technical skills.
This study finds that even amidst recent rapid changes in the institutional
environment (in terms of globalization), the pattern of skill development in Telco has
remained robust, with only incremental changes such as additions to subjects (reflecting the
adoption of Japanese production techniques such as kaizen and "5S" on the shop floor).
Such internal mechanisms for skill development have clearly enabled the firm to develop its
innovation capabilities, as demonstrated by its high level of investment in R&D, including
investment in the personnel engaged in R&D. At the same time, Telco's internal reward
structures, along with a tradition of "family-like treatment" of its employees," have
attracted competent employees and kept them committed to the firm.
Likewise, when Maruti started production in 1983, as it uses technologies much
more advanced than in other Indian auto firms, the existing educational and training
institutions, such as the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and the Industrial Training
Institutes (ITIs) were not equipped to provide the kind of skills Maruti needed. Therefore,
it had to train its own employees in house and send them to Suzuki in Japan.
I0 Many employees of Telco I interviewed emphasized this.
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3.3.2 The Role of the Government
Clearly, the government has played a critical role in shaping the patterns of skill
development in both Maruti and Telco. This role has been twofold: first, creating national
institutional frameworks in terms of setting labor policy and training policy; and second,
more direct involvement in managing Maruti. First, the protective labor policy, which
prevented large firms from firing workers, constrained the firms in their recruitment and
deployment of workers, thus creating rigidities in the external labor markets. However,
this institutional framework actually led the firms to develop their own internal incentive
structures, including elements of both motivation and rewards for developing skills: long
periods of apprenticeship and probationary training; productivity-linked (at Maruti) or skill-
linked (at Telco) reward systems; and overseas training as part of internal labor markets.
Contrary to the argument by neo-classical economists that such institutional constraints
distort the functioning of labor markets and thus discourage employers from investing in
human capital (Middleton et al. 1993), both Maruti and Telco have actually turned these
constraints into a motive to develop their internal capabilities.
Second, the legal obligation to train apprentices has also shaped the pattern of skill
development in Indian finns, while effectively setting the educational level of entry-level
production workers at one year of in-firm apprenticeship training plus two years of post-
secondary vocational education at ITIs. Though the retention rate has fallen in recent years,
the investment by both firms in statutory apprenticeship training has still paid off for
several reasons. First, it lowers the cost of searching for labor with the right kind of skills
and knowledge, and thus enhances the skill match between demand for and supply of
labor: by the time they are formally hired, workers have already acquired basic knowledge
and skills that are firm-specific. Second, it has spillover effects, as many apprentices are
absorbed by the finns' suppliers and service stations after the training, thus sustaining
increasing returns to the investment in training at the level of the supply chain. Third, this
system reduces net training costs, because of the economies of scale: for smaller-scale
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suppliers to individually train apprentices in their own facilities would increase the net
training costs for the supply chain as a whole. Finally, the system has clearly allowed the
firms to develop firm-specific skills at relatively low costs; coupled with long-term stable
employment practices, this increases returns on investment in subsequent in-firm training,
and allows high premiums on firm-specific skills. Thus, again, both firms have actually
taken advantage of the institutional constraints created by the apprenticeship policy.
However, though this institutional framework has been in place for the last forty
years, it has not always been effective. Moreover, it is unlikely that the government could
clearly see all these positive gains from apprenticeship training when it set the policy in the
early 1960s. Maruti and Telco, motivated by changes in the institutional environment, i.e.,
globalization of the Indian automobile industry as discussed in Chapter 2, have adapted to
the conditions created by the apprenticeship rule, as an unanticipated consequence, beyond
what the government originally intended." Indeed, the apprenticeship training perhaps
became more effective in the 1990s, not because the government reformed the program in
response to the changing skill demand in the external labor markets, but because it allowed
its program partners--the fins--to use the program to accelerate their internal learning
process and adjust themselves to the changing environment.
Unlike the experiences of developed (particularly European) countries, where the
apprenticeships have been institutionalized but were used mainly in small craft production
firms, the apprenticeship in India has involved large firms, allowing them to more directly
link it to the firm's overall human resources strategies. The Indian experience in fact can
offer lessons for developed countries that have only started active discussions on possible
partnerships between technical schools and the corporate sector as "alternative training"
(OECD 1994).
The case of Maruti shows more direct government involvement in shaping the
firm's pattern of skill development. The government insisted on including training as part
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of its initial joint-venture agreement with Suzuki.12 In fact, even after the gradual
liberalization of FDI policy in the mid-1980s (see Chapter 2), the government set a series of
clear guidelines for any foreign collaboration proposals to adhere, including the provision
of training to Indians in the areas of production and management. As Maruti was a
"model" foreign collaboration project, the government was particularly concerned with the
enforcement of this guideline. Indeed, Maruti's governance structure, which maintains a
fine balance between the government and Suzuki, has allowed the government great
autonomy and control, including training. In fact, many of Maruti senior managers were
former senior government bureaucrats. 3 Suzuki's appointment of a senior government
bureaucrat as Maruti's CEO, who was well connected with the central government
administration and politics and who was eager to adopt Japanese management styles,
helped Maruti gain the confidence of the government, which would have otherwise been
more cautious about FDI operation. The strong link with the government also helped
Maruti gain considerable legitimacy within the government, as a national project for India's
industrial development even during the anti-FDI regime before liberalization.
At the same time, Maruti's leadership by Indian managers, supported by a few
Japanese managers, has led to its employees accepting new and unconventional ways of
running businesses: management styles, production processes, and employment practices,
including training. This has in turn reduced potential conflicts and employee resistance to
the introduction of such new practices.
1 For discussions on unanticipated consequences of institutional arrangements, see Perrow (1986), North
(1990).
82 A talk by Mr. B.C. Bhargava, at Harvard, February 1998.
3 For example, Maruti's Managing Director (CEO) is chosen by the government and Suzuki by turn every
five years. The Board of Directors consists of representatives of both the government (Secretary to the
Government of India, Heavy Industry, and other senior bureaucrats) and Suzuki (senior managerial staff).
But, at Suzuki's turn, as a surprise to even Indians, Suzuki picked an Indian elite bureaucrat (Indian
Administration Service: IAS) who was involved in the Maruti project from the inception.
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3.3.3 Forging Institutional Alliances
The cases of Maruti and Telco reveal that they have not only made good use of
national institutional frameworks as discussed above, but also positively built institutional
alliances with other organizations, such as local industrial training institutes, training
intermediary organizations, joint-venture partners, and the supply chain and service
networks.
As argued earlier, the institutional arrangement between industrial training institutes
(ITIs) and large firms has worked well for developing the skills of workers and reducing a
gap between classroom-based vocational education and actual shop-floor practices. In fact,
India has a long history of this partnership between government-run industrial training
institutes and firms: it started in the 1950s, and gradually spread in all the states. The
central government set the rules and developed training manuals for industrial training.
Clearly, the apprenticeship training has been more efficient and effective, compared to
training conducted at such vocational training institutions' own facilities, which has been
widely speculated as inefficient, unsatisfactory, and ineffective for providing the types of
skills demanded in the labor markets (Middleton et al. 1993). Even an ITI training officer
admits that the type of skills provided by ITIs "cannot be utilized in the contemporary
workshop." 84 In the 1990s, as the Indian economy has increasingly become globalized,
the number of apprentices has risen by 40% nationwide, especially in the automobile,
hotel, and electrical servicing industries.85 Both Maruti and Telco closely interact with
local ITIs for coordinating the apprenticeship training. For example, local ITIs frequently
send their trainers to the firms sponsoring apprentices to monitor their training performance
and learn the nature of their operations. Their observations are in turn reflected into basic
training held at ITIs.
" Interview with a training officer, ITI, Delhi, in March 1997.
8 interview with an officer from the Directorate of Employment and Training, the Ministry of Labor, the
Government of India.
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A large body of literature points to the role of multinationals in transferring
knowledge and skills (Kokko 1991, Caves 1996). The case of Maruti reveals, however,
that not only its joint-venture partner, Suzuki, but also training intermediaries such as
AOTS and JAVADA have played important roles in facilitating inter-firm knowledge
transfer by institutionalizing overseas training for workers from developing countries. As
discussed earlier, this tripartite arrangement among Maruti, Suzuki, and the intermediaries
not only lowered the costs of such overseas training but also helped the firm institutionalize
its cross-border mechanisms to transfer knowledge, skills, norms, and values related to
production practices (see Appendix 3-3).
3.3.4 Strategies for Developing Technological Capability
The experiences of Maruti and Telco represent two different models of in-firm skill
development: one based on exposure, and the other based on experience (see Table 3.11).
One explanation for their different models lies in the firms' strategies for developing
different types of technological capabilities: Maruti focuses on production capability, while
Telco focuses on innovation capability, though these two types of capabilities are not
mutually exclusive. Consequently, Maruti's training has primarily focused on behavioral
and attitudinal aspects to develop skills for improving both product and process quality,
and in particular, diagnostic and problem-solving skills for improving line management.
On the other hand, Telco's training reflects its strong orientation toward strengthening
engineering and R&D capabilities (Kathuria 1995, Bowonder 1998), as demonstrated by
its remarkable achievements in component manufacturing, product diversification, and
design development. Such differences have led the firms to develop different mechanisms
for their internal knowledge dissemination.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined the patterns of skill development in Maruti and Telco, two
leading Indian auto manufacturers, by analyzing the mode, content, and extent of their in-
firm training. Both firms have placed great emphasis on training for their employees. Both
have successfully developed an elaborate system to promote skill development built into
their internal incentive structures; they have positively utilized apprenticeship schemes
beyond what the government legislation required, and have developed well-designed
formal training programs. Such mechanisms are embedded in their internal labor markets,
in that they recruit employees with high educational levels, and provide long-term stable
employment, high wages and generous benefits, flat wage structures, incentive schemes,
and promotion opportunities (albeit limited for production workers).
These practices are strongly influenced by a robust local institutional framework.
For example, Maruti's high wage policy, involving productivity-linked incentive schemes,
has been influenced by inherent institutional conditions such as national labor policy, rules
governing public sector enterprises, income tax policy, and wide wage dispersion in its
supply chain. In particular, the rigidity of the external labor markets has actually made high
wages and long periods of initial in-firm training crucial to employing and keeping high-
quality workers. These high wages have in turn served as a means of motivating workers
to learn new skills and strengthening employees' sense of identity with and commitment to
the firm.
Moreover, the statutory apprenticeship training has greatly shaped the patterns of
in-firm training. While the literature regards such schemes as institutional constraints that
distort the functioning of labor markets, both Maruti and Telco have turned these
constraints to their advantage as mechanisms to efficiently deploy workers trained in firm-
specific skills, promote their organizational learning, and lower production costs. The
national institutional framework has remained robust and played a critical role in shaping
the patterns of in-firm skill development even in the process of globalization.
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Like many other auto manufacturers in different countries, in the mid-1990s, both
Maruti and Telco have adopted some elements of the "lean" production techniques as a
response to recent rapid transformations in the Indian automobile industry, as described in
Chapter 2. This adoption process has led the firms to change some aspects of their work
organization; thus shifting the content of training from technical toward more behavioral
and attitudinal, and increasing the amount of training particularly at Telco. Thus, the focus
of in-firm training has shifted in recent years, from diffusing knowledge and skills to
infusing norms and values to be shared across different corners of the organization. In
addition, increased computerization has led both finns to include more computer-related
subjects in their in-firm training programs.
Despite these similarities in the patterns of skill development between Maruti and
Telco, this study still finds significant differences in these patterns. Indeed, they represent
different models of learning: Maruti's learning is exposure-based, while Telco's learning is
experience-based. Maruti's training aims at improving collective efficiency and
productivity, while Telco's training aims at improving individual technical skills. Maruti
emphasizes the direct transfer of ideas, knowledge, and norms between Maruti and Suzuki,
thus allowing constant exposure to foreign practices among all levels of its employees,
which has led the firm to develop production capabilities. Its training thus focuses on
developing diagnostic and problem-solving skills to improve quality. Telco, on the other
hand, emphasizes the accumulation of technical knowledge, reflecting the 'self-learning'
tradition in developing technological capabilities, especially innovation capability, as
exemplified by its remarkable R&D efforts to develop design capability. In other words,
each firm's patterns of training are closely linked to their strategy for developing
technological capabilities. The particular historical conditions have greatly influenced each
firm's strategies for technological development, and hence let them take different paths to
skill development.
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This study finds that the government has played an important role in shaping the
patterns of in-firm skill development in two ways: first, through its policies, and second,
through more direct involvement in Maruti's governance and decision making. For
example, the government's imposition of apprenticeship has effectively set a high
educational standard for production workers in large firms throughout the country, thus
ensuring a secure supply of high-quality industrial labor with ready-to-use firm-specific
skills, and providing firms with some flexibility in deploying labor. While such an
institutional framework had already existed for many decades, it became more effective, as
the automobile industry underwent rapid transformations, as described in Chapter 2. The
pre-existing policy framework actually eased the process of the firms' adjustment to the
fast-changing institutional environment. Moreover, as Maruti's joint-venture partner, the
government has directly been involved in Maruti's governance and operations, including
those related to human resource development. When the Maruti project started in the early
1980s, the government insisted on including extensive overseas training as part of the
technology transfer from Suzuki, which has greatly influenced the patterns of skill
development at Maruti.
In sum, this study finds that the patterns of skill development are shaped by the
interplay of various institutional forces: historical imperatives, national labor and training
policies, institutional alliances with the government, and with foreign firms and training
institutions, and firm-level technological development strategies. While a growing body of
literature attributes recent changes in the patterns of skill development in developing
countries to the adoption of "lean" production systems and/or FDI, this study suggests that
they are only part of the whole story. The patterns of in-firm skill development are shaped
by a complex interaction between such "new" forces and "old" historical and institutional
factors, including national-level policy.
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Appendix 3.1: Profile and Performance at Glance: Maruti and Telco (1997)
Maruti Telco
1. Establishment 1981 1945
2. Ownership 50:50 Joint venture between the Privately-owned local firm (100%
Government of India and Suzuki owned by the Tata Industries
Motors, Japan Group)
3. No. of Plants 2 3
4. Location of Plants Gurgaon (Haryana) Pune (Maharashtra);
Jamshedpur (Bihar);
Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh)
5. No. of Employees 5,404 16,132 (Pune Plant only)
(about 40,000 for all plants)
6. Product Mix Passenger cars (small cars, Heavy/medium commercial
medium cars; jeeps, utility cars) vehicles; light commercial
vehicles; multi-utility cars;
passenger cars
7. Installed Capacity 250,000 254,160
(Units)
8. Vehicle Production (No. 336,811 218,393
of units)
9. Capacity Utilization (%) 135% 86%
*
10. Market Share (%) 80% of the passenger car segment 72% of M/HCV segment; 67.2%
of LCV segment
11. No. of 1st-tier 404 1,200 (for Pune Plant only)
Suppliers
12. Local Content Maruti 800/ Omni: 95%; Gypsy: Tata Sierra/ Estate/ Sumo: 95%
80%
Esteem: 75%
13. Capital (Rupees in 16,016.3 17,153.9
million)
14. Sales (Rupees in 79,564.8 101,284.3
million)
15. Exports (No. of units) 35,031 (10.4%) 16,005 (7.3%)
(% of Production) **
16. R&D Expenditures 153.9 (0.2%) 3,489.5 (3.4%)
(Rs. In million) (% of
Turnover)
17. No. of Authorized 1,010 224 *
Service Workshops II
Notes: * Calculated from lines 7 & 8 above.
** Calculated from line 8 above.
Sources: Maruti, Telco; *** Bowonder 1998.
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Appendix 3.2: In-firm In-class Training Subjects: Maruti and Telco
Subjects Maruti Telco
A. Quality
Al. Total Quality Management
A2. Benchmarking
A3. Business Process Re-engineering
A4. ISO 14000 Engironmental Mot. Systems
A5. Practical Improvement Program for Factories
A6. Quality Concepts and SQC Techniques
A7. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
A8. Process Audit
A9. Personal Growth and Information Sharing
A10. 5S '4(on the shopfloor) ' (both video and
practice)
A11. Housekeeping
A12. IS09000 QA System Standard
A13. Measuring Instruments & Care
A14. Quality
A15. Self Inspection
A16. Seven Tools for Problem Solving
A17. Design of Experiments
A18. Pokayoke
A19. Measurement System Analysis
A20. Waste Control
B. Finance
Bl. Basic Financial Management
B2. Forex Regulation/ Risk Management
B3. Exim Policy - Its Interpretations
B4. Excise & Modvat (Tax)
C. Health & Safety
Cl. Personal Health and Hygiene
C2. Stress Management
C3. Safety
D. Computers
D1. MS Office/ FoxPro/ Dbase
D2. Auto CAD
D3. Multi-media - Basic
E. Behavioral
El. Supervisory Development
E2. Executive Development / Creative Leadership
E3. Managerial Development
E4. Communication
E5. Creative Thinking
E6. Customer Orientation
E7. Counseling Skills
E8. Effective Office Management
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E9. Excellence in Work
E10. Small-Group Activity
E11. Kaizen
F. Technical
Fl. Value Engineering
F2. Product Orientation
F3. Basic Engineering for Supervisors
F4. Statistical Process Control (SPC)
F5. Geometorical Diametering (GD)
F6. Cutting Tools
F7. Engineering Drawing
F8. Introduction to CNC
F9. Hydraulics & Pneumatics
F10. Painting Technology
F1 1. Welding Defects and Inspection
F12. Workshop Calculations
G. General
G1. Materials Management
G2. Japanese Language
G3. Training for Trainers
G4. Preventive Maintenance
G5. Corporate Philosophy & Welfare Activities
G6. Automobile Industry in A Changing Scenario
G7. Common Errors in English
G8. Energy Conservation-Introduction
G9. Productivity Concepts
G10. Retirement Planning
Source: Company data.
Appendix 3.3: AOTS Training Schemes
AOTS is a non-profit Japanese organization set up in 1959 to promote technical
assistance to developing countries and to enhance mutual understanding. Since then,
AOTS has accepted a total of 69,000 people from 150 countries for training in Japan. In
addition, it has organized various training programs in developing countries involving over
20,000 participants. The activities of AOTS are financed by subsidies, as part of ODA
(Official Development Assistance), from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), contributions from private corporations, and other sources. AOTS offers
two types of training: 1) individual training in respective technical fields by private firms in
Japan; and 2) group training through various management courses offered for top
managers, engineers, and shop floor supervisors. In the case of in-plant practical training,
the sponsor firms must ensure that one third of the training is in classrooms, and two thirds
of training is on-the-job training, and that the on-the-job training does not involve simple
repetitive tasks.
For both types of training, applications are made to AOTS through a host company
in Japan. An applicant is required to be a citizen of a developing country with at least a
bachelor's degree or equivalent education. Once the application is accepted, AOTS obtains
the training visa for entry into Japan. The host company pays the participation fee to AOTS
and AOTS in turn reimburses the subsidy for air fare, a per diem allowance and other
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expenses to the host company (which also bears one fourth of recurrent costs of training),
even if the training costs are finally to be borne by an overseas firm in a developing
country.
In 1995, ACTS accepted 4,752 trainees in its various courses. Of these, 1,576
(33.2%) were sent by Japanese joint venture firms in developing countries, 10.4% were
from overseas firms engaged in technical collaboration with Japanese firms, and 5.5%
were at the request of governments of developing countries. As the table below shows, the
automobile sector has received by far the largest number of trainees from about 150
countries both ever since 1959. In 1994, 90 Indians participated in technical training, and
121 took management courses offered by AOTS; a total of 2,357 trainees have used the
AOTS scheme since 1959.
Table 3.13: Distribution of AOTS Reg lar Training Program Trainees by Sector
Sectors 1994 1994 (%) 1959-94 1959-94 (%)
Transportation Equipment 777 17.4 13,947 23.6
(Automobile) (707) (15.9) (11,986) (20.3)
Electric & electronic 752 16.9 12,457 21.1
Machinery 488 11.0 7,993 13.5
Chemical 217 4.9 4,135 7.0
Metallurgical 203 4.6 3,292 5.6
Textile 96 2.2 2,369 4.0
Food 39 0.9 747 1.3
Other Manufacturing 45 1.0 929 1.6
Agriculture, Fishery & Mining 33 0.7 894 1.5
Construction 147 3.3 2,575 4.3
Others 1,647 37.1 9,768 16.5
(Management Courses) (1,481) (33.3)
Total 4,444 100.0 59,106 100
Source: AOTS Annual Report 1995.
The management courses offered by AOTS include: 1) Top Management Seminar;
2) Executive Program on Corporate Management; 3) Program for Cross-Cultural
Managemnt; 4) Program on Production Management in Manufacturing Industry; 5)
Program for Innovative Operations Management; 6) Program on Company-wide Problem
Solving; 7) Practical Imrprovement Program for Factories; 8) Production Management
Training Center; 9) Executive Seminar on Total Quality Management; 10) Program for
Quality Management; 11) Quality Control Training Course; 12) Program on Industry and
Environmental Protection; 13) Program on Solving Human & Organizational Problems;
and 14) Program for Supervisory Methods and Effectiveness. Clearly, the emphasis is on
quality control, process control, and development of problem-solving skills. For example,
the course on Effective Problem Solving for Production Managers provides participants
with an understanding of the concept of holistic problem-solving, economic efficiency
analysis, the lean production system, the adoption of human behavioral engineering
through lectures, case studies, and factory visits, with a view to improving problem-
solving skills to improve production process control. Given the scale of the training and
close coordination between the firm in developing countries and the sponsor firms in
Japan, intermediary organizations such as AOTS certainly play an important role in
diffusing values, ideas, and techniques, and transferring cognitive and analytical skills,
particularly problem-solving skills to developing country firms.
159
In addition, AOTS has local liaison offices in several Asian countries where some
management courses, along with training in Japanese language, are provided. Moreover,
AOTS has an active alumni network in various regions in 40 developing countries. These
are run in close coordination with AOTS and its local liaison offices. They constitute local-
based secondary associations, organizing seminars and training courses among themselves,
inviting some specialists from abroad (mainly from Japan), and promoting correspondence
courses in TQC, to improve their knowledge and skills, particularly in TQC, QC circles,
and kaizen. They also nominate some trainees from their local areas to be sent to Japan.
For instance, in India, there are 7 alumni organizations: in New Delhi, Mumbai, Pune,
Calcutta, Chennai, Kerala, and Bangalore.
According to a recent AOTS survey to evaluate the effects of its training, on ex-
trainees and their firms, trainees from India found AOTS training useful in improving
quality awareness, production control, introducing techniques such as "5S," and QC
circles, providing more effective guidance to their suppliers, and reducing wastes and
increasing productivity (AOTS 1997). Particularly, one fourth of 117 respondents found
training in specific engineering technologies very useful. In addition, a large proportion of
participants from India found that their understanding of Japanese employment relations
enormously improved through training.
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Chapter 4
Supply Chain as a Learning Chain: Skill Development
and Transfer at Automotive Component Suppliers
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the patterns of skill development in two leading
Indian car manufacturers, Maruti and Telco, in the process of a global integration of the
Indian economy. This chapter analyzes the nature of skill development in their first-tier
suppliers and examines the extent to which these large firms influence the patterns of skill
development among their suppliers. How has the rapid process of globalization of and
resulting transformations in the Indian automobile industry affected the patterns of skill
development among smaller component suppliers? The chapter draws on extensive
interviews and a questionnaire survey that I conducted with 50 first-tier suppliers of Maruti
and Telco in 1997 and 1998. Thus, discussions in this chapter focus mostly on first-tier
suppliers, and may not apply to lower-tier suppliers.
In the 1990s, the Indian automobile industry has experienced dynamic
transformations, with considerable restructuring within the sector, remarkable growth in
both vehicle and component sectors, and increased competitiveness (see Chapter 2). In
fact, the auto component sector has grown even faster than the vehicle sector during this
period. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the Indian government has promoted small
firms through various policy measures for the last three decades. Through its localization
policy, the government has mandated car manufacturers, including Maruti and Telco, to
accelerate their localization (see Chapter 2). This has led them to achieve high percentages
of local content and to create backward linkages with local firms that are largely small-
scale, leading to the gradual formation of tiers within the industry.' Thus, given the high
I Various strands of the economic development literature point to the importance of organizations of firms,
and vertical inter-firm relations, as a way to promote economic development. For example, Stigler (1951)
argued that as in Adam Smith's famous theorem that "division of labor is limited by the extent of the
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level of subcontracting that these large firms rely on (see Chapters 2 and 3), whether they
can become more competitive in the global market depends largely on the performance of
these local suppliers, and to a large extent, on the skill acquisition and development among
them. How then did the component industry upgrade their skills?
Despite the government's generous support for the small-scale industry (SSI) sector
since the 1970s, this issue of skill development still presents an enormous challenge to
local Indian component suppliers: Many of the vertical inter-firm linkages created between
Indian firms had largely been inefficient and internationally uncompetitive until the mid-
1980s (Lall 1985b: 123).2 Even in more recent years, resource constraints kept small firms
from developing their own skills. They have also typically relied on outdated technologies,
and had limited access to the market (FICCI 1994). Moreover, unlike large firms, smaller
firms do not have the elaborate internal labor markets that would facilitate internal on-the-
job training. Given these serious constraints, the role of inter-firm linkages appears to have
become ever more critical as a mechanism to transfer knowledge and skills from large to
small firms and develop workers' skills at the latter.
Scholars from various disciplines have recently studied the nature of supplier
relations in manufacturing, 3 and those in the automobile industry in particular (Womack et
market," as the industry grows, an increased degree of the division of labor and specialization makes firms
more profitable to promote vertical "disintegration." This affects the extent and amount of knowledge to be
kept and diffused within and between organizations. On the other hand, the market failure approach regards
the establishment of inter-firm linkages as a way to overcome market failures-as a firm's compromise
between buying inputs and raw materials from the "perfect market" and establishing its own vertical
integration by completely internalizing production activities of related firms as a manifestation of
"complete" market failures (Lall 1985b). Transaction cost economists also discuss vertical integration
versus disintegration, by focusing on the cost of conducting transactions, especially of reaching contractual
agreements on information transfer as a determinant of firms' "make or buy" decisions (see Williamson
1975). In the development literature, Hirschman (1958) elaborated the concept of backward linkages and
focused on its role in economic development, in the context of his argument for "unbalanced growth."
2 Lall's (1985b) concept of "linkages" is similar to Hirschman's (1958), to the extent that both deal with
inter-industry relationships and both are concerned with externalities to the market function. They do differ
considerably, however: Hirschman is more concerned with the mechanism of production growth in selective
industries (e.g., the automobile industry) leading to demand growth in other industries (e.g., the automotive
component industry), while Lall is more concerned with the direct inter-firm relationships in
complementary activities as an externality to "pure" market functions.
I Gereffi (1994) and his colleagues have developed a concept of global commodity chains (GCC) that
encompasses not only supplier relations in manufacturing but commodity chains in the service sector.
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al. 1990, Nishiguchi 1994, Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994, Helper and Sako 1995). But
much of the literature has focused on the nature of contractual relations between final
product assemblers and component suppliers (Granovetter 1985, Helper and Sako 1995)
and paid little attention to the question of how skill and knowledge transfer actually
occurs.4
A growing body of literature has recently examined changes in employment
practices in manufacturing and, in particular, in the automobile industry. Some studies
have speculated on a causal relationship between the adoption of "flexible" or "lean"
production systems and such changing employment practices, including skill development,
among auto manufacturers (MacDuffie 1996, Kochan et al. 1997, Sargent and Matthews
1998). Other studies have analyzed the changing nature of supplier relations in the
automobile industries across different countries in the globalization era (Womack et al.
1990, Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994, Helper and Sako 1995, Humphrey et al. 1998; also see
Chapter 2). However, few studies so far have examined how such recent changes in the
supplier relations have affected employment practices, particularly those concerning skill
development in suppliers, let alone the profile of their workers, in India or elsewhere.
Therefore, this chapter proceeds as follows. Drawing on the results of my
questionnaire survey, Section 4.2 first portrays the profile of first-tier automotive suppliers
to Maruti and Telco, and, in particular, those of 50 sample suppliers. Given the segmented
nature of the Indian labor market, the characteristics of the labor force at suppliers differ
significantly from those at vehicle manufacturers such as Maruti and Telco, as described in
Chapter 3. Section 4.3 presents the results of the questionnaire survey of the 50 suppliers
with respect to their patterns of skill development. Section 4.4 analyzes factors that have
motivated the sample firms to develop their workers' skills in recent years. Section 4.5
discusses the roles of inter-firm linkages in facilitating and transferring skills for workers at
' Perhaps an important exception is a study by Lall (1985b), which examined the nature of backward
linkages that two Indian truck companies, Telco and Ashok Layland, developed.
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suppliers and changes in the nature of such linkages in the process of transformations in the
industry. Section 4.6 summarizes the findings.
This chapter offers several general findings. First, during the rapid transformations
in the automobile industry, the auto component industry has seen a general trend of
upskilling of the workforce in the 1990s: the educational level of the workforce as a whole
has risen, as has the demand for professionally-trained managerial workers. Second,
suppliers, including small firms, considerably increased their investment in in-firm training
in the 1990s. Third, the current process of globalization has strengthened the inter-firm
linkages between car manufacturers and their suppliers, through the institutionalization of
various mechanisms to improve quality both in production processes and products,
including frequent monitoring, information dissemination, and training for suppliers. In
other words, the inter-firm linkages, i.e., the supply chain, have served as a learning chain:
an institutional form that places demands for learning on suppliers in exchange for ensuring
long-term contracts. Thus, it has played a critical role in enhancing the skill levels of
workers, changing the nature of skills required, and promoting in-firm training at small-
scale suppliers.
4.2 The Profile of Suppliers to Maruti and Telco
This section briefly portrays the characteristics of Maruti suppliers and Telco
suppliers in general, and of the 50 sample suppliers in particular.
4.2.1 Maruti Suppliers
As of 1997, Maruti had 404 first-tier suppliers. Of them, over 100 are small firms
located within an hour of Maruti's main plant in Gurgaon in the state of Haryana. About
10% of them have Japanese involvement; of these one third are in joint ventures, and two-
' As discussed in Chapter 1, some smaller first-tier suppliers also serve large first-tier suppliers of Maruti
as second-tier suppliers. Thus, the divisions between tiers in the pyramidal structure are not completely
straightforward.
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thirds in technical collaboration. Several key suppliers are located in Chennai in the
southern state of Tamil Nadu. Of the 404 suppliers, 53 rely on Maruti for more than 90%
of their sales. Other first-tier suppliers have multiple customers. In fact, because the
volume of production is still very small, Maruti encourages its suppliers to have multiple
customers so that they can attain economies of scale, with the exception of a handful of key
suppliers of which Maruti holds equity shares, as discussed in Chapter 2. Of the 404,
about one-third were established after Maruti started operating in 1983. Many suppliers
have long-term contractual relations with Maruti; the majority has continuously worked
with Maruti since 1983. Challenging the "arm's length" supplier relations which had
prevailed in India, Maruti first introduced close relations with its suppliers in India, as
discussed in subsequent sections. At the same time, Maruti placed great emphasis on
improving suppliers' performance, particularly in terms of product quality and on-time
delivery, factors totally new to Indian suppliers before Maruti's entry.
4.2.2 Telco Suppliers
Telco's three plants in Jamshedpur, Pune, and Lucknow have about 900, 1,200,
and 700 first-tier suppliers respectively. About 500 of these suppliers cater to all three
plants. Many large-scale suppliers serving all three plants are located in Chennai in the
state of Tamil Nadu, and some of them also serve Maruti. Many of these Chennai-based
suppliers have recently shown an interest in setting up another plant in Pune once the
volume of production increases. Although many of the 1,200 first-tier suppliers of the
Pune plant are spread all over the country, about 50% of them are actually concentrated in
Pune and surrounding cities in Maharashtra, creating a high level of geographical
concentration. Of the 1,200, about 700 to 800 are small-scale; most produce basic items,
such as sheet metals, and their operation does not rely on high-tech equipment. Many are
family-owned enterprises, often one-man operations. Telco has traditionally had an "arm's
length" relationship with its suppliers. Until recently, Telco's primary criterion for
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selecting suppliers was price; it thus had a relatively small volume of business with high-
quality but high-price suppliers such as Denso India. In 1997, however, the firm
drastically changed the nature of its supplier relations, focusing on closer relations, with
greater interest in the suppliers' overall performance.
4.2.3 Profile of Sample Supplier Firms
Taking into account these geographical and size factors, I selected a sample of 25
Maruti suppliers, mainly located in Faridabad and Gurgaon in the state of Haryana, and in
Delhi, and another 25 Telco suppliers mainly located in Pune and Aurangabad in
Maharashtra (for a summary of the profile of these suppliers, see Appendix 4. 1).6 It
should be noted that labeling the sample firms as "Maruti suppliers" and "Telco suppliers"
only reflects how these firms were identified for sampling and does not necessarily mean
that they have exclusive supplier relations with Maruti or Telco. In fact, many of the
sample firms have more than one customer (see Appendix 4.1), and of the 50 sample
firms, 11 cater to both Maruti and Telco (see discussions below).
1) Establishment
Of the 25 sample Maruti suppliers, 18 firms were established long before Maruti
was set up. These are mainly located in Faridabad, an old industrial district in Haryana,
where the majority of Maruti suppliers are located (see Appendix 4.2 for the geographical
distribution of Maruti suppliers). Of these 18, the majority had been suppliers of tractor
components for major tractor companies, such as Escort and Eicher Tractor, both located in
Faridabad.7 These suppliers turned to the automobile sector when Maruti started
production in 1983. Many firms started as small units simply undertaking "job work,"
6 Hereafter, I use the codes employed in Apprendix 4.1 to refer to the suppliers I interviewed, instead of
identifying their real names.
7 The growth of tractor component manufacturers in Faridabad reflects the government's priority on
agricultural development in the 1960s and 1970s, which supported the development of agricultural
equipment such as tractors, agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation, and inputs such as fertilizer.
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processing certain types of components with the raw materials supplied by customers; and
then gradually moved to manufacturing. In other words, they had already accumulated
basic engineering skills before Maruti entered India, which has made it easier for Maruti to
facilitate their development since then. The other 6 firms were established in the mid-
1980s, a few years after Maruti's start, in Gurgaon, a new industrial district that grew as
Maruti grew.
Of the 25 sample Telco suppliers, 14 firms, mainly located in Pune and
Aurangabad, were established before liberalization of the Indian economy started in the
mid-1980s. Many small firms in Pune grew as the three auto manufacturers based in the
city, Telco, Bajaj Auto and Bajaj Tempo, grew. About 60% of all small-scale industry
(SSI) firms in Pune serve one or more of these three customers, forming the country's
largest industrial district specializing in auto components.
2) Firm Size
First-tier suppliers are relatively small, largely in the categories of small and
medium enterprises. Of the 25 sample Maruti suppliers, 6 have fewer than 100 employees,
while 13 firms employ between 100 and 400 employees. On the other hand, of the 25
sample Telco suppliers, 8 firms have fewer than 100 employees, while 9 have between 100
and 400 employees. Reflecting the still small overall production volume in the Indian
automobile industry as a whole (see Chapter 2), first-tier suppliers in India are much
smaller on average than are Japanese first-tier suppliers (1,198 employees).9
Indeed, 19 of the 25 Maruti suppliers and 15 of the 25 Telco suppliers are in the
SSI sector, enjoying various benefits of the government support to this sector. This
reflects a general tendency in India for an entrepreneur who starts an enterprise as a SSI
firm to qualify for subsidies and various support measures provided by the government for
this category, which would have been difficult to obtain otherwise. Such measures include
' My interview with a general manager of the District Industrial Center (Pune), in April 1997.
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a priority allotment of land, water, electricity connection, telephone connection, access to
capital,'" lower tax rates, reservation of certain items for SSI firms (see Chapter 2), and
exemption from various obligations imposed on large firms. This generous government
support has resulted in considerable inefficiency in operation among SSI firms, but they
have still helped develop a wide industrial base in the country, even though their growth
was stagnant in the 1970s.
Interestingly, however, some of these SSI firms are small only in disguise. A
closer look reveals that they have actually grown to be more than they appear to be on
paper. They create other firms under separate names on the same premises in order to
qualify for the privileges and protection the government provides to SSI firms. Indeed,
many of the firms I visited have more than two, and as many as seven, firms under
different names as "sister concerns" owned by family members, even though they actually
share the same production facilities, management, and labor." For example, one SSI firm
in Faridabad has six plants under four different names,' 2 while another firm in Gurgaon
has three plants under two names in different locations." Some firms set up separate
plants to cater to each of several different customers. Such arrangements have helped firms
overcome the otherwise great difficulty in attaining economies of scale.
Most sample firms, both Maruti and Telco suppliers, have grown remarkably since
the mid-1980s, confirming the general trends observed in Chapter 2. For some firms,
sales figures grew more than 100 times between 1990 and 1996. Some firms have
graduated from their SSI status in the last few years, having reached the point where the
benefits of being a medium-scale unit (more business opportunities and greater economies
of scale) exceeded the benefits from the various protections and privileges provided to a
SSI unit.
9 Fujimoto and Takeishi 1994.
10 For example, the government has required all commercial banks, which had all been nationalized until
the recent liberalization of the financial sector, to reserve 20% of lending available for the SSI-sector firms.
" Lall (1987) makes a similar observation about SSI firms in India.
" Interview with M 11, in February 1997.
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3) Supplier Relations
Until the mid-1990s, the approaches of Maruti and Telco to their suppliers differed
considerably. Maruti developed a long-term close relationship with its suppliers, following
the Japanese model of supplier relations, while Telco had a rather "arm's length"
relationship with its suppliers, close to the Western model of supplier relations (see Chapter
2).
Among the 25 sample Maruti suppliers, only three firms have exclusive supplier
relations with Maruti. Of the 25 sample Telco suppliers, only two have exclusive relations
with Telco. Indeed, some suppliers have more than 10 customers. Some still produce
components of tractors and other consumer electric goods such as refrigerators. On the
surface, therefore, both Maruti and Telco appear to have weak supplier networks.
However, detailed interviews with their suppliers revealed that they still maintain such
close relationships with these suppliers that it significantly affects their performance, as
discussed in subsequent sections.
Large-scale suppliers are often original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
themselves; they have their own brand names, export their products, and have relatively
autonomous relations with their customers. Some recently started forming joint ventures
with foreign suppliers (see Chapter 2). By contrast, few small-scale firms have their own
products or proprietary technologies, producing products "as per the specification and
drawings provided by customers," relying on the customers to design products.1 4 Few
such small suppliers are involved in joint design development with their customers.
Customers usually give these suppliers the designs of products, dies and tools. Some
small firms are engaged in "job work" or processing of intermediary goods, and depend
more on their customers. As they grow, they gradually move to manufacturing activities,
" Interview with M20, in February 1997.
1 These firms include M2, M3, T10, T16, and T19, to name a few.
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and some start developing their own products." Some firms undertake to manufacture
components for some customers and remain engaged in "job work" for other customers. 6
Some small firms that depend highly on Maruti have actually developed even their
production layouts following the specifications Maruti prescribed in the mid-1980s."
Even without exclusive supplier relationships, many sample suppliers do have
some sense of trust in Maruti and Telco, compared to other customers. Some Maruti
suppliers maintain that Maruti's remarkable success lies in its developing suppliers and
good relationships with them.18 Many Maruti suppliers stressed their dependence on
Maruti as a deliberate business strategy."' One loyal supplier with 100% dependence on
Maruti said, "since 1983, we never felt a sense of insecurity; Maruti and my firm have a
very clean relationship. With Maruti's phenomenal growth, our business also grew, with a
large increase in our business volume."20
As discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of supplier relations even among domestic car
manufacturers began to change dynamically in the 1990s, as many foreign car
manufacturers entered the Indian market. The automotive component industry has
witnessed a large inflow of FDI in the component sector, a growing division between OEM
and "after market" suppliers, and closer supplier relations between car manufacturers and
their suppliers (see Chapter 2).
While many of the sample firms are local, several have started joint ventures with
foreign firms. Among Maruti's suppliers, one sample firm, the largest and oldest seat
maker in India, and located on the same premises as Maruti's main plant, was set up in
1985 as a joint venture among four partners: Maruti, Suzuki, a Suzuki supplier in Japan,
and a local entrepreneur. Such key suppliers form rather exclusive relations with Maruti,
" For example, T13 even started developing its own R&D facilities under a different company name at the
facility next door (interview with T3 in April, 1997).
16 For example, M5 undertakes processing for Maruti and PAL, while it does "job work" for Eicher
Tractor, Bajaj Auto, and Bajaj Tempo.
" For example, M21.
1 Interviews with M13.
'9 For example, M3.
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catering only to Maruti, even though Maruti does not entirely rely on such dedicated
suppliers and has alternative sources for each component. On the other hand, Telco,
reflecting its traditional "arm's length" supplier relations, never held equity in any of its
suppliers until the mid-1990s when it created a supplier base in Tamil Nadu, forming
several joint ventures with different foreign firms for different key components (see
Chapter 2).
While both Maruti and Telco have adopted some elements of "flexible" and "lean"
production as discussed in Chapter 3, the ways they interact with their suppliers still differ
considerably. While Maruti suppliers can coordinate their own production schedules
following Maruti's monthly production schedules, Telco gives its suppliers its production
schedule daily. While Telco has recently introduced just-in-time inventory systems, it often
changes its production schedules in an erratic manner, placing a large burden on the local
suppliers that then need to adjust their production volumes on a daily basis. Some of these
suppliers complain that because of Telco's frequent schedule changes, it is extremely hard
for them to plan production: Some have to change up to 50% of their monthly production
schedules. This problem stems partly from a lack of coordination concerning suppliers
among different Telco departments, such as Purchase, Production Planning, and Supplier
Development. Suppliers sometimes dispatch their trucks with their products only to learn
that Telco no longer needs them due to changes in its production schedule. Sometimes
their trucks and drivers are stranded at Telco's gate for a few days, causing further losses
in addition to the wasted excise duty payment. These frequent schedule changes thus
seriously increase production costs for local suppliers, particularly smaller ones, sometimes
eroding trust between Telco and its suppliers. On the other hand, Maruti suppliers maintain
that Maruti's monthly production schedules are stable and reliable, thus helping the firm
generate some sense of security and trust among its local suppliers. Thus, the intra-firm
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20 Interviews with M3. Managers at other firms such as M2 made similar remarks.
division of labor and coordination on the part of customers greatly affects the nature of
supplier relations.
4.3 Skill Development at First-tier Suppliers
This section examines the nature of skill development at the sample first-tier
suppliers. It first analyzes the characteristics of the internal and external labor markets
surrounding the workers at suppliers, including the educational level of employees, and
then examines where they obtain skills and how they develop skills of workers within the
firm.
4.3.1 Characteristics of Labor Markets at the Supplier Level
Given the highly segmented nature of labor markets in India (see Chapter 1), the
characteristics of the labor market segments surrounding the workers at small suppliers
obviously differ considerably from those for workers at large vehicle manufacturers such
as Maruti and Telco, as described in Chapter 3. To understand the nature of skill
development for workers at suppliers, we first need to know what types of workers these
suppliers employ, what tasks they actually perform, and under what conditions they work.
This subsection therefore analyzes the occupational structures, labor characteristics, and
employment practices among the sample 50 suppliers.
1) Occupational Structure
As expected, the occupational structure of firms differs depending on the firm size.
Large-scale suppliers have occupational structures similar to those of vehicle manufacturers
such as Maruti and Telco. Like vehicle manufacturers, they have well-developed internal
labor markets, with clear rules governing recruitment, promotion, salaries, and training.
Due to the segmented nature of labor markets, however, the port of entry for recruitment at
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large suppliers differs according to the occupational group of employees, requiring
different educational levels for entry.
The proportion of trained engineers (those having a degree or diploma in
engineering) in the workforce is relatively small among first-tier suppliers. While large-
and medium-scale firms employ such trained engineers, smaller firms often employ ITI
graduates as "technicians." This is because in many small firms the labor-intensive nature
of their operation does not require engineering expertise, and because they often cannot
afford to pay the prevailing wages for engineers.
As for production workers, at large suppliers, recently hired production workers
are mainly fresh ITI graduates, as at Maruti and Telco (see Chapter 3). However, many
older workers have previously worked in other industries, but typically transport-related
manufacturing firms, such as Escort, a tractor producer. Through such channels, basic
engineering skills had been accumulated in the automotive component firms even before the
liberalization policy was introduced in 1991.
Interestingly, despite their shallower hierarchical structures compared to large
firms, small firms do have informal ways of classifying their production workers according
to skill level, such as unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, and sometimes, highly skilled, which
often determine workers' wage levels. Though the definition for each category of workers
varies from one firm to another, these categories implicitly create a defacto informal
internal occupational hierarchy.
At the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, firms commonly hire unskilled
workers often called "helpers," who typically undertake such simple tasks as loading,
unloading, packing, and moving materials. Out of the 50 sample suppliers, only one firm
had no unskilled workers, as it instead used semi-skilled workers to perform such tasks.
In addition, many firms in India use so-called "casual labor" outside of the formal
employment system. Some firms have far more casual workers than formally employed
workers; in others, nearly all the production workers are casual. Because casual workers
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do not quality for labor welfare measures and legal protection, most "keep coming and
going" on a short-term basis. These casual workers are further classified into two types,
thus serving two different purposes. The first type, the cheap laborers, receives minimum
wages, substituting for regular unskilled workers. They also serve as a buffer to fill in for
absent workers, given the high incidence of absenteeism in India, on average 12% for the
transport equipment and parts sector as of 1992.21 The second type, contract workers,
receives wages on a piece rate basis depending on their output (hence sometimes receiving
higher earnings than regular workers). They serve as a buffer when demand fluctuates.
The second type may sometimes work outside the premises of the enterprises; thus they are
sometimes called subcontractors or Outside Labor Processors (OLS).
Three factors explain this extensive use of casual workers: First, the rigid nature of
labor markets, particularly the difficulty in firing workers due to protective labor legislation
(see Chapter 3) makes employers prudent about formally employing workers. Second, the
general anti-union attitudes make employers reluctant to hire more permanent employees,
which could lead to the creation of unions in their firms. This anti-union attitude is
particularly prevalent in the north where most Maruti suppliers are located. Some
employers I interviewed have deliberately chosen not to increase their firm size above 100
employees, because they would then have to allow a union within the firm, which they
think would harm management. Finally, some small firms are afraid to increase regular
workers, who might start their own business once they became skilled and acquired
enough knowledge about the nature of the firm's business.
However, transformations in the automobile industry in the 1990s (see Chapter 2)
have changed the patterns of labor deployment among suppliers. First, many small
suppliers have increasingly turned "from a family-managed enterprise to a professionally
managed enterprise."23 Smaller suppliers traditionally had a shallower occupational
2' Government of India 1997.
2 My interview with M1, in February 1997.
23 My interview with M1, in February 1997.
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structure; many were essentially the owner's one-man operation. Usually a son of the
owner, often with a degree in engineering, held the second position in the firm as a
technical director overseeing technical aspects. In the 1990s, however, new types of small-
scale suppliers have slowly emerged: some educated engineers with experience working at
large assemblers have established professionally-managed small firms. Second, an
increasing number of firms have started hiring more professional managers, particularly in
the areas of quality assurance and maintenance. This has resulted in a marked increase in
the proportion of qualified managers even among small firms, while creating a more
hierarchical structure within each firm. For instance, holders of MBA are now in high
demand. Even smaller firms commonly have professional accountants and one or two
college-educated administrative employees. This change in the occupational structure in
favor of managerial skills, a trend also observed in developed countries in the 1980s
(OECD 1996), seems to have been common among the sample first-tier suppliers in the
1990s. Table 4.1 shows a changing employment growth trend for different occupational
groups in the sample first-tier suppliers that have kept employment records since the mid-
1980s.
Table 4.1: Average Annual Employment Growth for Different
Occupational Groups in 13 Selected First-tier Suppliers
Occupational Category 1985-1990 1990-1996
Managers 7.7% 12.8%
Engineers 2.2% 2.8%
Production Workers 16.9% 5.1%
Helpers (Unskilled workers) 32.5% 5.5%
Casual Workers 24.1% 3.7%
Source : Calculated from the results of my questionnaire survey.
There are several reasons for this change, according to a small supplier in
Faridabad. First, many firms became more interested in expanding than in continuing as a
SSI firm. Second, the entry of many vehicle manufacturers led even small suppliers to
establish various plants in various locations, which in turn made it difficult for one person
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to manage and oversee the entire operation. Third, "the exposure to Japanese business
culture through Maruti and Hero Honda prompted suppliers to realize the importance of
having an efficient business organization."2 4 Finally, suppliers needed to transform
themselves to obtain ISO 9000, required by customers, particularly Maruti, as discussed in
more detail in subsequent sections.
Moreover, increased quality consciousness widened the range of jobs within each
firm. Many firms have recently created new positions in the areas of quality assurance,
inspection, and maintenance, which are mostly filled by educated employees with college
degrees. For example, a small firm in Aurangabad had only four shops until recently:
forging, heat treatment shop, tool room, and finishing room.2 ' But the firm recently
created a new section focusing on inspection, which is now staffed completely by college
graduates. In other words, production processes have called for a wider range of tasks
requiring higher skills than before, resulting in considerable upskilling among component
suppliers.
In contrast with the considerable growth in demand for managers, the employment
growth for engineers has been slower than in other categories throughout this period. This
slow growth may reflect the extremely limited product development capabilities of these
suppliers, which rely mostly on the drawings provided by their customers. It also reflects
assemblers' focus on improving suppliers' capabilities in the production process
management, particularly for quality control, rather than product development. In fact,
many of the small firms I interviewed had recently created a position of quality assurance
manager.
In addition, increased quality consciousness has lowered the demand for casual
labor, particularly in small firms. Among the firms I interviewed, some have recently
decided to stop using casual workers for several reasons. First, the use of casual workers
makes it difficult to sustain the quality standard that customers require, since retraining new
24 My interview with M1, in February 1997.
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workers is particularly costly for resource-constrained small firms. A manager of a small
firm noted that, "each time when new ones come, we have to teach them from scratch,
which results in wasting a huge amount of time on the part of managers."2 6 Second, many
suppliers, including small firms, have recently introduced new forms of work organization,
which require more worker responsibility and involvement, a quality that cannot be
expected in casual workers who "keep coming and going." This stands in marked contrast
with earlier recruitment practices: until recently, many firms "recruited basically whoever
came to the gate." Therefore, contrary to the popular assertion in the literature that
globalization has led to the casualization of labor, the case of the Indian automobile industry
suggests otherwise.
On the other hand, second-tier suppliers are very small, often home-based,
consisting of only a few workers, many of whom are often family members. They are
often in the informal sector, and they often operate and live in slums in the neighborhood.
Some of the first-tier suppliers have a separate quarter for their own workers in the same
factory premises (but often in a separate building in poor condition). The changes in
supplier relations between vehicle manufacturers and first-tier suppliers following "lean"
production principles--increased awareness about quality, on-time schedule, and in-time
delivery--are not yet seen in the relations between first-tier and second-tier suppliers.
Therefore, there is a clear discontinuity between the first-tier and second-tier suppliers in
the supply chain in terms of production processes as well as labor markets, which limits the
possibility of second-tier workers moving up to a job in a first-tier supplier. In some
cases, however, former operators of first-tier suppliers become independent subcontractors
(i.e., second-tier suppliers) paid on a piece rate basis, almost exclusively working for their
former employers (i.e., first-tier suppliers).
2) Labor Characteristics
25 My interview with T22, in March 1997.
26 My interview with T8, in April 1997.
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This subsection analyzes the characteristics of workers at the sample first-tier
suppliers, in terms of a) educational background; b) age and gender distribution; and c)
regional and social background.
a) Educational Background
Changes in the occupational structure as observed above also coincide with
considerable recent changes in the educational level of employees of suppliers. While
serious data constraints permit no systematic analysis on the educational trends for the
whole industry, Figure 4.1 shows a general upward shift in the educational level for every
category of the workforce in the sample first-tier suppliers. Given the rigid nature of the
labor market, long-term employees with less education were still working in 1996. During
my interviews, however, many firms, including smaller ones, indicated that while they had
not previously placed any weight on job seekers' educational backgrounds, they started
requiring better-educated workers in the early 1990s. One Maruti supplier with 140
employees explained this shift: since 1993, his firm has recruited ITI graduates as workers
instead of those who had completed the fifth grade.
This shift was necessary for at least three reasons. First, workers' tasks
increasingly require literacy and numeracy, because of increased automation and
computerization: workers have to read and interpret parameters to operate machines.
Second, ITI graduates have better basic technical knowledge. While employers commonly
acknowledge the importance of on-the-job training, the changed nature of operation now
requires more basic knowledge, which workers acquire through ITI training. Finally,
supplier firms now increasingly emphasize in-firm training, which requires the readiness to
learn new skills, a quality found only in those workers who have basic knowledge through
schooling.27 In other words, even small-scale firms now demand more of the general
skills acquired through general vocational training.
27 Interview with a firm in Faridabad, in March 1997.
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Figure 4.1: Educational Trends of Employees by Occupational Group:
Selected Sample Suppliers
(Frequency of responses: %)
Educational Levels of Managers Educational Levels of
Engineers/Supervisors
up to
5th 10th 
" post
Educational Level graduat
1985
Educational Levels of Helpers
up to up to
5th 10th
Levels
Notes: 1) N refers to the number of firms that had valid responses to the question. Thus, the percentage refers to
the share of the firms that had employees in each category of the given educational level. This was 12 firms in
1985 and 1990, and 45 firms in 1996. 2) As firms employ different occupational groups of employees with
different levels of education, the sum of the percentages for each occupational group is not equal to 100. 3) Firms
rarely keep personal records on casual workers; thus few firms knew their educational background.
Source: Constructed from the data obtained through the questionnaire survey conducted by the author.
b) Age and Gender Distribution
Table 4.2 shows the age distribution of the 10,696 employees in the 40 sample
firms where data were available. The largest group of employees is in the age group
between 25 and 34 years, indicating that the industry relies on relatively young employees.
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Suppliers in general employ few women, except for one large joint-venture firm in
Delhi producing wiring harnesses, where 80% of production workers are women.
However, increased computerization even at small firms has increased employment
opportunities for women in the automotive industry, which has traditionally been male-
dominant. In most firms I visited, one or two women, usually young college graduates,
have been recruited in the last few years for a clerical job involving some computer
operation. Employers explain that they prefer women for this type of position because
women are more serious and reliable, and concentrate more on their tasks.
c) Regional and Social Background
Workers' characteristics differ considerably across different regions. The majority
of employees in Haryana, where many of Maruti's suppliers are located, are from the
northern states of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) and Bihar, the two poorest states in India. This is
partly because in the 1970s when new industrial areas emerged in Haryana, many
entrepreneurs moved to Haryana from West Bengal, to escape from an anti-industry climate
in West Bengal where political power had long rested with the communist state government
and militant unions. These employers brought workers from U.P along with them.
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Even today, most production workers in Haryana are migrant workers from
agricultural areas in U.P. and Bihar. They tend to take leaves during the agricultural
season in summer (May through June), thus significantly affecting production outputs as
well as productivity at suppliers during the season. Labor turnover is relatively high
among recent migrants, as they sometimes do not return to their firms after going home to
their villages. Despite such constraints, employers in Haryana generally prefer such
migrants to local workers, for two reasons. First, migrants are more likely to accept low
wages, as the prevailing rural wages in such poorer states are lower than the prevailing
wages in cities surrounding Delhi. Second, they are less likely to become politically
organized than local workers; employers are afraid of their workforce unionizing.
In some cases, suppliers in the north employ workers from the southern states
(Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka), particularly workers in certain skill areas, such as
welders and machinists, because the level of education is generally higher in the south, and
ITIs and polytechnics in the south have courses in such specific trade skills. Interestingly,
the women workers employed at the wiring harness firm mentioned above are almost
entirely from Kerala. The firm prefers women from Kerala, having found them well
educated, diligent, and hard-working, compared to local women; in the north, women's
wage employment in the industrial sector is less socially acceptable than in the south.
On the other hand, workers in Pune are largely from local areas. As the educational
level in Maharashtra, the wealthiest state in India (see Chapter 2), is much higher than in
other states, the overall educational levels of workers are generally higher than those in
northern states, allowing firms to enjoy higher levels of general skills in their workforce.
Interestingly, differences in their attitudes regarding the recruitment of workers among
small firms in Haryana and Maharashtra lie in the difference in labor legislation in these
states: In Maharashtra, by law, even small firms must allow their employees to form a
union, and therefore, they do not need to rely on migrants to avoid unionization.
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3) Employment Practices
Employment practices vary among suppliers. Some firms, large and small alike,
generally have low labor turnover among their production workers reflecting the long-term
employment tradition, except for the "helpers" (unskilled workers) who keep "coming and
going,"2 s while others report high turnover among their workers. They usually recruit
workers through public employment exchanges, or more commonly, through the personal
connections of the existing workers, who often bring relatives and friends from their home
villages.2 9
A closer observation reveals that suppliers generally use three types of employment
practices for production workers, depending on their skill levels. The first type is long-
term employment for a small proportion of skilled workers who typically work at the same
enterprise for more than 10 years. These skilled workers are relatively well-paid compared
to other workers in the same fimns; they receive other incentives and training opportunities,
partly to discourage them from leaving. 0 Labor turnover among skilled workers is thus
very low." However, when such skilled workers do quit jobs, they often start their own
business, sometimes to become second-tier suppliers. 2 The second type is short-term
employment for a large proportion of workers, mainly unskilled or semi-skilled, who
receive minimum wages and "keep coming and going" after working four to six months at
a firm. Labor turnover among this type of workers is fairly high, particularly at firms
without unions.3 3 The third is medium-term employment for those who work at a firm for
several years and then move to another firm looking for better opportunities. For this type
28 Interviews with M3, M9.
29 For example, at M18, only 10% of the employees were recruited through the local employment
exchanges, while the other 90% were brought through personal connections of the existing workers
(Interview with M18, in March 1997).
30 For example, M18 provides monetary incentives to workers who have completed 5, 10, and 15 years of
service, to encourage them to remain in service.
" For example, a firm (T17) reported that in the last 10 years, only five workers left the firm. Another
firm (T4) noted that the average years of service are 15 to 16 years, as "experienced production workers
never leave."
" Interviews with T8, in February 1997.
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of employment, finns tend to employ workers who have already acquired necessary skills
through their previous jobs. Thus, the juxtaposition of these different types of employment
practices helps suppliers gain some flexibility, despite the institutional rigidity created in
external labor markets as discussed in Chapter 3. This skill-based labor mobility has clear
implications for the patterns of skill development, a central theme of discussions in
subsequent sections.
Another interesting pattern of labor mobility is that of casual workers in Pune,
which has the largest concentration of auto ancillary firms in three adjacent industrial
districts, Pimpli, Chichiwad, and Bhosari in a suburb of the city. Three large auto
manufacturers in Pune, namely, Telco, Bajaj Auto, and Bajaj Tempo, employ many
temporary workers for six months. For example, Telco employs about 10,000 such
temporary skilled workers, as they are much less costly to hire them than regular workers
(see Chapter 3 for Telco workers' wages). Such temporary workers work in nearby small
ancillary suppliers for the remaining six months. This labor sharing has helped facilitate
skill transfer between Telco and its suppliers. 4
Among suppliers, work hours vary from 42 to 72 hours per week including
overtime, for six days a week. Many firms in Haryana require several hours of overtime.
On the other hand, firms in Maharashtra discourage overtime, as they have to pay double
the hourly rate for overtime, which would considerably raise their labor cost." The
difference in attitudes toward overtime between the two regions reflects the stronger
enforcement of labor policy by the state government of Maharashtra.
Even small firms have some informal mechanisms for internal promotion, though
more limited in scope and less structured than large firms. Somewhat surprisingly, many
small suppliers generally prefer to promote existing workers rather than recruiting new
ones, because of the firm-specific nature of skills even in their relatively labor-intensive
" For example, M4, M9, M13, T7, T9, and T13 noted this point.
3 Interview with TI, in April 1997.
* Interviews with T4, T9, T19, in April 1997.
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operations. Helpers (unskilled workers) do become promoted as regular operators (semi-
skilled and skilled) after some years of service, only if their performance is good. Workers
acquire skills by moving up a job ladder from unskilled to semi-skilled, and further to
skilled jobs, and sometimes even to supervisory jobs, while acquiring necessary skills on
the job.
Table 4.3 summarizes wage structures and distribution among different
occupational categories at the sample suppliers, with and without FDI, where the wage data
were available. As anticipated, firms with FDI pay considerably higher wages to workers
at every level (except unskilled workers). The automotive component industry sees a wide
wage dispersion among different occupational categories: managers in firms with FDI
receive 8.2 times more than the lowest level of workers, whereas managers in firms
without FDI receive 9 times more than the lowest level of workers. In both FDI-affiliated
and non-FDI firms, helpers and casual workers receive minimum wages.
Table 4.3: Average Annual Earnings for Different Occupational Groups
at Selected First-tier Suppliers: 1996 (in US dollars)
Managers Engineers Production Helpers Casual Workers
I Workers (Unskiled) I
Suppliers with 6,492 2,208 1,440 648 792
FDI
(9 firms) (n=256) (n=671) (n=3183) (n=80) (n=1475)
Suppliers 5,184 1,488 1,020 708 576
without FDI
(31 firms) (n=133) (n=432) (n=2128) (n=618) (n=623)
Total 6,060 1,920 1,236 708 720(40 firms)
(n=389) (n=1103) (n=5511) (n=698) (n=2173)
Source: Calculated from data obtained through a questionnaire survey conducted by the author.
Notes: 1) Out of the sample firms, only those which have matching data for employment and wages are
included in this computation. 2) n refers to the number of employees in the category. 3) The exchange
rate was US $1 = Rs. 35.43 in 1996 (IMF 1997).
As discussed in Chapter 3, a large wage gap also exists between assemblers and
first-tier suppliers. While the wages for workers at large-scale joint-venture suppliers
receive are 80% of Maruti workers' wages, those at small-scale suppliers are only about
20% (see Chapter 3: Table 3.4). These wage differentials between assemblers and
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suppliers in India are much greater than in the U.S. and Japan (80% in both countries).36
Clearly, the high degree of subcontracting by Maruti and Telco (see Chapters 2 and 3) has
taken advantage of low wages at suppliers. This huge wage disparity between assemblers
and small suppliers also means that workers in assemblers and small suppliers operate in
different labor market segments, which makes labor mobility between these different
segments very difficult.
However, the recent upward shift in the educational levels of the workforce (see
Figure 4.1 above) has had various effects on employment practices among suppliers.
First, it imposed some limits on these informal skill formation practices within the firm. As
more small firms started demanding ITI graduates for new recruits, opportunities for
uneducated and unskilled helpers to become skilled have become extremely limited. In
fact, several firms witnessed some conflicts between uneducated but experienced old timers
and educated but inexperienced new recruits on the shop floor. In some cases, in-firm
training has served as a forum to mediate such conflicts by treating them on the same
ground and balancing the types of skills acquired by the two groups of workers. Second,
in Maharashtra, where educational levels are generally higher than in other regions, a recent
rise in the educational level among production workers has made it increasingly difficult for
employers to fill unskilled minimum-wage jobs; high school graduates do not easily accept
tasks and work conditions as cheap laborers. Such new constraints due to upskilling
trends have led firms to reform their organization of work, as discussed below.
Despite considerable difficulties in examining the nature of external labor markets
surrounding the workforce of suppliers due to a serious lack of data, Figure 4.2 presents
the responses of the 44 sample suppliers regarding demand for and supply of different
occupational categories of workers for their firms. Figure 4.2 shows that employers
generally face few supply constraints for most occupational categories. However, nearly
40% of the sample firms, particularly small ones, have had some difficulties in recruiting
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36 See Nishiguchi 1994.
qualified managers, and about 30% had some difficulties in recruiting qualified supervisors
and engineers, indicating an increased demand for and a shortage of qualified employees in
these categories.
Figure 4.2: Labor Market Conditions for Different
Occupational Groups: Frequency of Responses
from 44 Sample Firms
*No Need to Recruit
* No trouble recruiting
o Some Difficulty in Recruiting
o Severe Difficulty in RecruitingIL uN/A
- 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
% of Responses
Source: Computed from the results of a questionnaire survey conducted by the author.
Qualifications of supervisors and engineers vary, however, largely depending on
the firm size. At large firms, well-educated holders of degrees or diplomas in engineering
occupy these jobs, while smaller firms employ few engineers, and their supervisors are
more likely to have been promoted from production worker jobs after 15 to 20 years of
service at the same firm. Where holders of degree or diploma occupy supervisory
positions, production workers have extremely limited promotion opportunities beyond their
occupational category.
As shown in Figure 4.2, several factors explain why small firms find it difficult to
recruit qualified engineers. First, engineers generally prefer to work at large firms, because
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of the higher social status and recognition attached to large firms, let alone better wages
large firms pay. Thus, small firms often cannot recruit the best-qualified engineers."
Second, at small firms, even educated engineers need to perform odd tasks.38 Finally,
because applicants' skills acquired through previous work are firm-specific, it is hard to
match them with the skills other firms require, especially in such areas as the tool room,
maintenance, and rubber processing.39 At the same time, labor turnover is very high
among engineers at small firms. Thus, the difficulty in attracting qualified engineers has
increasingly led small firms to contract out such engineers' tasks as testing and
maintenance, to outside independent testing facilities.
In addition, 16% of the sample firms found it difficult to recruit even skilled
workers for various reasons. First, as discussed earlier, as many workers are from
agricultural areas, it is difficult to find good workers during the agricultural season as they
go back to their villages. Second, skilled workers, especially those with particular trade
skills, such as die-makers, tool makers, rubber specialists, fitters, and welders, are in high
demand and in short supply, due partly to the recent remarkable growth of the industry (see
Chapter 2), as these skills are not easily available in the labor markets.4 0 Finally, like
engineers, skilled workers also prefer to work at large firms, as they offer better wages and
more opportunities."
In sum, labor markets for workers at suppliers are more complex and mixed than
for workers at large vehicle manufacturers, with the coexistence of various patterns of
employment practices, including those concerning skill development. At supplier firms,
the level of skills largely determines the patterns of employment practices. The recent
transformations in the industry have resulted in a considerable upward shift in the general
skill levels and in increased demand for skilled and managerial workers even among small
" Interviews with TI, T9, T10, T14, T17, T18, T20, in April 1997.
38 Interview with T9, in April 1997.
39 Interviews with M18, T13, T15, T16, in March 1997.
4 Interviews with M2, T10, T12, T13, T14, T19, T23, in March and April 1997.
41 Interview with T23, in April 1997.
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suppliers. At the same time, while on-the-job training remains a dominant method of skill
development for workers at small suppliers, general education, particularly post-secondary
industrial training at ITIs, has become increasingly important to acquire basic technical
knowledge to enter a production job even at small suppliers.
4.3.2 The Changing Patterns of Skill Acquisition and Development
This subsection explores where and how different types of skills are acquired and
developed at small suppliers and why the demand for skills has increased among suppliers
in the 1990s, as seen in the previous section.
1) Managerial Skills
Traditionally, many suppliers, particularly small firms, are family-owned and
managed by the owner who started the enterprise. Many of these small owners used to
work at firms producing tractors, such as Eicher, as skilled workers before they established
their firms.
As discussed earlier, professional managerial skills have become more important
even among small firms in recent years, as indicated by an increased demand for educated
and qualified managerial workers, particularly in the areas of production control, quality
assurance, and maintenance. Moreover, a growing number of employers, particularly
among young well-educated entrepreneurs, started gaining managerial skills through
outside industrial associations, particularly the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and
the Automotive Component Manufacturers' Association (ACMA). These organizations
have recently played an important role in disseminating such management techniques
among Indian entrepreneurs and managers through their training activities.42 This
industry-wide diffusion of knowledge and values has played an important role in changing
42 For example, M1, M3, M4, M6, M11, M18, T16, and T18.
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the perceptions of entrepreneurs and managers about what changes are required to improve
their business.
Moreover, several entrepreneurs have participated in management training courses
organized by AOTS in Japan (see Appendix 3.3 in Chapter 3). They paid half of their air
tickets, and AOTS bore the rest of the costs, including boarding and lodging. During these
courses, they learned the Japanese production systems, particularly such areas as
production control, quality control, inventory systems, and other management techniques,
and were assigned to Japanese firms that produce similar products to theirs to observe the
Japanese shop-floor practices. This experience has helped them change their perception
about how to run their business. For example, two young owners (brothers) of a small
supplier in Faridabad introduced a training program in their firm upon their return from
Japan. Before going to Japan, they had thought that small firms like theirs would not need,
and could not afford, to conduct training programs for employees. But in Japan they
observed that even small firms with only five employees had regular training programs.
This experience literally opened their eyes. A young owner of another firn in Pune also
participated in a similar course organized by AOTS in Tokyo. Upon his return, he changed
the production process and the layout of his factory. He installed a new floor which was
much safer and easier to clean than his earlier floor, placed a yellow line on the floor
following the flow of production lines to better organize the flow of materials and workers
on the shop floor, and introduced a color-coding scheme to more easily identify each item
according to the stage in each process. These changes have significantly improved the
efficiency of the operation and reduced the wastage and rework, thus improving
productivity.
Young managers, often sons of owners of SSI firms, actively participate in
activities organized by AOTS's alumni organizations set up in several cities in India, such
as Delhi, Pune, Faridabad, Bangalore, and Madras. They voluntarily organize seminars
and workshops for local young managers on new management techniques, such as kaizen,
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"5S," and quality control, developing a new form of horizontal networks among small
firms to facilitate the diffusion of information, knowledge, and management techniques,
and thus developing managerial skills among them.4 3
In addition, other region-specific horizontal networks among entrepreneurs and
managers, such as the Maratha Chamber of Commerce in Pune and the Faridabad Small-
Scale Industry Association (FSSIA), have recently started organizing seminars and training
programs for their members in each region, thus serving as an increasingly effective forum
for diffusing new knowledge, skills, and values. When asked, many respondents
maintained that such organizations were a major source of new knowledge and
management practices, particularly those pertaining to quality improvement.4 4
Interestingly, organizational change appears to occur faster among firms whose
owners (and their sons) are exposed to production processes in Japan, either in their
foreign partnerships or through AOTS training. In fact, these firms whose owners have
had some overseas exposure most actively introduced formal training programs for
workers in their own firms as well. Indeed, perceptional changes among entrepreneurs and
managers have also had a large impact on the patterns of skill development for workers.
For example, a managing director of a small supplier in Faridabad attended a training
course on ISO 9000, organized by CII, in 1993 for the first time. His increased quality
consciousness led him to introduce training programs for workers at his firm, which in turn
resulted in a marked increase in sales (more than doubled between 1990-91 and 1995-96)
and improvement in product quality and in productivity. Therefore, once again, industrial
associations such as CII and ACMA and training intermediaries such as AOTS have played
a critical role in diffusing information, knowledge, and ideas throughout the industry,
particularly those concerning quality improvement, and creating an organizational
environment conducive to industry-wide learning.
4 For example, M23.
I For example, T5, T 11, T12, and T14.
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2) Engineering Skills
Table 4.4 is a summary of the responses from the 50 sample suppliers to the
question as to where their employees mainly acquired their skills. As Table 4.4 shows,
engineers in suppliers mainly acquire their skills through schooling or on the job.
Table 4.4: Where Did Employees Acquire Their Skills?
Responses from 50 Sample First-tier Suppliers
(Number of firms)
Supervisors Engineers / Technicians Production Workers
a. Higher level education
(e.g., degree / diploma 10 15 0
from engineering
college)
b. Technical / vocational
schools (ITIs) 7 10 19
c. Apprenticeship 1 1 3
d. In-house off-the-job 1 0 1
training
e. In-house on-the-job
training (from 20 14 31
supervisors/ senior
workers/ managers)
f. Informal learning from 1 1 3
co-workers
g. From magazines and 0 0 0
other publications
h. Through previous 14 15 22
work at another firm
i. From friends 0 0 0
j. From family or 0 0 0
relatives
k. From vendors of 0 0 0
machinery/ tools
Notes: As multiple answers were permitted, the total number of an
respondent firms.
Source: The results of my questionnaire survey conducted in 1997.
swers does not equal the total number of
Reflecting small suppliers' relatively low engineering capabilities, very few have
their own R&D facilities. Their product development capabilities are low, as they produce
products based on the drawings and samples provided by their customers. While many of
the sample firms did have simple testing facilities, they rarely used them until the mid-
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1990s. The development of engineering skills among small suppliers still appears to be
slow.
Prior to the entry of Maruti in India, reflecting the prevalent "arm's length" supplier
relations, Indian vehicle manufacturers rarely deputed their engineers to suppliers. But
Maruti started sending its engineers to its key suppliers in joint ventures with Maruti for an
extensive period of time. One Maruti engineer I interviewed was sent to a supplier for the
initial three years soon after the supplier was established, to provide technical assistance to
the firn. The engineer apparently served as an effective interface between Maruti and the
key supplier, as he went back and forth daily between the two firms, carrying problems in
his hand one way and their solutions on the way back. As the supplier was located in the
same premises as Maruti's main plant, this intimate feedback mechanism through the
Maruti engineer worked smoothly and quickly, and was thus effective. Maruti does not
depute but frequently sends its engineers to other suppliers to provide technical assistance,
as discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
Telco too, despite its traditional "arm's length" supplier relations, had had some
close interactions with its suppliers in the area of parts development, even before it
drastically changed its supplier relations in 1997: Telco's Ancillary Development
Department works closely with suppliers to develop parts, until they can produce such
parts on their own on a commercial basis. Then, Telco's Purchase Department deals with
such suppliers through its bidding process. Therefore, both Maruti and Telco in effect
show that vertical inter-firm linkages have helped suppliers develop their engineering skills.
Overseas training opportunities for engineers at suppliers are limited. Among the
50 sample suppliers, only a few, especially those in joint ventures with Japanese
component manufacturers, have sent their engineers to Japan for training.
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3) Production Skills
Production skills are mostly acquired through on-the-job training, especially as
many production workers do not have technical training at ITIs and other training
institutions before they begin their jobs. Employers do welcome those who have already
acquired necessary skills through their previous jobs. When they require skills that are not
available elsewhere, they mostly rely on in-firm on-the-job training to develop their
workers' skills. Interestingly, first-tier suppliers define production skills differently among
themselves, reflecting their diverse product range and equally diverse production
processes. Even small firms have their own norms regarding what it takes for workers to
become skilled, informally defined not by years of schooling but by the experience required
to perform certain tasks. For example, in a small firm producing 50 different items,
production processes are flexible, as the firm has to change jigs and dies frequently
according to the orders from customers. Thus, new workers in its press shop need to
become familiar with all 50 items, which usually takes two months. Workers gradually
learn when and how they load dies, change them according to the line shift, and make
adjustment. They learn in progression how to operate machines and understand the nature
of products and of materials.
Typically, however, helpers learn the basic nature of work while performing their
simple tasks. Many firms find no need to train helpers, thus leaving them outside the scope
of even on-the-job training. Only occasionally, those helpers who perform well are
gradually paired up with more experienced workers for on-the-job training to prepare them
to become regular production workers.
The recent rapid transformations in the industry have resulted in two concomitant
patterns of skill acquisition; an increasing reliance on standardized vocational training,
especially at ITIs, to acquire basic skills, and traditional experience-based on-the-job
acquisition of craft skills. Until recently, firms generally preferred to recruit those who had
already acquired necessary skills through previous work; now, however, more firms prefer
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to recruit fresh graduates from ITIs (see Table 4.4).45 Indeed, the ITI training has
increasingly become a minimum qualification for entry into production jobs at these
suppliers. This does not undermine the importance of on-the-job training, however; as an
owner of a small firm admitted, "those ITI graduates cannot perform our kind of jobs right
away"; they still need to acquire firm-specific skills through their jobs.
On the other hand, despite rapid automation in the workplace, craft skills such as
die making are still in high demand, as most Indian suppliers have their own tool rooms in
their workshops. Because the development of such craft skills requires long years of
experience, firms keep such highly skilled workers, who are often not educated and are
older than other workers, by paying special skill premiums.
Few small firms conduct their own apprenticeship programs,4 6 as it is costly to do
so. Even in the cases where supplier firms do accept apprentices, the rate of retention is
low. After the apprenticeship, trainees often look for jobs elsewhere. But, they do accept
apprentices trained by their customers such as Maruti and Telco, thus saving the costs of
training they would have incurred otherwise.
4.3.3 Changes in Work Organization
Not only did Maruti adopt a number of Japanese work organization practices within
the firm (see Chapter 3), but it also served as a model for diffusing such practices
throughout the industry, and in particular among its suppliers. Table 4.5 compares the
degree of introduction of some of the lean production techniques among Maruti suppliers
and Telco suppliers. Clearly, the diffusion of new work organizations with emphasis on
team work and quality consciousness occurred much faster among Maruti's local suppliers
than Telco's local suppliers, except for the practices of rotation and multi-skilling,
suggesting the role of vertical inter-firm linkages in the diffusion. The adoption of such
4 Interviews with M12, M14, M22, T1, T5, T7, T10, to name a few.
* For details of the Indian statutory apprenticeship scheme, see Chapter 3.
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new techniques and practices was also common among those firms which supply both
Maruti and Telco; these are mainly large firms, some of which are themselves FDI-related.
On the other hand, large FDI-related suppliers, such as Denso India, which is a key
member firm in the Toyota group in Japan and one of the largest component suppliers in
the world, are more influenced by their parent company than by local customers in shaping
production processes. In fact, Denso is the only firm in India which has introduced Hourly
Outputs Control Panels, a management tool to improve per-hour productivity for each line;
even in Japan, this technique is used only by Toyota group firms."
Table 4.5: Adoption of New Management Techniques and Practices:
Maruti and Telco First-tier Suppliers
QC circle Suggestion Multi-skilling/ ISO 9000
Scheme Rotation Certification
Suppliers with FDI 5 4 7 7
(n= 11)
Suppliers without 6 7 17 15
FDI (n=36) 
_
Suppliers to 5 5 9 9
Maruti (n=18)
Suppliers to Telco 0 1 11 4
(n=18)
Suppliers to both
Maruti and Telco 6 6 4 9
(n= 11)
Total (n-47) 11 12 24 22
Source: Calculated from the results of my questionnaire survey.
However, a closer examination reveals that in the process of diffusion, because of
such prevailing social institutions as the caste system and labor relations, such practices
have been modified into something different from what was originally intended. For
instance, many suppliers have introduced QC circles, originally designed to promote
workers' participation in quality and productivity improvement efforts, only for managers
and staff (indirect workers), without involving the production workers on the shop floor.
Therefore, unlike the Japanese model, these organizational changes have not really led to
decentralization of decision-making on the shop floor at first-tier suppliers.
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4.3.4 Growing Formalization of Training Programs at Suppliers
In recent years, many Indian suppliers have increasingly adopted formal training
programs. Of the 50 suppliers I interviewed, 31 now have regular training programs for
their employees; many have introduced them only since 1993, as a totally new activity."
Some firms have even developed an annual training plan for each employee, based on the
individual's training needs defined by the individual, his supervisor, and the manager of
the department. Many firms have also introduced induction training for new entrants in
recent years. This move toward formalizing the in-firm training among suppliers is a new
phenomenon in India. For example, even a large firm with a total of nearly 1,800
employees set up its human resources development (HRD) department and started formal
training programs for production workers only in 1996, after more than fifty years of
operation. However, many firms' training programs cover only managers, indirect
workers and supervisors, and often exclude production workers.
Like Maruti (see Chapter 3), some firms with FDI use direct interactions and
exchanges with their foreign partners, including visits to their foreign plants to provide
their employees with instant exposure to foreign practices. One such firm sent its new
workers to Japan for training at the initial stage of operation. Another firm sends its HRD
manager to the U.S. and supervisors to its Japanese joint-venture partner for training. An
FDI-affiliated wiring harness manufacturer sends 50 employees a year, including 35 female
workers, several supervisors and engineers, to its Japanese joint-venture partner, for three-
month on-the-job training. Trainees commonly learn foreign technologies, production
systems, teamwork, and problem-solving techniques, and inventory systems in foreign
plants. As at Maruti, workers bank their salaries during their overseas training, while they
also receive stipends from the firm's Japanese partner. While such overseas training
occurs more commonly among FDI-affiliated firms, the ownership does not necessarily
" My interviews with a joint managing director of Maruti and managers of Denso India, in May 1997.
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determine the amount of in-firm training. Some FDI-affiliated firms, such as Denso,
conduct little training except for the introduction of QC circles.
Table 4.6 summarizes the frequency of responses regarding the subjects covered by
in-firm training among three groups of suppliers: those supplying both Maruti and Telco,
those supplying Maruti, and those supplying Telco. Although the sample size is small,
Table 4.6 still indicates some interesting trends. First, the firms supplying both Maruti and
Telco, which are mostly large, generally conduct training in various subjects, particularly
those concerning health and safety, quality improvement, and problem-solving techniques.
Second, Maruti suppliers conduct more training in most areas than Telco suppliers, except
for training in new technologies. In particular, the difference in interests between the two
groups is most apparent in such subject areas as statistical process control, quality
improvement, communication and personal skills, team building, problem-solving
techniques, and QC circle activities. Interestingly, these trends reflect the different focus of
training between Maruti and Telco; Maruti mainly focuses on quality improvement,
problem-solving, and interpersonal skills for improving production capabilities, while
Telco focuses more on improving technical skills and learning about new technology (see
Chapter 3). This suggests the considerable influence of their customers' orientation toward
strategic areas over learning at their suppliers. Also, there is a clear shift in the focus of in-
firm training toward the improvement of product and process quality and greater efficiency,
suggesting considerable changes in the nature of skills required by suppliers.
4 These firms include M5, TI, T3, T5, T16, T19, T20, to name a few.
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Table 4.6: Subjects Covered by In-firm Training: Selected Suppliers (By Group): 1997(Freque cy of Responses)
Suppliers to both Suppliers to Maruti Suppliers to Telco
Maruti and Telco (n = 17) (n = 18)
(n = 11) _
On-the- Off-the- On-the- Off-the- On-the- Off-the-
job job job job job job
Subjects training training training training training training
1. Safety and health
91% 45% 53% 47% 33% 28%
2. Technical skills upgradation
or refreshing 64% 45% 71% 35% 61% 28%
3. Knowledge about new
technology 36% 9% 24% 29% 33% 11%
4. Statistical process control
55% 73% 35% 18% 17% 11%
5. Basic mathematics
0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 6%
6. Quality improvement
82% 82% 65% 53% 39% 28%
7. Communication &
interpersonal skills 18% 18% 29% 29% 6% 17%
8. Time management
27% 27% 24% 6% 6% 6%
9. Information management
36% 36% 6% 6% 0% 0%
10. Team building
55% 27% 35% 35% 17% 17%
11. Problem solving
techniques 64% 55% 29% 6% 17% 17%
12. QC circle activities
45% 55% 29% 18% 0% 0%
13. ISO 9000
18% 36% 12% 6% 17% 0%
14. About company policy/
goals 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 6%
15. Cleanliness/ housekeeping
9% 9% 24% 18% 0% 0%
Source: My questionnaire survey conducted in 1997.
4.4 What Motivates Firms to Foster
Demand-Driven Learning Chains
Skill Development? :
Why have supplier firms started requiring better-educated workers and introducing
more in-firm training in recent years? Many factors explain this upward trend toward skill
development among suppliers. Table 4.7 summarizes the responses of the sample
suppliers.
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Table 4.7: Reasons for the Introduction of and Increases in In-firm Training:
Frequency of Responses from the Sample Suppliers (1997)
Suppliers to Suppliers to Suppliers to
both Maruti and Maruti Telco
Telco (n= 17) (n= 18)
(n= 11)
a. A need to improve productivity 4 9 8
b. An increase in exports 1 2 2
c. Suggested by export agents 0 0
d. An interest in improving quality/ increased 8 13 11
quality consciousness I
e. Guidance from government/ government agencies 0 0 1
f. Guidance from foreign collaborators 3 2 1
g. Guidance from business associations 3 8 4
h. Guidance /demand from customers * 6 14 9
i. Workers' interests in training 4 8 3
j. Pressures from unions 0 0 0
k. Interests in creating better work culture ** 0 2 1
1. Reduce costs ** 1 3 2
m. Increased computerization ** 0 0 3
n. Technological change /upgradation ** 1 2 4
Notes: Multiple answers were permitted, so that the total number of answers does not equal the total
number of firms in each category. However, some firms did not reply, as they did not introduce or upgrade
their training activities (3 Maruti suppliers, 5 Telco suppliers); * includes variants of answers such as
customer satisfaction; to gain confidence of customers; interested in becoming core suppliers. **
respondents raised these as reasons other than those covered in A through J. Thus, the number of answers
might be higher if these items were pre-given.
Clearly, for all three groups, two linked factors most clearly motivated supplier
firms to promote skill development: their interest in improving quality, and pressure from
their customers. As a Maruti supplier put it, "complaints from Maruti were a main
motivation to improve quality."49
Many firms explain the reasons for their increased quality consciousness. Since the
introduction of the liberalization policy in 1991, competition in the industry became intense,
which forced firms to reduce costs and improve productivity.50 Because of this intensified
competition and technological change, "firms today require better workers, and therefore
need to improve the quality of workers."" Others put it, "If we want to survive, we have
49 Interviews with Maruti suppliers (M10), in March 1997.
50 Interviews with M5, T12, in March 1997.
" Interviews with M6, T6, and T11, in March 1997.
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to do training."" The rapid recent transformations within vehicle manufacturers have
clearly been translated into suppliers' strategies for organizational change. Another firm
noted, "As our customers' awareness has improved, they now want us to upgrade our
training. We now require better machines, better procedures, new layout, new testing
equipment, more housekeeping, and improved quality."53
In addition, many suppliers became motivated to accelerate in-firm training to
reduce costs and improve productivity (see Table 4.6). Indeed, some firms attributed their
recent productivity increase to the introduction of in-firm training and its resulting
improvement in attendance and/or reduction in waste and defects.54 Other firms, however,
indicated no interest in improving productivity, as the delivery schedules set by their
customers determines their productivity in terms of output per hour.
Behind all these factors, one strong driving force for the recent introduction of
training programs among supplier fins was their interest in obtaining ISO9000/ IS09002
certificates, required by both Maruti and Telco. This requirement has actually forced
suppliers to implement training programs, one on a long list of items that firms needed to
comply with for obtaining the ISO certification. As one supplier put it, "ISO is the most
important determinant for our introduction of training."55 Clearly, pressures from their
customers have induced an unusually high momentum for introducing organizational
innovation, including training among suppliers.
Indeed, many firms I interviewed have conducted special training programs
specifically designed for ISO certification, often hiring a special consultant as a trainer,
since the mid-1990s.5 6 While most firms have allocated 0.5% to 1% of sales turnover to
training activities in recent years, some report a phenomenal rise in their training costs,
ranging from Rs.400, 000 to Rs.5 million in 1996, 10 times more than they spent in
52 Interviews with T3, T12, in March 1997.
* Interview with T15 in April 1997.
" For example, M5, M23, T23.
" Interview with M18, in March 1997.
56 For example, these firms include T5, T16, T19.
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1995." In fact, many firms noted that a large portion of training costs are spent on paying
those consultants specially hired to introduce Statistical Process Control (SPC), TQM, and
ISO. Many firms are concerned about whether it is worth spending so much on training,
but they do so, because it is what "everyone is doing." Thus, new ideas, techniques, and
practices are being rapidly diffused throughout the automobile industry, even among small
firms. Suppliers' decisions to introduce such new ideas and practices are not necessarily
based on their profit-maximizing interests. Rather, they are motivated by the industry-wide
dissemination of new norms and values through increasingly standardized training
programs conducted by their customers and independent consultants.58
As the process of ISO certification entails a detailed sequence of standardized
organizational reforms involving virtually every aspect of their production activities, the
requirement of obtaining ISO certificates has effectively forced suppliers to adopt these
procedures as an institutional form. Suppliers' adherence to the principles of ISO has in
turn become institutionalized as a norm. This new norm has rapidly been diffused
throughout the industry in response to a rapidly changing institutional environment.59
Because the ISO certificates also serve as a status symbol of good quality and as a ticket for
gaining credibility from customers, this process of institutionalization was also legitimized
among supplier firms fairly quickly. This process of diffusion among suppliers has also
helped change their perception of production management from ex-post "inspection" to ex-
ante "prevention" with greater focus on quality improvement embedded in the production
processes, as discussed in the next section.
While neither Maruti nor Telco directly requires their suppliers to undergo
organizational reforms in the areas of work organization and training, their indirect
influences are still strong. Even though many suppliers have multiple customers, only
Maruti and Telco, among many vehicle manufacturers, impose strict quality standards on
57 For example, these firms include M2, T5, T16.
58 For the theoretical constructs of such institutional isomorphism, see Powell and DiMaggio (1990).
59 See Powell and DiMaggio (1990) for theoretical constructs of institutional isomorphism.
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them. For example, several Telco suppliers noted that although Telco never conducted
training for suppliers until recently, its auditing focuses on various areas for improvement,
and the feedback from Telco they received through the auditing prompted them to introduce
training activities." Many firms admitted that Maruti and Telco had implicitly threatened to
terminate business unless they improved their quality standards.6
Not only "threats" but also "rewards" motivate suppliers to improve their
performance; Maruti gives annual performance awards to the best performing suppliers
each year at an annual convention, inviting all its suppliers. The criteria for award selection
include 1) delivery schedules; 2) quality; 3) prices; 4) loyalty; 5) maintenance; and 6)
rejection rates. While some suppliers also recognize the importance of the ISO certification
for the firms' international recognition and global market access in the long run, their main
motive still is to satisfy their customers' demands. Clearly, an increased demand for
quality improvement from the customers has induced the current acceleration of skill
development among suppliers.
With respect to the relationship between technological change and skill development
at suppliers, their responses were mixed. Some firms cited the increased use of computers
in the workplace, such as the introduction of CAD, and thus the growing need to
familiarize workers with computers, as an important factor in increasing training
activities. 62 One firm noted that 60% of its employees, including production workers, are
now computer literate.63 Some finns even sent their employees to outside training
institutes or brought in specialized trainers to conduct computer training. The increased
computerization has improved the performance of suppliers in such areas as inspection and
quality control, thus allowing them to attain higher process control, in adherence to the
principles underlying the QS certification.64 In other words, the recent accelerated
6 For example, T19.
61 For example, M13, T16.
62 For example, T4.
63 Interview with T20, in March 1997.
" Interviews with T5, T20.
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computerization is also part of suppliers' efforts to obtain the certificate required by their
customers.
Unions played a very small role, if any, in promoting skill development at
suppliers, as their interests largely remained in the issues of compensation and working
conditions. Many firms noted, however, that while workers were initially not interested in
ongoing organizational changes within the firm, including the introduction of training, they
gradually started showing an interest, as they started seeing the positive effects on them, in
terms of wage increases because of sales growth.
Further, as discussed earlier, some firms, particularly small ones, noted that the
management's exposure to Japanese production practices had an eye-opening effect,
leading them to introduce in-firn training upon their return from Japan. As discussed in
Chapter 3, intermediary training organizations such as AOTS played an important role in
disseminating knowledge, ideas, and managerial techniques that value quality. Several
owners of small firms without foreign collaboration noted that their own "learning" in the
form of direct exposure to the Japanese production systems during their visits to Japanese
suppliers as part of AOTS training programs had a tremendous effect on their perceptions
of running business.
4.5 The Role of Inter-firm Linkages
The previous sections pointed to the important role that the demand, pressures, and
guidance from customers have played in changing the attitudes of suppliers toward skill
development. This section analyzes the nature of interactions between Maruti and Telco
and their respective suppliers, to reveal the role of inter-firm linkages in shaping the
patterns of skill development at suppliers.
Building on Lall's work (1985b) on backward linkages in the Indian commercial
vehicle industry, this section analyzes the nature of linkages between Maruti and Telco,
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and their respective suppliers, as they relate most directly to skill development at supplier
firms.65 Such linkages may take four different but interconnected forms: 1) direct
interaction between employees of customers and suppliers; 2) activities for information
sharing with suppliers; 3) the enforcement of quality standards that require suppliers'
efforts to promote organizational innovation and improvement; and 4) spillovers, when
customers' employees move to suppliers. In what follows, I examine each of these forms
of inter-firm linkages that Maruti and Telco forged with their respective suppliers.
4.5.1 Direct Interaction
Maruti has seven Vendor Development Departments in its Materials I and Materials
II Divisions. Four Departments in the Materials I Division, staffed by 90 engineers and
technicians, are responsible for supplier development, while three departments in the
Materials II Division deal with the purchase of raw materials, consumables, and tools, and
handles matters related to excise, shipping, transportation, and inventory of components.
Each department is responsible for a fixed group of suppliers according to their product
line. The Vendor Development I Department, the largest of the four departments in
Materials I, looks after Maruti's dedicated suppliers, particularly those in joint venture with
Maruti, such as Asahi Glass India, Bharat Seats, and Sona Steering. The Vendor
Development II Department looks after suppliers of transmission components, while the
Vendor Development III and IV Departments are responsible for suppliers producing
engine and other components respectively. As in the case of Japanese auto assemblers
65 A study by Lall (1985b), comparing the nature of backward linkages of Telco and Ashok Layland in the
1970s, identified ten kinds of backward linkages: 1) establishment; 2) locational; 3) informational; 4)
technical; 5) financial; 6) raw material procurement; 7) managerial; 8) pricing; 9) distributional; and 10)
diversification. Of these, I focus here on 3) informational; 4) technical; and 7) managerial linkages, as these
are perhaps most directly related to inter-firm skill development and transfer. Informational linkage refers to
placing orders for specified periods to facilitate current production planning, and communication of long-
term plans to facilitate investment planning. Technical linkage refers to the provision of technical
assistance or exchange of technical information, to ensure the precise matching of needs with supplies, to
provide for adequate quality, and to facilitate innovation. Managerial linkage refers to providing training and
other help with management and organization, to improve the supplier's performance (Lall 1985b: 269-
270).
204
(Nishiguchi 1994, Fujimoto 1997), these departments work closely with their assigned
suppliers, providing them with technical assistance, evaluating their products and
performance, and jointly solving problems that suppliers encounter. Most suppliers receive
the drawings from Maruti, indicating the generally low levels of supplier involvement in
their own product design development. As noted earlier, engineers from these departments
frequently interact with the suppliers.66 Many Maruti suppliers note that engineers come
from Maruti much more frequently than from other customers. As most suppliers are
located in proximity to Maruti, the costs of such frequent monitoring are kept relatively
low.
Such technical guidance by Maruti engineers occurs in various forms (see Table 4.7
below) and covers a wide range of areas, from product quality to plant layouts, procedures,
and housekeeping, with great emphasis on improving quality and reducing rejections,
waste, and costs. Some suppliers note that they have received detailed technical guidance
on tooling, assembly processes, and welding techniques. For example, one Maruti
supplier explained, "Our rejection rate was very high. Maruti taught us how to curtail the
rejection, by improving housekeeping and changing the layout of both office and factory
spaces." 67 Another firm noted that Maruti found its die-casting workshop very stuffy and
thus suggested how to improve the layout. Table 4.8 summarizes responses of the sample
suppliers about what forms of guidance and/or pressures they have received from their
customers.
Moreover, a group of Japanese engineers sent from Suzuki visit Maruti suppliers
periodically; they make extremely detailed suggestions on specific areas for improvement.
For example, a Suzuki engineer, during his visit to a small supplier in Faridabad,
suggested that the firm should replace wooden storage cartons with plastic ones, which are
more durable, easy to handle and clean, thus reducing wastes and time spent on reworking.
* This frequent face-to-face interaction with suppliers is also considered a characteristic of the Japanese
model of supplier relations (Fujimoto 1997).
67 Interview with M5, in April 1997.
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Clearly, Maruti's supplier relations follow the model of lean production (Womack et al.
1990: 146-153) with great emphasis on "inter-firm collaborative problem-solving"
(Nishiguchi 1994).
Table 4.8: What forms of guidance and/or pressures do you receive from your customers?:
Frequency of Responses from the Sample Suppliers
(No. of firms)
Suppliers to Suppliers to Suppliers to
both Maruti and Maruti Telco
Telco (n= 17) (n= 18)
(n= 10)
A. Guidelines 2 11 9
B. Distribution of training manuals/modules/ 3 9 5
materials
C. Providing trainers 4 7 6
D. Verbal discussions 5 12 9
E. Threats to terminate business 0 8 5
F. Performance/quality evaluation ranking 7 13 9
G. Awards/prizes 2 ** 5** 0
H. Financial assistance for training activities 0 1* 1
Notes: As multiple answers were permitted, the total number of responses is not equal to the total number
of firms that answered. Some firms (1 Maruti supplier and 3 Telco suppliers; 1 firm supplying both
Maruti and Telco) did not introduce or upgrade their training activities; their responses were "not
applicable," and thus not included here. * not Maruti but TEF and Escort. ** Three firms note that while
there are no awards for promoting training, Maruti provides performance awards (M16).
Sources: Questionnaire survey conducted by the author.
In addition to technical support, Maruti also provides its suppliers with financial
support in the form of on-time payment. Suppliers receive payment from Maruti within 15
days after the delivery of goods, which helps them, particularly the small firms, to gain
some financial stability, as they are often short of working capital and lack access to
credit.68 In return for the on-time payment, however, Maruti takes 1% as a commission.
This new financial stability due to Maruti's on-time payment has in turn helped develop
confidence among suppliers. This "trust" relationship between Maruti and its suppliers did
not exist at the earlier stage, however: many suppliers were skeptical about working with
Maruti, then a state-owned enterprise, because of the deeply-rooted stigma among Indians
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against state enterprises as inefficient and corrupt. Thus, contrary to the embeddedness
argument (Granovetter 1985) that such inter-firm relationships are embedded in the
prevailing social relations, Maruti actually has worked hard to win trust among its
suppliers, by instituting clear, transparent "rules of the game" in its business with its
suppliers, and thus building a reciprocal relationship with them.
Telco, on the other hand, despite its traditional "arm's length" contractual
relationship with its suppliers, has developed various forms of linkages with them. Its
different departments were involved in supplier development, without much overall
coordination among them. Telco's Ancillary Development Department has been
responsible for locating and developing new suppliers up to the stage of placing orders
(Lall 1985b: 279). Its Quality Control Departments monitor the quality of purchases and
evaluate the performance of suppliers, while the Purchase Department actually places
orders based on competitive bidding and controls delivery schedules. Meanwhile, the
Product Development Departments worked with Telco suppliers in developing new
components, by working out the precise specifications for each supplier and advising on
tooling-up for production (Lall 1985b: 280).
Until recently, however, Telco's supplier management had largely been confined
only to inspection and instruction regarding the use of gauges, other than earlier joint
prototype development of certain components before their commercial production. As a
Telco manager described, "Telco gives drawings to suppliers, and they in turn give
components to Telco. If products are not satisfactory, we simply go to another supplier.
We were meeting as a stranger with our suppliers. Our relationship has been businesslike,
not like family or relatives on both sides."69 Thus, as in the Fordist model of supplier
68 This arrangement is rather unusual, as large firms in india typically pay their subcontractors four to six
weeks, and sometimes even six months after the delivery, causing serious shortages in working capital
(Hesp 1996).
69 Interview with a Telco manager in Material Division, in March 1997.
207
relations,7" Telco offered little help to its suppliers in solving their problems, either
technical or financial.
In 1997, Telco drastically changed its supplier relations, however, from "arm's
length" to longer-term, closer ones, as part of Telco's strategic move to enter the passenger
car market amidst ever-intensifying competition in the Indian car market with the entry of
many global players (see Chapter 2). The new competitive environment has posed Telco a
set of new challenges: global quality, attractive price, after services, available spare parts,
and cost competitiveness. Such new challenges made Telco acutely aware that to compete
in the global market without its global "brand name," it would need to achieve the same
quality standard as those of the global players. This meant an enormous need to improve
the performance of suppliers, forcing Telco to drastically change its supplier relations.
This change has in turn involved a considerable internal restructuring, altering the division
of labor among its departments concerning supplier development. Under the new
arrangement, when Telco develops a new product, its Planning Department and Ancillary
Development Department jointly decide whether to "make or buy" each component. Based
on the bought-out component list, the Ancillary Development Department supports
suppliers in the areas of quality, costs, and delivery requirements. The department also
works with suppliers on the drawings and specifications of components. If suppliers have
any difficulty in proceeding independently with the production of parts based on the
drawings, Telco sends its engineers to work on the production process, machine
engineering, and quality control, to guide suppliers. Suppliers in turn must strictly meet its
quality, volume, and schedule requirements. Telco now evaluates its suppliers on the basis
of their meeting and reducing the lead time and meeting target costs.
Moreover, in 1997, the process of mutual learning between Telco and its suppliers
intensified further, as Telco started a new practice. The firm started visiting its suppliers to
70 On the comparison between the Fordist model of supplier relations and the "lean" production model of
supplier relations, see Womack et al. 1990.
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assess their production processes, training needs, and types of knowledge required,
through three new schemes: a supplier assessment and orientation, supplier self-evaluation
questionnaires, and a quality system survey. Based on the assessment, Telco selected its
best commercial vehicle suppliers to work for its new small car project.
Further, in 1997, Telco also set up a new special unit, the Supplier Quality
Improvement Program (SQIP) unit, to strengthen the capability of its suppliers and
improve the quality of their products. The SQIP comprises 32 young and motivated
engineers gathered from various departments. The manager of the SQIP first trained these
engineers on the method for supplier assessment and how to conduct the quality system
survey. Then, the 16 paired engineers were assigned to 4 suppliers selected for Telco's
small car project, to train them in specific areas such as the statistical process control (SPC)
and the use of gauges and calibrators. Some of them are deputed to their assigned
suppliers on a short-term basis to accelerate the process of knowledge and skill transfer.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Telco (Pune) also plans to reduce the number of its first-tier
suppliers from 1,200 to 500 in the next few years, and to consolidate its supplier base by
adopting a policy of double sourcing per item (from the previous three or four sources per
item).
Taken together, Telco has responded to a new institutional environment in terms of
the rapid transformations in the industry, by redefining not only the division of labor but
also the quality of the relationship with its suppliers, with a considerable shift in focus from
the inspection of products to the control of process." This in turn induced a great deal of
learning on the part of suppliers; one Telco supplier noted that this new relationship with
Telco forced the firm to work on redesigning and reengineering, including die designs to
" Interestingly, Telco's model for change was not Maruti or other foreign newcomers in India but its sister
company, Tata Cummins (a joint venture between the Tata Industries and Cummins in the U.S.), which
also started changing its supplier relations in recent years, following the practice of Cummins. A senior
manager in charge of Telco's SQIP was trained at Cummins in the U.S., which provided a basis for his
initiatives in reforming Telco's supplier relations.
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conform to Telco's new quality standards. The firm's manager commented, "what was
accepted two years ago is no longer acceptable today."72
Like Maruti, Telco provides detailed drawings to most of its suppliers. But Telco's
Engineering Research Center, an R&D facility (see Chapter 3), recently started developing
its products through "simultaneous engineering" jointly with its suppliers, especially for
prototype and design development." Where Telco's own technological base is sound,
however, it usually does not involve its suppliers in developing technological capabilities.
Telco does not charge its suppliers for its technological support, except for the costs of
tools that Telco develops for suppliers' use, as the firm considers it to be "creating assets
which will be useful to Telco in the future."74
4.5.2 Information Sharing
Apart from direct interactions with individual suppliers, Maruti has developed
various ways of sharing information with its suppliers. To speed up information
dissemination between the firm and its suppliers, Maruti has connected its suppliers on-line
to ensure accurate information from them as to inventory and delivery schedules; it also
plans to communicate with them through the internet for more comprehensive supplier
management.
Maruti also organizes various kinds of training for managers from supplier firms to
diffuse knowledge among them, particularly in the areas of quality control, particularly ISO
9000, statistical process control, and process auditing systems. In addition, Maruti has
also encouraged its suppliers to participate in training seminars organized by industrial
associations such as CII and ACMA, and management training programs organized by
AOTS, though suppliers have to bear the costs of these activities.
72 Interview with T15, in March 1997.
" When Telco engages its suppliers in joint product development, there is an implicit agreement that
suppliers cannot sell products to other auto makers (Interview with a senior manager, Telco's Materials
Division, in August 1998).
7 Interview with a senior manager, Telco's Material Division (Pune), in August 1998.
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Telco, on the other hand, reflecting its "arm's length" relationship with suppliers,
has not been active in organizing activities for suppliers. Telco started conducting training
for suppliers only in 1997, though still on a limited scale.
Both Maruti and Telco distribute some manuals on quality improvement,
specification, and cleanliness, thus diffusing knowledge and standardizing expected
procedures and performance among suppliers. Such manuals focus on 1) the improvement
of quality; 2) in-time delivery; 3) on-time schedules; 4) right materials; 5) right timing; and
6) proper dispatch and packing. The formalization of training for suppliers serves as an
effective way to communicate with them and diffuse new knowledge, norms, and values
among suppliers. These efforts have helped not only to improve the performance of
suppliers but also to strengthen the supplier relations.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, Maruti involves selected suppliers, particularly
those in joint ventures with Maruti, for joint product development, often considered a
characteristic of the Japanese supplier relations. However, the majority of small suppliers
receive the detailed drawings from Maruti and are not involved in joint product
development. In this sense, Maruti's supplier relations are not as decentralized as the
Japanese model, with limited autonomy on the part of suppliers.
4.5.3 Setting and Enforcing Quality Standards
Maruti has taken various measures to improve the quality standard of its suppliers.
First, it participates in the equity of its key suppliers, many of which are located in the same
premises as Maruti's main plant, to strengthen its influence and control over them, and
thereby to ensure their quality and efficient operation. Second, as discussed earlier, along
with Suzuki, it has actively sought a match-making arrangement between over 40 Maruti
suppliers and Suzuki suppliers in Japan, thus facilitating knowledge transfer to and
improving quality standards at Indian suppliers. Third, in addition to requiring suppliers to
obtain ISO certificates, Maruti instituted its own system of self-certification, a common
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practice among Japanese auto assemblers: only certified suppliers can remain in business
with Maruti, and their products can be directly placed on the assembly line without on-site
inspection at Maruti." Fourth, the firm developed a system of vendor rating and auditing,
which constantly reminds its suppliers of the need to improve their performance. Each
year, Maruti organizes several conventions inviting all suppliers, where it awards the best
suppliers a prize to further motivate suppliers to improve their performance and provides
training on quality control and ISO certification. Finally, Maruti provides its suppliers with
gauges and calibrators for setting and enforcing Maruti's quality standards on their
products. With these measures, as in the case of Japanese automobile assemblers
(Nishiguchi 1994), Maruti has developed an institutionalized mechanism to achieve the goal
of continuous improvement within its supply chain.
Along with other dynamic changes that occurred in Telco's supplier relations, in
1997, like Maruti, Telco also introduced a system of self-certification, which means an
automatic acceptance of parts delivered by certified suppliers to be directly placed on the
assembly line without on-site inspection at Telco.7 6 This is Telco's own certification
system, though it follows a similar format to the ISO certification. It requires suppliers to
install certain standardized procedures, including in-firm training, while strengthening the
ties between Telco and its suppliers as they share more and more common codified
knowledge. Of 1,200 Telco (Pune) suppliers, 225 were self-certified by 1997. This
institutionalized mechanism for improving quality created in the supply chain has led
suppliers to undertake various organizational reforms, including the promotion of quality-
enhancing training activities, as discussed earlier.7 7
" Fujimoto (1997) notes that this is a key feature of the Japanese supplier relations linking suppliers
closely to the production systems, including quality control, at assemblers. This practice is an extension of
a lean production practice focusing more on quality control within the production processes than on
inspection.
76 Interview with T 11, in April 1997.
77 For example, T3, T8, T10, T14, T15, T19, T20 instituted a new training program to become eligible
for self-certified suppliers.
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Moreover, as at U.S. auto firms, Telco has recently started requiring its suppliers,
particularly those which cater to all three plants, to acquire the QS9000, to achieve two
goals: 1) to improve supplier quality to enhance the quality of components to the global
standard; and 2) to reduce wastes and thus reduce production costs. A Telco manager
found that while many Telco suppliers had already acquired ISO9000, it brought about little
real change in the area of production control. But QS9000 requires firms to make a full
commitment to production control. A Telco supplier noted, "previously, we had our own
system of quality control, but this changed a few years ago. We now have to conform to
QS9000."78 Other firms noted: "The acceptable rejection rate used to be 1% at the
customer (Telco) end. But, Telco now wants 0%,"7' and "We were basically given two
choices: either to meet the customers' standards or close down."80 Again, the introduction
of such a certification scheme has served as an effective institutional mechanism to enforce
quality improvement, which has in turn induced organizational changes at suppliers.
In addition, like Maruti, Telco conducts a quality audit once a year, to check all
aspects of operations at suppliers. The results of this audit become one basis of "vendor
rating," which determines their decisions on long-term contractual relations. In fact, these
quality improvement efforts resulted in a significant reduction in rejection rates (e.g., down
to 99.55 ppm in the case of Telco), thus improving productivity at assembly firms.
Indeed, it is this acute sense of pressure to improve the quality of their products and
production processes that has motivated supplier firms to upgrade the skills of their
workers. In this process of institutionalization the code of behavior expected of suppliers
through such certification schemes and other procedures, behavioral and cognitive skills
have become more important even at the level of suppliers. At the same time, the shift in
focus of the supplier management on the part of customers from inspection of products to
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the control of production processes has made it critical for suppliers to acquire managerial
skills, as we have seen in the previous sections.
As illustrated above, with these quality enforcement mechanisms in place, the
supply chains of Maruti and Telco are no longer just contractual relationships but actually
involve the diffusion of norms, standards, and values, as well as the transfer of technical
knowledge and skills, in addition to what they are transacting. Organizational learning at
suppliers induced through such institutionalized enforcement mechanisms differs
considerably from the "opportunistic behaviors" of firms predicted by the transaction cost
theorists (Williamson 1975).
The nature of inter-firm linkages that Maruti and Telco have developed with their
suppliers also differs from the embeddedness argument (Granovetter 1985) that the patterns
of firms' behaviors are embedded in the prevailing structures of social relations between
firms. Indeed, neither the embeddedness argument nor the cultural argument (Dore 1973)
can successfully explain the close supplier relations that Maruti has created and the dramatic
changes that have occurred in Telco's supplier relations, both fairly unconventional within
the prevailing social relations. Rather, various forms of institutional arrangements,
particularly for quality improvement, built into the supply chains have led the firms to
develop reciprocal relationships with their suppliers: Trust was acquired through the latter's
adherence to a set of strict standards and requirements, rather than embedded in existing
networks of personal relations.
4.5.4 Spillover
Inter-firm spillover of embodied knowledge and skills may take various forms,
including 1) former employees of vehicle manufacturers becoming independent suppliers;
2) vehicle manufacturers and suppliers sharing employees between them; and 3) workers
formerly trained at vehicle manufacturers moving to supplier firms. I consider each aspect
in the cases of Maruti and Telco.
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Maruti observes relatively few cases where former Maruti employees became
independent suppliers; more often, former employees become directors (senior managers)
of Maruti suppliers, though either situation leads to no preferential treatment from Maruti.
However, Maruti more often deputizes employees to its key suppliers. In addition, as
discussed in Chapter 3, Maruti suppliers and authorized service stations often absorb
apprentices trained at Maruti.
Likewise, few Telco employees became independent suppliers. Reflecting the
traditional "arm's length" supplier relations, Telco has not provided any assistance or
preferences to such suppliers run by its former employees. Like Maruti, Telco chooses its
suppliers based only on its evaluation of their performance. Only in 1997 did Telco start
sending its engineers to those suppliers specially selected for its small car project.
In sum, various forms of inter-firm linkages that Maruti and Telco have forged with
their suppliers have clearly facilitated the transfer of knowledge and skills. Such linkages
have been strengthened in the 1990s, as they have developed much closer ties with their
suppliers. The role of inter-firm linkages has therefore become even more important in
developing and transferring knowledge and skills to smaller supplier firms in the process of
transformation in the automobile industry. These linkages have not only increased the
amount of interaction between vehicle manufacturers but also instituted various forms of
quality control mechanisms that have demanded different kinds of knowledge and skills,
and made suppliers realize the need to transform themselves.
A quick observation of second-tier suppliers reveals, however, that they have a very
different type of interactions with their customers, the first-tier suppliers. Even though
many owners of second-tier suppliers previously worked at their customer firms and thus
acquired their skills there, these first-tier suppliers provide little technical assistance to
develop skills at second-tier suppliers. Clearly, the reciprocal relationship that has emerged
between vehicle manufacturers such as Maruti and Telco and their respective suppliers has
not been adopted at the lower level of supply chains. Thus, the unusually high momentum
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created among first-tier suppliers to enact organizational reforms with a focus on quality
has not reached the second level. Unlike those in the Japanese automobile industry,
therefore, production networks among different tiers of firms in India seem not only
shallower but also weaker as a decentralized learning mechanism. In order to fully
understand the changes that have occurred in the entire spectrum of segmented labor
markets like India's, a detailed study of the nature of production and the patterns of inter-
firm coordination at lower levels is necessary, a topic that future research should address.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined changes in the labor market at the level of automotive
component suppliers in the face of dramatic transformations in the Indian automobile
industry, with particular focus on changes in the patterns of skill development for their
workers.
Drawing on a questionnaire survey conducted with 50 first-tier suppliers of Maruti
and Telco, this study found a considerable recent change in labor markets toward
upskilling. Even smaller suppliers have witnessed a general upward shift in the educational
levels attained by workers in different occupational groups and an increased demand for
professional managerial workers. As at vehicle manufacturers, the nature of skills at first-
tier suppliers has changed considerably. While traditional craft skills such as die making
still receive high skill premiums because of their increasing scarcity, even smaller finns
have recently placed greater emphasis on cognitive, particularly problem-solving, skills,
behavioral traits for quality improvement, and computer-related skills. Such changes
reflect increased quality consciousness among suppliers, which in turn reflects a greater
demand from their customers for improved product quality. Suppliers have dramatically
increased their training activities in recent years; many have even hired professional
consultants to conduct training in such areas as quality control and statistical process
control. Contrary to the assumption by the neo-classical human capital theory that firms
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invest in human capital based on their maximization calculation, small suppliers make their
decisions on investing in human capital, motivated instead by informal institutional
constraints embedded in their inter-firm relations with customers. Indeed, significant
organizational changes conducive to skill development have recently occurred at suppliers
of Maruti and Telco, largely induced by pressures and demands from their customers.
Both Maruti and Telco have created various forms of backward linkages that have
facilitated skill development at and transfer to their suppliers. Maruti has developed long-
term stable supplier relations, introducing the Japanese model of supplier relations in India.
Telco, too, recently changed its traditional "arm's length" supplier relations to close stable
ones, due to changes in the institutional environment with intensified competition in the
Indian market. Various forms of institutional arrangements between the vehicle
manufacturers and their suppliers have forced the latter to take up drastic organizational
reforms to improve quality and operational efficiency in the workplace, including a change
in the organization of work. In particular, institutionalized mechanisms created to set and
enforce quality standards have turned the supply chain into a learning chain, based on a
collaborative reciprocal relationship between them. At the same time, frequent interactions
between customers and suppliers through various channels have helped ensure rapid
information flow, thus allowing a fast diffusion of knowledge, skills, and norms among
suppliers. Clearly, inter-firm linkages have played a critical role in facilitating skill
development at suppliers.
While the literature asserts that knowledge and skills in today's production activities
are becoming more and more tacit and firm-specific, this study finds the processes and
modes of skill diffusion becoming increasingly explicit, standardized, and codified,
through various forms of on-going monitoring and evaluations of suppliers' performance.
The institutionalized procedures of quality certification required by the vehicle
manufacturers, such as self-certification, IS09000, and QS9000, have forced suppliers to
adopt similar patterns of organizational changes covering virtually every aspect of their
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production activities, thus resulting in considerable homogenization in the patterns of skill
development among suppliers.
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Appendices
Appendix 4.1: Profile of Sample Suppliers
Type of FDI Year Size of Sales 96 Capacity SSI # of
of Emp. (Rs. iStatuslCustomers
Estab 1996 millions) Utilizati
Ilish. on
Maruti Suppliers _________
M1 Sheet metal no 1963 320 11 70-90% SSI 6(M=20%)
(trying)
M2 Fuel hoses/Fuel injections no 1963 301 9 50-70% mediun 10(M=40%)
M3 Sheet metal parts no 1965 142 38.8E above SS 1(M=100%)
_ _90%
M4 Precision machining no 1967 20 60 92% SSI 10(M=20%)
M5 Cylinder head/die-casting no (G 1967 461 131.7 70-90% mediur 8+(M=55%)
initially)
M6 Precision JV (J) 1968 121 18 50-70% SSI 4(M=60%)
machining/hydraulic
cylinders
M7 Harness no 1969 4( 16 70-90% SS 8(M=10%)
Grommets/Suspension
Bushes
M8 Tubes JV (J) 1969 400 355 70-90% SSI 9(M=1 5%)(two
names
M9 Sheet metal components no 197 275 55( above90% SSI 30(M=80%)
M10 Clutch JV(199 1971 692 52 70-90% large 9(M=30%)
0-93)
M11 Door locking sys./indow no 1972 253 17 above SSI 10(M=50%)
glass regulator (trying) 90%
M12 Sheet metal components no 197 14 7 50-70% SSI 3(M=60%)
M13 Oil chambers/Body no 1975 9 n/ above SSI 1 (M=100%)
components 90%
M14 Machined cast components no 1978 64 32.5 above SSI ( 5(M=25%)
90% firms)
M15 Switch and lock TC (4) 197 18 n/a below 30% SSI ( 6 (M=60%)
aseemblies/Lamp _________________ firms) _____
M16 Sheet metal no 198 5 9. 50-70% SS 5(M=70%)
M17 metal components no 198( 20 7 45-50% SSI 9(M= 50%)
M18 Sheet metal/Fuel pipes no 1981 113 7 80-85% SSI 5(M=23%)
(trying)
M19 Integrated wiring harness JV (J) 198 150 95. n/a n/ n/a
M20 Sheet metal/Plastic no 1981 71 9 70% SSI 10(M=65%)
components
M21 Fiber glass products no 198 17 42 70-90% SSI 4(M=98%)
M22 Precision machining no 198( 8 16 75% SSI 4(M=60%)
M23 Car seats JV(J) 198 361 n/a 30-50% large 1(M=100%)
M24 Plastic moulds no 1992 14 15 50-70% SSI 3(M=60%)
M25 Starters/Alternator/Coolin JV 1984 800 1350 n/a n/a 13(M=65%)
g fan motor
219
Source: The questionaire survey conducted by the author.
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Telco Suppliers_________
T1 Lighting eqpt./air filtration JV5(JJS 194! 1845 686.! above larg I(T=30%)
sys. JK) 90%
T2 Oil seals/rubber no 1966 129 33.2 80% 51 3(T=50%)
components
T3 Aluminum die-casting JV (J) 196J 981 61( 50-70% ja 14(T=15%)
T4 Forging JV (G) 1961 45 350( 65% la 80(T=?)
T5 Sheet metal components no 1961 7 171. 70% SSI 3(T=98%)
T6 Clutch disc assemblies JV(J) 1971 423 n/ 50% mediu 6(T=?)
T7 Gear box components no 197 3 6 80% SSI1 (T=1 00%)
T8 Industrial rubber products no 197 5 13.1 70-75% SSI 5(T=50%)
T9 Plastic moulding no 197 24 9. 70% S T=60%)
T10 Sheet metal no 197 5 2 70% 3(T=99%)
T11 Sheet metal press parts no 198 20( 16 70-90% SSI(til 5(T=75%)
_ _ _ 
_1996)
T12 Suspension/subassemblies no 198 471 15 70-90% larg 4(T=85%)
T13 Rubber components no 198 12 4 65% SSI 15(T=20%)
T14 Oil seals/rubber no 1982 13 4 85% SSI 7(T=15%)
,components -I ____
T15 Rubber components no 1984 113 72 80% SSI I(T=5%)
T16 Sheet metal press parts no 1985 391 n/a 66-70% SSI 2(T=80%)
T17 Aluminum die-casting no 1985 311 3825 40_ 6(T=10%)
T18 Integrated wiring harness JV2 1986 1500 95. 70-90% larg 11(T=10%)
I_ (JJ) I _
T19 Aluminum die-casting no 1987 34 2 60% SSI 6(T=70%)
T20 Springs/Fuel injection JV (J) 1981 13- 117.0 88% 20(T=14%)
T21 Sheet metal components no 1984 2 2 60% SSI 2(T=80%)
T22 Ferrous steel forging no 198 16 7 70-80% SSI 6(T=60%)
T23 Sheet metal press parts no 199 1 1 50-70% SSI1 (T=100%)
T24 Accelerator Pedal no 197 14 54. 70-90% SSI 5(T=5%)
T25 Precision machine no 198 1 4. 70-90% SSI 15(T=30%)
components I___ -J__ I___ I_____ I___ _____
Geographical Distribution: # of Firms % Dist'n Firm Size:
City State Large Medium Small
Faridabad Haryana 77 19.1 12 36 29
New Delhi Delhi 71 17.N 29 22 2C
Gurgaon Haryana 6' 15.N 17 19 27
Chennai Tamil Nadu 2 6. 17 4 7
Mumbai Maharashtra 23 5. 11 4 8
NOIDA* U.P. 16 4. 5 2 9
Pune Maharashtra 16 4. 10 6 0
Bangalore Karnataka 15 3.7 7 7 1
Coimbatore Tamil Nadu 8 2.0 4 3 1
Old Delhi Delhi 7 1.C 3 2 2
Ludhiana Punjab 6 1.C 2 4 0
Ghaziabad U.P. 6 1. 1 2 3
Calcutta West Bengal 5 1.A 4 1 0
Jaipur Rajasthan 4 1. 3 1 0
Pondicherry ________4 1A 2 0 2
Rohtak * Haryana 4 1. 0 2 2
Chandigarh Punjab/Haryana 3 0.7 2 0 1
Madurai Tamil Nadu 3 0.7 3 0 0
Mohali Punjab 3 0.7 1. 1 1
Secunderbad A.P.- 3 0.7 1 2 0
Ahmedabad Gujarat 2 0.5 1 1 0
Goraya Punjab 2 0.5 2 0 0
Nasik Maharashtra 2 0.5 1 1 0
Thane Maharashtra 2 0.A 1 1 0
Kolhapur Maharashtra 2 0.5 2 0 0
Vadodara Gujarat 2 0.5 1 1 0
Other Locations ________27 6.7 12 13 2
Total __ 404 100.C 154 135 11
Source: Maruti Udyog Ltd.
Note: The data are based on Maruti's supplier database as of January 1997.
* refers to firms located in an hour distance from Maruti.
Large: firms with annual sales of more than Rs. 100 million (US$2.82 million).
Medium: firms with annual sales of more than Rs. 20 million (US$ 0.56 million)
but less than Rs. 100 million (US$2.82 million)
Small: firms with annual sales of less than Rs. 20 million (US$ 0.56 million)
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4.2:
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This study examined the conditions under which firms promote skill development
for workers in the face of a rapid integration of developing countries into the global
economy. The case study of the Indian automobile industry presented in the preceding
chapters has shown that in the process of globalization, firms--both foreign-affiliated and
local, and both assemblers and suppliers--, have considerably increased their investment in
developing their workers' skills. At the same time, the patterns of skill development at
both assemblers and suppliers have changed significantly. I argue that even as the Indian
economy has become more globalized under the increasing liberalization of the trade and
industrial regime, paradoxically, an interacting set of local institutional factors still crucially
shapes the patterns of skill development at firms. In particular, inter-firm linkages are
critical in promoting skill development among smaller firms, thus spreading workers'
learning across different segments of the economy. In this study I found that the Indian
government has played an important role in creating the institutional conditions that
promote skill development, and thereby helping the industry grow. This final chapter
recasts the findings of this study to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the
conditions that foster workers' skills in the context of emerging economies, and ends with
some policy implications.
This chapter is organized into three sections. Section 5.1 summarizes the findings
of the study. Section 5.2 places the findings into a theoretical framework. Section 5.3
discusses policy implications for developing countries that aim to promote skill
development in a changing economy.
222
5.1 Workers' Learning under Globalization: Lessons from the Indian
Automobile Industry
Since the liberalization policy was introduced in India in the mid-1980s, and more
intensely implemented in 1991, the Indian automobile industry has experienced remarkable
growth and dynamic transformations with a growing inflow of foreign capital, resulting in
intensified competition within the domestic market. What made it possible for the industry
to achieve such dramatic growth? This study found that both Maruti, a joint venture
between the Indian government and Suzuki, and Telco, a leading local commercial vehicle
manufacturer, significantly contributed to the growth of the industry, and improved export
performance, even before the large inflow of FDI started in the 1990s. In particular,
Maruti, with its remarkable growth in production, sales, and productivity, literally became
the driving force of the growth spurt in the passenger car segment in the 1980s. On the
other hand, unlike many local vehicle manufacturers in developing countries that have
typically weakened their relative market positions in the face of growing dominance by
FDI-related firms, Telco strengthened its market position by diversifying its product range,
and even entered into the passenger car segment in the 1990s.
The rapid process of transformations has also led to a dynamic restructuring of the
industry with the gradual formation of tiers within the industry. As the component industry
grew much faster than the vehicle industry in the 1990s, a growing number of local
component suppliers started forming alliances with foreign component manufacturers. At
the same time, vehicle manufacturers started setting up joint ventures with global suppliers
to strengthen their supplier base. Moreover, Maruti played an important role not only in
developing backward linkages through its own supplier development efforts, but also in
helping change the dominant model of supplier relations in the country, from short-term
"arm's length" relationships to more long-term, close ones, involving reciprocal
interactions with suppliers.
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The detailed case study of these two leading Indian car manufacturers revealed one
key factor which has led them to perform so well: their massive investment in skill
development not only for their own workers but also for their suppliers. Both Maruti and
Telco built elaborate skill development systems into their internal incentive structures,
involving various aspects of internal labor markets, such as recruitment, wages,
promotion, and formal training. Both firms recruit well-educated workers for permanent,
long-term, stable employment. Both firms use high wages and generous benefits, not only
to attract well-educated and highly motivated workers to begin with, but also to keep
motivating them by rewarding their efforts to improve their skills and thereby their
performance. Thus, both firms experience very low labor turnover among production
workers. Indeed, both firms have their own systems of rewarding workers' skills, either
collectively or individually, by linking them with remuneration and promotion structures
(though promotion opportunities are limited for production workers). Maruti, in particular,
developed a productivity-linked incentive scheme to reflect a productivity increase in
workers' pay, leading Maruti production workers to receive the highest wages in the
industry. Also, at Maruti, small wage differentials between production workers and
indirect employees, as well as egalitarian and participatory practices on the shop floor, have
resulted in a high level of employee identification with the company and created incentives
for workers to develop and use their skills to produce more cars and improve their
processes. In addition, both firms have systematic in-firm formal training programs to
foster firm-specific skills in areas carefully linked with each finn's respective strategic
focus. These internal incentive structures have kept motivating workers to learn new skills.
Moreover, both firms have extensively used apprenticeship schemes beyond what
the government legislation required, as mechanisms for recruiting reliable and competent
workers, efficiently deploying workers trained in ready-to-use firm-specific skills,
promoting their organizational learning, and lowering labor costs by paying apprentices
stipends which are only a tiny fraction of regular salaries.
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Further, Maruti has actively promoted overseas training for its employees--
production workers as well as engineers and managers--on a massive scale for an extensive
period. Such overseas training, involving direct exchange between Maruti and Suzuki
employees across all levels, has provided Maruti workers with an opportunity to gain
"hands-on" experience on the Japanese shop floor and learn about new technologies and
production processes. Such training has enabled workers to understand the importance of
ensuring full quality proofing in the production processes, particularly in the areas of
process control, a critical element to improve the quality of products, and thus to acquire
diagnostic and problem-solving skills. Overseas training opportunities have not only
upgraded the skills of Maruti workers but have also served as an incentive to motivate them
to perform well, as only good performers are selected for overseas training.
In addition, Maruti introduced a Japanese-style human resources management
policy, with more participatory and egalitarian gestures, which created a sense of
confidence and trust among workers. Both management and labor have been clear that
Maruti is totally unconventional among existing Indian firms, and have seen Maruti as a
"model for change," not only in the automobile industry but also in Indian industry as a
whole. This in turn has generated great pride and momentum for learning new skills
among Maruti employees. Maruti's remarkable success, in not only achieving soaring
growth but also adopting the new models of work organization, management, and
production processes, has brought it much attention at the national level, inducing industry-
wide and, in fact, economy-wide learning.
What has motivated these firms to create such internal incentive structures to
promote their workers' learning? This study revealed that the interplay of a set of local
institutional factors both inside and outside the firms has played a critical role in motivating
firms to develop their workers' skills. First, the legal obligation to train apprentices has
greatly influenced the patterns of in-firm skill development, while effectively setting the
educational level of entry-level production workers at one year of in-firm apprenticeship
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training plus two years of post-secondary vocational education. The apprenticeship
program has effectively linked government-sponsored industrial training with in-firm on-
the-job training, which in turn helps supply a high quality workforce for long-term
employment. At both Maruti and Telco, the apprenticeship scheme has also served as a
buffer as the firms adjusted to changes in demand for production labor; as a screening
device to recruit the best-performing workers for long-term employment; and as a source of
knowledge and skill spillover to their suppliers and service stations. This scheme also
helped both firms to lower the costs of searching for labor with the right kind of skills and
knowledge and to develop firm-specific skills at relatively low costs. Thus, both firms
have actually taken advantage of the institutional constraints created by the apprenticeship
policy.
Second, the Indian labor market is very rigid: the labor policy makes it difficult for
employers to fire workers, which has made firms very prudent about hiring. This rigidity
in the external labor market has actually motivated firms to conduct long periods of initial
in-firm training for new entrants so as to recruit the best-performing workers for long-term
employment from a large pool. This has in turn made stable employment practices viable,
while in effect reducing the cost of retraining.
Third, as the Indian labor market is highly segmented, an extensive use of
subcontracting by the vehicle manufacturers, due partly to the government's local content
requirement, has actually enabled them to pay high wages to their production workers,
while taking advantage of low wages among their subcontractors. Fourth, Maruti's
productivity-linked high wage policy emerged partly because the firm was a state-owned
enterprise until 1992 and its wage setting was governed by the government salary rules for
Indian civil servants, which prevented the firm from increasing wages to attract better-
qualified workers.
Fifth, Maruti has actively promoted overseas training for its workers in Suzuki,
Japan, institutionalizing a tripartite institutional arrangement among Maruti, Suzuki, and
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intermediary training organizations in Japan to facilitate knowledge and skill transfer
between the two firms. A carefully organized cost sharing among the three institutions has
made such overseas training affordable and greatly benefited all the parties involved:
Maruti, Maruti workers, and Suzuki. Finally, the Indian government ensured the inclusion
of such overseas training as part of the initial technological transfer agreements between
Maruti and Suzuki, when the Maruti project started. All these factors suggest the existence
of robust local and cross-country institutional conditions under which practices related to
skill development have evolved in these firms.
However, this study also found considerable differences in the patterns of skill
development between Maruti and Telco, which require further explanation beyond the
existence of local institutional frameworks. First, they have made different kinds of
institutional arrangements for skill development. At Maruti, various measures link
workers' collective performance with its reward system and on-the-job training systems,
whereas Telco's internal labor markets focus on upgrading workers' individual trade skills
to promote multi-skilling. Second, they have different occupational mix: Maruti has a
higher proportion of production workers than Telco, resulting in a flatter occupational
structure, reflecting its focus on improving its production capabilities. By contrast, Telco
has a higher proportion of engineers, reflecting its focus on technological deepening,
particularly in terms of developing design capabilities. Indeed, Telco's innovative skill
development schemes for enhancing individual trade skills have enabled the firm to develop
the dedicated workforce it needed to continue its tradition of "self-learning" technological
development, while integrated into a closely linked feedback system among R&D,
engineering, production, and training.
Third, with respect to the content of training, Maruti's training is concerned with
the standardization of procedures related to line management, and has focused on diffusing
values and norms about operational and quality standards, while Telco, more concerned
with design specifications and protocols, has focused on enhancing individual skills.
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Indeed, at Maruti, in-firm training stresses the diffusion and penetration of both technical
standards and behavioral norms involving a considerable degree of standardization and
formalization of rules and procedures with respect to parameters, temperatures, speed, and
quality, for each line.
Finally, the two firms' learning reflects their very different amounts of exposure to
foreign practices. Unlike Telco, Maruti's in-firm learning involves a direct inter-firm
transfer of knowledge and skills through individual exposure, concrete instruction, and on-
the-job training at the work site among employees at various levels, allowing Maruti
employees to quickly disseminate their knowledge and skills. Overseas training on a
massive scale, along with its flatter hierarchical structure and more participatory
management, has facilitated fast information flows within the firm and between Maruti and
Suzuki.
These findings suggest that Maruti and Telco follow different models of skill
development: one is exposure-based, and the other experience-based. These different
models of skill development also reflect a very different mechanism of intra-firm diffusion
and transfer of knowledge and skills in these firms: Maruti focuses on externalizing its
internal labor markets beyond the firm's boundary, while Telco focuses on internalizing its
bought-out foreign technologies, reflecting its long tradition of self-learning. At Telco,
intra-firm diffusion requires the indirect transmission of the experience of a limited number
of senior managers and engineers, which necessarily involves the codification of their
knowledge and skills.
Like many other auto manufacturers across different countries, both Maruti and
Telco introduced and incorporated some elements of the "lean" production techniques such
as TQM, QC circles and kaizen into their training activities in the early 1990s. Such
adoption has led the firms to change some aspects of their work organization, and then to
change some of the training content from technical toward more behavioral and attitudinal,
and to considerably increase the amount of training, particularly at Telco. Thus, the focus
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of in-firm training has shifted in recent years, from diffusing knowledge and skills to
infusing norms and values to be shared across different parts of the organization.
Also, the direction of diffusion of knowledge and skills within each firm differs: in
Maruti it is horizontal, and in Telco vertical. These differences, in turn, reflect their
orientations in technological development: Maruti focuses on production capabilities and
Telco on innovation capabilities, hence requiring different types of skills and developing
different modes of training. In other words, each firm's distinctive strategy for
technological development also influences its patterns of skill development.
The rapid growth of the Indian automobile industry since the mid-1980s has
brought about dynamic transformations in the auto component sector, which has grown
even faster than the vehicle sector; increasing alliances with foreign component
manufacturers; a growing emergence of pyramidal structures (though shallower than those
in the U.S. and Japan); and closer supplier relations. Maruti has played an important role
in transforming the component industry by forging much closer supplier relations.
In this process of restructuring, the component industry has witnessed considerable
changes in the characteristics of workers in supplier firms, with a general trend of
upskilling. The patterns of skill acquisition and development have also changed
considerably among suppliers: higher educational qualifications demanded from job
entrants for production jobs; greater demand for well-educated managerial workers; an
increasing tendency toward longer-term employment and a decrease in casual workers; and
the increasing introduction of formal training programs at suppliers. Moreover, many
suppliers have transformed themselves by adopting some elements of the "lean" production
techniques, with emphasis on quality improvement. All these suggest that Indian auto
component suppliers have increasingly strengthened their efforts to promote skill
development for their workers.
What has made auto component suppliers so eager to develop their workers' skills
in the 1990s? This study found that for suppliers to both Maruti and Telco, pressures and
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guidance from their customers have been the largest motivating factors. In fact, the results
of my questionnaire survey revealed that even the content of training closely reflects their
respective customers' orientation in skill development, considerably influencing the way
training takes place at suppliers: For Maruti, emphasis is on developing production
capabilities, and for Telco, on developing innovation capabilities. Moreover, many
suppliers have increasingly set up measures to improve quality in their plants.
Indeed, Maruti has instituted a variety of mechanisms to foster skills in its
suppliers. First, Maruti's four Vendor Development Departments frequently send
engineers to its suppliers, and regularly invite suppliers to its own plant. Second, Maruti
disseminates various types of information among its suppliers through its close interactions
with and training for suppliers, in such areas as product quality, plant layouts, and
housekeeping, with great emphasis on improving quality and reducing rejections. Third, it
enforces strict quality standards through various measures such as vendor rating and
auditing to which suppliers must adhere to retain their business with Maruti. Such
influence is particularly strong over Maruti's key suppliers, some of which are dedicated to
and in joint venture with Maruti, and located in the same complex as Maruti's main plant.
Telco also started these practices in 1997, when it changed its supplier relations drastically,
from the traditional "arm's length" into much closer ones, and created a new unit specially
designed to develop selected suppliers through intensive interactions to transfer knowledge
and skills to them. All these have led to unusually high momentum in the Indian
automobile industry for intra-firm as well as inter-firm learning, resulting in industry-wide
learning. This study found that in the 1990s, with the intensification of domestic
competition due to the entry of many FDI firms, inter-firm linkages became strengthened as
a mechanism for developing and transferring knowledge and skills to suppliers.
What has shaped the patterns of skill development at these firms? This study finds
that the interplay of various institutional forces, such as historical imperatives, national
labor and training policies, and institutional alliances with the government, foreign firms,
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and training institutions, shapes the patterns. First, the peculiar historical conditions under
which firms have to operate necessarily shape the patterns of skill development at the firm
level. Under the inward-looking trade regime from the mid-1960s through the 1980s,
which restricted the import of raw material, equipment, and components, and the purchase
of foreign technologies, Telco needed to develop specific strategies regarding product
development, production, and organizational capability development. These, in turn,
determined the patterns of skill development. Telco had to internally develop its capabilities
in design, R&D, manufacturing of engineering equipment and tools, and large tool rooms.
Even amidst recent rapid changes in the institutional environment, the pattern of skill
development in Telco has remained largely unchanged, with only incremental changes such
as recent additions to the subjects in training.
Second, the government has played a critical role in shaping the pattern of skill
development in both Maruti and Telco, by creating national institutional frameworks in
terms of setting labor policy and training policy, and by getting more directly involved in
the management of Maruti. The protective labor policy, which prevented large firms from
firing workers, constrained the firms in recruiting and deploying labor, and created
rigidities in the external labor markets. However, as discussed earlier, the firms actually
turned these institutional constraints into an advantage to develop their own internal
incentive structures, including those to motivate and reward workers' skill development.
The government also directly intervened in the governance and management of Maruti, by
insisting on including training as part of its joint-venture agreement with Suzuki. Maruti's
governance structure, which maintains a fine balance between the government and Suzuki,
has enabled the government to promote organizational change on its own terms.
Finally, the cases of Maruti and Telco show that they not only made good use of
national institutional frameworks, but also positively built institutional alliances with other
organizations, such as local industrial training institutes, intermediary training
organizations, joint-venture partners, and the supply chain and service networks. For
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instance, Maruti's skill development system is largely shaped by its institutional alliances
with its joint venture partner and training intermediaries, thus externalizing its internal labor
markets beyond the boundary of the firm through its extensive overseas training.
I argue that a series of government policies, particularly those concerning local
content, foreign investment, and reservation of many components to be produced by the
small-scale industries (SSI) sector, have effectively created conditions under which car
assemblers, such as Maruti and Telco, were motivated to promote skill development at
suppliers. Moreover, the government played a critical role in developing Maruti itself,
which has not only led the growth of the Indian automobile industry but also served as a
catalyst for promoting industry-wide learning.
5.2 Skill Development in the Context of Emerging Economies: A
Conceptual Framework
The experiences of Maruti and Telco have demonstrated the critical role of training
in knowledge transfer and skill development. The findings of this study offer a conceptual
framework for understanding the conditions that promote skill development and transfer in
emerging economies undergoing industrialization.
As national economies integrate into a global economy that is increasingly becoming
"knowledge-based," with ever-accelerating technological change and innovations, it has
become more important than ever for firms, and nations, to acquire, accumulate, and
diffuse knowledge and skills, in order to become and remain competitive. At the same
time, firms, both foreign and local, need to cut production costs, including labor costs, to
compete in the global market. Faced with such paradoxical challenges, firms need to
promote skill development while reducing production costs.
As the process of industrialization in developing countries largely involves learning
in terms of borrowing technology from industrially advanced countries (Amsden 1989),
developing countries need to develop ways to induce and facilitate learning at various
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levels: in-firm, industry-wide, and economy-wide. As technological change forces firms to
move into more complex products, the nature of skills required in production processes
also changes. As the knowledge and skills required for today's production activities are
becoming more and more tacit, hard to obtain, and costly to transfer between firms, and
thus more industry-specific, or even firm-specific, the firm's role as a defacto institution
for skill development becomes more important than ever to improve productivity and gain
competitiveness. Thus, to compete in the global market, firms in emerging economies need
to develop mechanisms inside the firm while involving other outside institutions in order to
learn specific types of new knowledge and skills from more advanced countries and diffuse
them quickly enough within the organization.
Training, whether on-the-job or off-the-job, is an institutionalized form of
knowledge and skill transfer. In particular, in-firm training is a means of acquiring and
enhancing firm-level learning, through the intra-firm diffusion of knowledge and skills;
what the organization has learned translates into learning by members of the organization,
and they share acquired knowledge in different parts of the organization. This also
involves the process of socialization (Adler 1993), through which certain norms and values
are infused within the organization. Training changes the very way workers do their jobs,
by changing values and behavioral norms, standardizing procedures, thoroughly diffusing
quality awareness, and instilling "forward-looking visions." Thus, training is an integral
part of the process innovation that firms promote in creating "competitive assets" (Amsden
1995).
In-firm training thus has three distinctive but interrelated components: 1) the
transfer and diffusion of knowledge and skills within the organization; 2) the embodiment
of knowledge by individuals; and 3) the institutionalization of learning mechanisms.
Hence, strengthening each of these components would accelerate workers' individual
learning as well as the firm's organizational learning. As a large part of in-firm learning
occurs through on-the-job training, these three components involve not only formal training
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programs but also much larger spheres of organizational structures, including internal labor
markets and the organization of work. Thus, firms in emerging economies that want to
foster their workers' skills need to find ways to strengthen these three components.
However, in general, firms and workers in emerging economies face various
institutional constraints that influence the mode, contents, and extent of in-firm training.
First, as the patterns of skill development are shaped over a long period of time involving
various parts of organizational structures, they are greatly influenced by historical
imperatives, i.e., peculiar historical conditions under which the firm needed to operate and
promote its technological development. Second, the patterns of skill development are
embedded in the national institutional framework, including the nature of local labor market
institutions and conditions of the external labor markets that are generally characterized by
abundant surplus labor and are largely segmented.
Third, as the contents of knowledge and skills that local firms want to bring from
abroad tend to be based on more advanced technologies than those available locally, they
may not be an extension of existing bodies of knowledge and skills that have already been
accumulated in the firms. Thus, knowledge and skill transfer would simultaneously
require the intra-firm infusion of norms and values that would facilitate the transfer, as it
would help the firm bring about attitudinal and behavioral changes among employees and
enhance their commitment to improving performance, and thereby productivity. Until
workers know clearly what the acquisition of such new knowledge and skills entails and
how they benefit the firm and/or workers, they may not be motivated to learn. In that
event, the diffusion of new knowledge and skills may require more drastic acceptance and
adaptation on the part of workers, which would in turn require changes in their norms and
values.
Fourth, as locally produced products are commonly of poor quality in developing
countries, in-firm training at local firms inevitably must focus on quality control and
improvement, particularly through production line management. But changes in product
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quality actually involve every aspect of production activities, as well as changes in values
and attitudes on the part of employees. As the nature of the required skills shifts from
simple repetitive work to work involving more of workers' problem-solving capabilities,
they must make judgments regarding problems they encounter and detect any irregularities.
Firms then must shift their mode of skill development, toward a more organized and more
knowledge-imparting one, to make their workers attentive to such problems.
Finally, to compete in the global market, firms, both foreign and local, need to
reduce production costs, often by increasing local contents because relying on imported
components is too costly. However, in developing countries, smaller local supplier firms
generally have much more limited financial, technological, and managerial capabilities than
large firms do. For example, as few local suppliers have their own design capabilities,
they must rely on drawings provided by their customers. Thus, to promote localization
through the development of backward linkages, large firms must improve the skills of
smaller component suppliers. On the other hand, the latter need to meet their customers'
quality standards, to retain business with their customers.
Thus, the structural constraints discussed above greatly determine the nature of in-
firm skill development, as they influence firms' decisions regarding their investment in skill
development--not only the amount of investment, but also the mode, extent, and content of
training. This view is contrary to the assumption of the dominant neo-classical human
capital theory that firms make decisions essentially by calculating the price of labor in the
external labor markets, expected productivity increases, and the likelihood of turnover of
trained workers (Becker 1993[1964]). Such structural constraints are also more complex
and contextual than the explanations provided by the market failure theorists that the
markets, for both labor and products, are imperfect in developing countries. On the other
hand, it also considerably departs from the model of skill development developed by the
internal labor market theorists which focuses on internal rule-bound mechanisms regarding
the allocation and pricing of labor, i.e., the internal labor markets, as a determinant of
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training (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Koike and Inoki 1990). The structural constraints
discussed above concern factors that exist largely beyond the firm's organizational
hierarchies.
Indeed, the experiences of Maruti and Telco as well as their suppliers presented in
this study suggest an alternative model of in-firm skill development, one that is based on
"inter-firm linkages," rather than "markets" (of labor) as in the human capital model, or
"hierarchies" as in the internal labor market model. This alternative model postulates that
firms make decisions on training for workers, largely determined by institutional
conditions, particularly through inter-firm linkages, under which firms can overcome
structural constraints discussed above.
Analytically, this model significantly differs from the human capital model of skill
development in three ways. First, while the human capital model focuses almost
exclusively on the supply side of skills (e.g., the price and availability of labor trained in
skills, either general or specific, in external labor markets and the likelihood of turnover) in
its theoretical framework (Becker 1993[1964]), the alternative model looks into factors that
are on the demand side of skill development. Second, while the human capital theory
model of skill development focuses mainly on a single firm's calculations of costs and
returns as a determinant of the extent of training, the alternative "linkage" model regards
both the costs and the returns of training as capable of being shared among a group of
networked firms. Finally, while the human capital theory almost entirely disconnects a
firm's decisions on training from those on production, the "linkage" model sees it as part of
the firm's strategic decisions on its production activities, including technological
development (see Figure 5.1 for schematic illustrations of difference between these
models).
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igure 5.1 Schematic Illustrations of Three Models of Skill Development
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The alternative model also analytically differs from the internal labor market model.
First, as in the human capital model, the internal labor markets model also focuses largely
on the supply side of skills, overlooking the demand side conditions for skill formation.
Second, as in the human capital model, the internal labor markets model also looks at a
single firm as a unit of skill development. As in the internal labor markets model, firms in
the "linkage" model proposed here need to create internal incentive structures by rewarding
workers for acquiring new knowledge and skills. But, the "linkage" model considers that
internal incentive structures can actually be externalized beyond the boundary of a single
firm to a group of firms that form institutional alliances, which makes it easier to
institutionalize cross-country training and facilitate this direct exchange of employees.
Finally, while the internal labor markets model is mainly applicable to large firms with
well-established bureaucratic structures, the model's utility is limited in analyzing
conditions for skill development in small firms. The "inter-firm linkage" model allows us
to see how the nature of inter-firm relations affects the pattern of skill development for
workers in small firms by creating demand for particular types of skills (see Figure 5.1).
Inter-country (horizontal) inter-firm linkages facilitate the transfer and diffusion of
knowledge and skills acquired from abroad through two mechanisms: direct interactions
between firms and between workers and the institutionalization of learning mechanisms
inside the firm. In this model of skill development, training serves as a means to expose
workers to more advanced production processes and procedures, thus allowing quick
diffusion of knowledge and skills through direct interactions between workers in local and
foreign firms and between workers across different parts of the organization. Constant
exposure to foreign practices on the shop floor by all levels of employees would speed up
the process of diffusing new ideas, knowledge, and skills across all levels of organizational
hierarchies. Actual observations and experiences would effectively make workers
understand the nature of advanced technologies and how they work, and the new standards
expected of them. In this model, two other factors facilitate the rapid transfer and diffusion
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of knowledge and skills: 1) a relatively flat organizational structure; and 2) standardization
of production procedures and training contents. These factors help the transfer of
knowledge and skills to occur horizontally between and within the firms.
Clearly, as this study demonstrates, the development of institutional alliances, either
local or foreign, greatly facilitates the process of knowledge and skill transfer. In the
process of globalization, FDI is widely believed to facilitate knowledge and skill transfer to
and accumulation in developing countries (Lall 1985a, Koike and Inoki 1990, de Mello
1997, OECD 1998). As this study showed, however, it is not the mere presence of FDI
that promotes skill development at local firms in emerging economies. Rather, certain
institutional conditions are necessary to forge such institutional alliances and make foreign
firms commit to transferring knowledge and skills to local firms. Such conditions include:
the imposition of skill transfer as part of technology transfer agreements; institutional
arrangements to reduce the costs incurred in transferring knowledge and skills, including
cross-country training; and the willingness by both local management and workers to adopt
new forms of skill development. As this study found, intermediary training organizations
can play a very important role in facilitating the development of such cross-border
institutional alliances, by instituting inter-firm arrangements to promote such knowledge
and skill transfer. These institutional alliances make the direct exchange of employees
between two firms easier, less costly, safer in terms of information leakage, and
administratively less cumbersome. As I discuss in the next section, the governments of
emerging economies can play an important role in building such institutional alliances.
Moreover, organizational innovations such as participatory management and flatter
organizational structures--flat occupational hierarchies as well as flat reward structures--
facilitate fast diffusion of knowledge and skills across different parts of the organizations in
various ways. First, they accelerate information flows between managers and workers,
thus speeding up the processes of transfer and diffusion of knowledge and skills, which in
turn expedites the process of collective learning throughout the organization. Indeed, the
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less time a firm spends on diffusing information and knowledge, the more it can improve
its productivity. Second, the flatter organizational structure helps motivate workers to learn
new skills by closely linking the interests of individual workers with those of management,
and by enhancing workers' receptivity about the knowledge and skills to be learned.
Third, the flat structure makes it easier to organize formal training programs for employees
across different occupational categories, thus leading to a greater stock of accumulated
knowledge and skills within the firm.
Further, training also serves as a mechanism for knowledge dissemination.
Although the knowledge required on the contemporary shop floor is becoming more and
more tacit, paradoxically, in-firm training actually requires a more and more codified
method, involving considerable standardization of rules and procedures, to enable workers
to share the tacit knowledge they have accumulated within the firm. Thus, in-firm training
involves the internalization of knowledge throughout the organization. The standardization
of production processes and procedures helps codify the knowledge and skills required in
the production processes and facilitate their thorough diffusion across different corners of
the organization. It would thus help attain the expected quality required of workers as well
as develop diagnostic and problem-solving skills to handle substandard parts. Also, as I
argue below, such standardization also greatly facilitates the inter-firm transfer of
knowledge and skills through the supply chain.
Another important element of this "linkage" model of skill development, particularly
relevant for emerging economies, is its focus on vertical inter-firm linkages as a mechanism
to extend the learning processes to a group of vertically networked firms through the
supply chain. I argue that the creation of backward linkages by leading firms plays a
critical role in developing such institutional mechanisms as learning chains to foster skill
development, even for workers at small firms, and thus promote the accumulation of
knowledge and skills in the economy at large. Such vertical inter-firm linkages effectively
promote skill development at supplier firms in at least four ways: 1) as employees in
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various occupational categories interact directly between leading firms and small firms; 2)
as information is disseminated through manuals, conventions, and training programs for
employees of suppliers; 3) as quality certification and auditing set and enforce quality
standards, which creates demand for skill training at suppliers; and 4) as suppliers absorb
engineers, workers, and apprentices with ready-to-use knowledge and skills, creating
learning spillovers.
In-firm training that extends beyond the employees of a firm to promote the sharing
of knowledge and skills with its suppliers and service dealers and spillovers to them greatly
benefits large firms that invest in in-firm training. Although the human capital theorists
assume that firms would have no incentive to invest in training if trainees cannot be retained
afterwards, the firms can actually benefit from such training, if their supply chains absorb
the trainees. Once again, the externalization of internal labor markets to the level of a group
of vertically networked firms in the supply chain helps institutionalize the learning
mechanism. Thus, the creation of such inter-firm linkages is effective for promoting skill
development in emerging economies.
5.3 Policy Implications: The Role of Governments in Fostering Skill
Development
The findings of this study, and the conceptual framework developed above, offer
some important implications for public policy in fostering skill development for workers in
emerging economies. In this final section I explore a set of policies that can promote in-
firm skill development. Challenging the currently popular policy prescriptions, particularly
those advocated by the World Bank (Middleton et al., 1993, World Bank 1995), that labor
markets should be liberalized to increase wage flexibility and labor mobility, I argue that to
promote skill development in emerging economies, it is important to internalize labor
markets, and create institutional incentive mechanisms both inside and outside the firm.
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Contrary to the claim by the human capital theorists that government intervention in
labor markets distorts the operation of labor markets and negatively affects incentives for
individuals and enterprises to invest in skill development (Becker 1993[1964],
Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985, Middleton et al. 1993), I argue that the government
can actually play a very important role in setting various institutional conditions to develop
and stimulate incentive mechanisms for firms to invest in in-firm training. The case of the
Indian automobile industry has shown that precisely because of various institutional
constraints, firms were motivated to promote training not only for their own workers but
also for workers at their suppliers. The evidence presented in this study, that the Indian
government has played a positive role in promoting skill development, is somewhat
surprising, given its generally negative reputation in the literature as corrupt, inefficient,
and bureaucratic (Krueger 1974, Lal 1985, Kohli 1987, Lall 1987).
While a large body of recent literature regards FDI as a driver of economic growth
and an important instrument for upgrading local skills, FDI does not automatically induce
the process of fostering skill development at local finns. Certain institutional conditions
must be established through various policy measures in order to involve foreign partners as
well as foreign training institutions in local skill development and transfer.
The findings of this study suggest several ways in which governments in emerging
economies can foster skill development, directly or indirectly, other than the conventional
model of government-run vocational schools. Indeed, the conventional policy measures
for promoting skill development, based on the dominant human capital theory, have almost
entirely focused on the supply side of skill formation, i.e., the development of skilled labor
through vocational training, without considering how to generate demands for skills and
how to link training with emerging skill demands (see Middleton et. al. 1993 for review).
Thus, policy debates have so far centered on whether training should be provided before or
after employment and who should finance such training.
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But this study has found that, as in-firm training involves large spheres of
production processes and organizational structures, a wide range of public policy measures
can help foster skill development, including those that enhance demands for skills and
thereby for skill development. First, the government, through its training policy, can
strengthen institutional alliances between fins and industrial training institutions in
developing firm-based training such as apprenticeship schemes to be implemented at large
firms, which would help the firms train potential workers in firm-specific skills. Such
alliances with close interactions between firms and industrial training institutions would
make in-firm training more flexible, more responsive to changes in skill demand, and less
costly than vocational schools. They would also make the deployment of labor more
efficient, more stable, and less costly. Moreover, the enforcement of mandatory
apprenticeship schemes in effect sets the educational standard of industrial labor at a high
level, thus ensuring the deployment of high general skills, which would in turn enhance
workers' readiness to learn new finn-specific skills through in-firm training.
Second, through its labor policy, it can create institutional environments in which
firms reward workers for acquiring new knowledge and skills. While India's exit policy
that prevents employers from firing labor may be extreme, some policy measures to
encourage long-term employment, discourage labor turnover, and support firms' high
wage policy, would help strengthen firms' internal labor markets and thereby create internal
incentive structures that promote in-firm skill development. While recent literature argues
for more fluid external labor markets, the micro-level evidence in this study shows that on
the contrary, long-term stable employment practices, high wages, and internal mechanisms
to reward workers' skill improvement, by internalizing labor markets, are a key to
motivating workers to learn new skills and improve their performance.
Third, the government can, through its foreign investment policy, promote the
transfer of knowledge and skills, by forcing foreign firms to do so as a condition for
approving FDI. Explicit agreements between the government and foreign firms on the
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terms of technology transfer involving a direct exchange of many employees in various
categories-not only engineers but also managers and production workers-would clearly
facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills between firms. Fourth, the government can
promote institutional arrangements with overseas training intermediaries such as AOTS,1 to
institutionalize overseas training to allow local workers to gain some instant exposure to
knowledge and skills required in more advanced production processes abroad. Similarly, it
can support local industrial associations, such as CII and ACMA, in disseminating
information and knowledge; this would accelerate the diffusion not only of knowledge
itself but also of norms and values which would help create an institutional environment
that encourages industry-wide learning.
Fifth, through industrial policies such as localization and reservation, it can promote
the development of backward linkages between large firms and local small firms, which
would force the former to promote skill transfer to the latter and create the demand for skill
development at the latter. The imposition of a high level of local content on both foreign
and domestic firms would effectively force them to develop ways to upgrade the skills of
their local suppliers' employees. Reserving certain items to be produced by small firms
would keep large firms from being vertically integrated and force them to use local small
firms as their suppliers. Taken together, these policies would encourage large firms to
improve local suppliers' capabilities and turn their supply chains into a learning chain.
Finally, the government can become more directly involved in creating key firms
that could lead the industry and serve as a "model for change" by introducing new practices
and management styles that are more conducive to the development of workers' skills; this
was the case with Maruti. The successful performance of such key firms can help
legitimate the new practices and enhance their acceptance by other firms, and thereby help
induce industry-wide, and even economy-wide, learning.
1 See Appendix 3.3 in Chapter 3 for a brief description of AOTS activities.
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A question arises, then, as to why some of these policies that the Indian
government had implemented for decades have only recently had significant positive effects
on skill development, and more broadly, on economic development. This study found that
the development of institutions for skill development takes time, and that some policy
measures that may not produce short-term results will still have long-term effects. But,
when a set of institutional conditions are in place as a consequence of these policies, they
allow firms to respond to changes in institutional environments such as the economy's
rapid integration into the global economy and intensifying competition within the industry.
Moreover, a single policy measure alone may not produce desired outcomes. The interplay
of various policy measures creates complementary effects. While the issue of training has
conventionally been approached within the narrowly defined domain of training policy,
with focus on the direct provision and financing of public vocational education, this study
proposes a new way for government to be involved in skill development, with a more
comprehensive and integrated approach to skill development, involving other policy areas
such as labor, foreign investment, and industrial policies.
Drawing on the micro-level evidence of successful experiences of two leading firms
in the Indian automobile industry in developing workers' skills, this study examined the
conditions under which firms foster skill development. In so doing, it showed alternative
models of skill development in the context of emerging economies. For further
generalization of the findings of this study, the experiences of other industries in India as
well as those of the automobile industries in other emerging economies need to be
examined. These are topics for future research.
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